Smart Agro 2025: Between paper value and the liquidity bridge
The annual loss narrowed and the second half was almost flat, but the improvement came mostly from fair-value mechanics. In practice, most of the thesis still sits on two holdings that need to prove funding, commercialization, and realizable value, while the parent relies on a tradable securities portfolio to fund the bridge.
Company Overview
Smart Agro is not an operating agtech company. It is a listed investment vehicle holding a basket of private agtech positions. That is the starting point for the entire read. The partnership qualifies as an investment entity, so its bottom line is driven mainly by fair-value marks on portfolio holdings rather than by a recurring operating profit engine at the parent level. Anyone reading the narrower annual loss as if this were a cleaner operating turnaround is reading the wrong business.
What is working now? Two holdings still carry the thesis. BetterSeeds ends the year at a fair value of NIS 6.463 million, reported revenue of about $1.4 million in 2025 versus about $334 thousand in 2024, and says its budget runs through the end of 2026. SupPlant ends the year at a fair value of NIS 4.46 million after a sharp step-up from mid-year and says revenue grew by more than 50% in 2025. Those are the assets keeping the story alive.
The bottleneck is that this value has still not turned into accessible value for public unitholders. The parent finished the year with only NIS 445 thousand of cash, against NIS 6.313 million of tradable securities and NIS 1.732 million of current liabilities. That means the parent-level bridge exists, but it is funded by tradable securities rather than by portfolio realizations. At the same time, one of the two core holdings, SupPlant, still depends on external financing, and the SAFE conversion that was supposed to happen at year-end had still not been completed by the end of January.
This matters now because of market pricing. At a unit price of 153.2 agorot and 4,189,138 participation units, market cap is roughly NIS 6.4 million. In plain language, the market is giving very little credit to the fair-value layer above liquid assets. That is not necessarily a market mistake. It is a demand for proof.
The Economic Map
| Layer | Amount as of 31.12.2025 | What it really means |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents | NIS 445 thousand | A thin cash cushion at the parent |
| Tradable securities | NIS 6.313 million | This is the real near-term flexibility |
| BetterSeeds | NIS 6.463 million | The largest holding, still unrealized |
| SupPlant | NIS 4.46 million | The main 2025 uplift, but still funding-dependent |
| Other level-3 holdings | NIS 6.831 million | Aruga, Citry, and oShi after meaningful write-downs |
| Equity | NIS 22.909 million | Accounting value after all markdowns |
| Estimated market cap | About NIS 6.418 million | The market is pricing mostly the liquid layer |
This chart is the core of the whole read: the market is valuing Smart Agro at almost the same level as its tradable securities portfolio. Everything else, especially the level-3 portfolio, still needs to prove it is more than an accounting number.
Events and Triggers
Trigger One: SupPlant lifted the mark, but did not close the loop
At the end of December the partnership invested another $150 thousand in SupPlant through a SAFE, on top of the earlier $350 thousand SAFE investment from November 2024. Under the original structure, all SAFE investments were supposed to convert into equity on December 31, 2025, leaving the partnership with about 2.6% of SupPlant. That did not happen. On January 29, 2026 the partnership updated that the SAFE investments had still not converted because SupPlant was considering expanding the SAFE round.
This is the center of gravity. On one side, the SupPlant holding rose to NIS 4.46 million in 2025. On the other side, the conversion mechanism that was supposed to turn that into a cleaner equity position was still unresolved a month later. So 2025 gave the partnership an accounting improvement, not yet a financing resolution.
Trigger Two: Agritask turned from strategic story into inaccessible value
Agritask, already written down to NIS 3.647 million in 2024, merged into CropX in October 2025. But as of the signing date of the annual report, the partnership was still in the process of registering the shares in its own name and had not yet received the CropX shares. The result was a full write-down of the position. That matters because it shows that the gap between a strategic transaction and accessible value is not theoretical. It already happened inside Smart Agro’s own portfolio.
Trigger Three: BetterSeeds chose to freeze a round and lean on revenue
BetterSeeds froze its Series B fundraising process during 2025, citing market conditions and the difficulty Israeli companies face in raising capital. Instead, it shifted focus toward revenue expansion, strategic partnerships, and alternative financing channels. That move has two sides. Positive, because the company is trying to prove commercialization rather than chase capital at any price. Negative, because the freeze itself says the outside market did not validate the price it wanted.
Trigger Four: the partnership extended its investment runway, but also kept the tap open
In December 2025 the unitholders approved the ability to continue making new investments through December 31, 2026. That gives the partnership flexibility to keep supporting existing portfolio companies or add new positions, but it is also a reminder that cash at the parent is not supposed to sit idle. It is expected to keep being used if the portfolio requires more support.
Efficiency, Profitability and Competition
At the partnership level, the improvement is mostly accounting-driven
Net loss fell from NIS 13.25 million in 2024 to NIS 8.85 million in 2025. On first read, that looks like a meaningful improvement. On a more analytical read, the main driver is the smaller fair-value loss, down from NIS 11.649 million to NIS 6.184 million. General and administrative expenses did fall from NIS 2.087 million to NIS 1.816 million, but that is secondary relative to the revaluation swing. Management and incentive fees to the general partner also moved back into expense territory at NIS 1.088 million.
The implication is straightforward: the narrower loss still does not tell a clean story of operating efficiency at the partnership level. It tells a story of less accounting damage.
The second half was almost flat, but because of the mark
Another point that is easy to miss sits in the split by half-year. In the first half of 2025, the partnership recorded a loss of NIS 8.853 million. In the second half it was almost flat, with a profit of only NIS 3 thousand. That sounds dramatic, but the source was a sharp swing in fair-value marks: negative NIS 7.715 million in the first half versus positive NIS 1.531 million in the second half. Management fees and G&A did not disappear. They still consumed NIS 1.607 million in the second half alone.
That is the common mistake. Anyone reading the second half as a genuine operating turn is assigning too much meaning to a model-driven mark.
Where there is real business progress
BetterSeeds is no longer just a concept-stage technology story. It reported about $1.4 million of revenue in 2025 versus about $334 thousand in 2024, and a monthly cash burn of about $200 thousand. These are still numbers from a very early commercialization stage, but this is no longer a deck without commercial motion. The company also stated that its audited 2024 financials did not include a going concern note.
SupPlant is more mixed. On the positive side, its three SaaS products are already sold commercially, it operates in 6 countries and 31 crops, and it claims average yield improvement of 20% together with meaningful water savings. On the other side, one reseller in the UAE accounts for more than 10% of revenue and the company does not disclose the identity, so concentration exists without full transparency. In addition, its audited 2024 financials included an auditor emphasis on the company’s dependence on external financing and continued investor support.
That leads to the key conclusion: the real business progress is happening inside the portfolio companies, not at the partnership level. But until that progress is translated into a financing round, a realization event, or cash that can move up to the public vehicle, it does not solve the shareholder-level value question.
Cash Flow, Debt and Capital Structure
The right cash frame here is all-in cash flexibility
That is the right lens for Smart Agro. It makes little sense to ask how much cash the business generates before growth spending, because there is no self-funding operating business at the parent. The relevant question is how much flexibility remains after the actual uses of cash: ongoing expenses, follow-on investments, and liabilities that built up during the year.
At the bottom line, cash fell from NIS 1.634 million at the start of the year to NIS 445 thousand at year-end. Cash used in operating activity was NIS 1.559 million. Investing activity added NIS 370 thousand, but only because the partnership sold securities on a net basis for NIS 1.732 million and collected NIS 100 thousand of interest, more than offsetting NIS 1.462 million of portfolio investments. In other words, the bridge did not come from portfolio realizations. It came from monetizing liquid securities.
Liquidity exists, but it is financial rather than operating
The partnership does not show meaningful financial debt on the balance sheet, which is an important distinction versus a leveraged holdco. There is no covenant story and no refinancing wall. But that does not mean the capital structure is comfortable. Current liabilities rose to NIS 1.732 million, including NIS 1.366 million payable to the general partner for management fees. At the same time, cash at the parent fell to a very low level.
The real cushion comes from the tradable securities portfolio, largely high-rated corporate bonds, at NIS 6.313 million. Adding cash and tradable securities produces a liquid layer of NIS 6.758 million. After current liabilities, the partnership still has roughly NIS 5.026 million of short-term flexibility. That is not negligible relative to market cap. It also does not answer whether the partnership will prefer to preserve that cushion for overhead and optionality, or use it to keep supporting portfolio companies that have not yet delivered a realization.
The problem is not insolvency. It is value capture
That distinction matters. Smart Agro does not currently look like a partnership choking on debt. It looks like a partnership whose market refuses to pay for level-3 assets until those assets are externally validated, funded, or realized. The shareholder question is therefore not whether the balance sheet survives the next quarter. It is whether the marked portfolio layer can be turned into something the market will actually recognize.
Outlook
Finding one: 2026 looks like a bridge year, not a breakout year. That is true both at the partnership level and inside the two core holdings. There is no evidence here of a large realization sitting around the corner, but there are a few checkpoints that can materially change the read.
Finding two: the portfolio is now more concentrated. BetterSeeds and SupPlant together account for NIS 10.923 million, equal to 61.5% of the portfolio fair value and 44.3% of total assets. That means the question of whether there is or is not real hidden value in Smart Agro has effectively become a question about whether these two holdings can deliver outside validation.
Finding three: 2025 proved that the lower tier of the portfolio is still highly fragile. CropX or Agritask was written down to zero, Nof was written down to zero, and oShi fell to NIS 900 thousand. So the market discount did not appear out of nowhere.
Finding four: one sharp accounting improvement is not enough to clean up the thesis. SupPlant created a NIS 1.922 million revaluation gain in 2025 and almost carried the second half to breakeven. Without a completed financing event and conversion, that is still not outside confirmation.
BetterSeeds: the next test is commercial proof, not technology narrative
BetterSeeds ends the year at a fair value of $2.026 million, unchanged from mid-2025 in dollar terms, so the decline in NIS is foreign-exchange driven rather than a fresh dollar mark-down. That matters because the model did not break. It is also not proof that the mark is right. BetterSeeds is still in early commercialization, with revenue from genetic-editing services and licensing, about $200 thousand of monthly cash burn, and a budget that management says is sufficient through the end of 2026.
The good news is that there is now some actual business substance here: revenue, USDA approval for the commercialization of edited peanuts in the US, and a plan to raise about $10 million at a $40 million valuation by the end of 2026. The less good news is that a larger round was already frozen once because of market conditions, so the partnership did not get a fresh external validation in 2025.
That makes 2026 at BetterSeeds a proof year inside a bridge year. If the company expands revenue, lands meaningful commercial agreements, or closes financing at terms close to its target, the current mark will look conservative. If it needs to raise at weaker terms, the market discount at Smart Agro will look justified.
SupPlant: the value jump looks good, but the conversion that did not happen matters more
The number that explains the second half sits in the valuation section: the value of the SupPlant holding rose from NIS 1.996 million at mid-2025 to NIS 4.46 million at year-end. In dollar terms, that is a move from $565 thousand to $1.398 million. That is not cosmetic.
But this is exactly where discipline is required. SupPlant itself still depends on external financing, its audited 2024 financials highlighted dependence on investor support, and by the end of January 2026 the SAFE that was supposed to convert at year-end had still not converted. So the market is not required to read the higher mark as confirmation. It can just as easily read it as a draft confirmation waiting for a financing event.
To SupPlant’s credit, there is real business substance here as well: three commercial SaaS products, revenue growth above 50% in 2025, activity in 6 countries and 31 crops, and a UAE reseller contributing more than 10% of revenue. Precisely because of that, the 2026 test is simple: can the company close the financing event and clarify the capital structure without eroding the quality of the existing stake, and can growth continue without leaning on terms that are more expensive to current shareholders.
The portfolio: who is left carrying the story
After 2025 the portfolio is clearer, but also harsher. The full write-down of Agritask or CropX, the full write-down of Nof, and the long-zero value at Prospec show that Smart Agro cannot hide behind a large number of positions. In practice, the story is now being carried by BetterSeeds, SupPlant, Aruga, Citry, and oShi, with the first two doing most of the work.
For readers, the implication is now much cleaner: either these two holdings will prove that the market is anchored too tightly to the liquid layer, or the market is reading the risk in level-3 value correctly.
Risks
Risk one: the gap between accounting value and accessible value can stay open for a long time
Partnership equity stands at NIS 22.909 million, while market cap is only about NIS 6.4 million. That gap will not close simply because reported NAV is higher. It closes only if there is an event that proves a holding can be realized, registered, refinanced, or otherwise converted into accessible shareholder value. Agritask or CropX is a sharp reminder that even a strategic transaction can still end in zero accounting value at year-end if the registration path is not complete.
Risk two: financing dependence inside the portfolio
BetterSeeds says its budget is sufficient through the end of 2026, but it also plans to raise about $10 million by then. SupPlant is targeting an additional financing round in the first quarter of 2026, and its audited 2024 accounts explicitly point to dependence on outside support. That means the value of the two key holdings depends not only on technology and revenue, but also on the market’s willingness to keep financing them.
Risk three: parent-level flexibility still depends on the tradable securities portfolio
The partnership is not under debt stress, but it is under proof stress. Its liquid layer is mainly a marketable bond portfolio, while recurring parent expenses still run through the P&L and accrued management fees to the general partner already reached NIS 1.366 million. If heavier follow-on support is needed for the main holdings, the story can quickly return to dilution risk.
Risk four: actionability in the stock is weak
The unit is extremely illiquid. On the latest reported trading day, turnover was only NIS 15 and the price did not move during the day. A unit with this kind of liquidity can remain at a deep discount even if the business thesis improves, simply because the market mechanism for repricing it is limited.
Conclusions
The right reading of Smart Agro at the end of 2025 is not “the loss narrowed.” It is “the accounting damage eased, but the realization test is still ahead.” What supports the thesis today is the combination of two still-meaningful holdings, a liquid layer that can fund a bridge, and a market that continues to demand proof before paying for level-3 value. What blocks a cleaner thesis is that the improvement has still not passed the external financing test and the accessible-value test.
Current thesis: Smart Agro is trading as if most of its value is the liquid layer, while the fair-value layer still needs to prove it can be realized, especially through BetterSeeds and SupPlant.
What changed versus the older understanding is not that the valuation gap disappeared, but that its center shifted. It is no longer enough to say the partnership trades below NAV. After 2025 it is clear that this gap now lives or dies on two holdings, a few near-term funding events, and the parent’s ability to get there without burning too much of its liquid layer.
Counter thesis: the market may simply be right. Most of the NAV layer is still not accessible, SupPlant and BetterSeeds still rely on outside financing, and the deep discount may be a correct risk adjustment rather than a missed opportunity.
What can change the market read over the next few quarters is not another parent-level report on its own, but three outside events: completion of the SupPlant funding and SAFE conversion, a new commercial or financing validation at BetterSeeds, and evidence that the partnership does not need to return to the capital market quickly just to fund the bridge.
Why does this matter? Because Smart Agro is a classic test of the difference between value created inside a fair-value model and value that can actually be captured for public unitholders.
| Metric | Score | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Overall moat strength | 2.5 / 5 | Interesting technology exposure, but not enough realization proof at the listed-vehicle level |
| Overall risk level | 4.0 / 5 | High concentration, external funding dependence, and dominant level-3 marks |
| Value-chain resilience | Medium-low | Two holdings carry the story, while the rest of the portfolio already showed how fragile outcomes can be |
| Strategic clarity | Medium | The direction is visible, but the route from mark to realizable value is still open |
| Short-interest stance | Data not available | No short-interest data is available for this company |
Over the next 2 to 4 quarters, the thesis strengthens if SupPlant closes its financing event without a sharp erosion in terms, if BetterSeeds gets closer to commercial or financing validation, and if the parent preserves most of its liquid cushion. It weakens if a new wave of write-downs appears in secondary holdings, if one of the two core positions is forced into weak financing, or if the partnership starts consuming the securities portfolio just to support itself.
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At the end of 2025 Smart Agro still had a liquid pool of cash and tradable securities, but that same pool already had to carry accrued management fees payable to the general partner, the rest of current liabilities, and the possibility of further portfolio support. That is why r…
BetterSeeds moved in 2025 from being mostly a technology story toward being a first-revenue story, but the carrying mark still rests on an accounting valuation without fresh external price discovery.
SupPlant's year-end mark inside Smart Agro strengthened at the end of 2025, but the SAFE that was supposed to convert that story into a cleaner ownership fact remained open, leaving the market with a stronger accounting number than a fully settled capital-structure outcome.