Yuvalim's Bonds: How Much Project Value Is Actually Available for Debt Service from 2026 to 2030?

The main article already stopped at the right place: the key issue at Yuvalim is not only whether value exists inside the projects, but who can actually reach that value and when. This follow-up isolates only the debt-service layer from 2026 to 2030. That is the right frame for a bond-only listed company. The question here is not how much profit can still be shown on paper, but how much project value can really become company-level cash in time to serve the bond stack.

That means changing the frame. The relevant bridge here is not normalized cash generation before investment, but how much cash remains after the period's actual cash uses. On that test the picture is tighter than the current-balance-sheet headline suggests. At year-end 2025 current assets exceeded current liabilities by only NIS 22.4 million, and inside NIS 1.275 billion of current assets there were only NIS 18.9 million of free cash plus NIS 17.9 million of cash earmarked for interest. At the same time bond principal due in 2026 stood at NIS 251 million, of which NIS 23 million was already repaid on 5 January 2026, leaving a NIS 228 million July 2026 wall by the report approval date.

That is the key alignment point from the start: Yuvalim is not entering 2026 from a place of no value. It is entering 2026 from a place of limited value that has already moved up to company level. Even if one takes Yamim A and Yu-Park projected withdrawable surplus at Yuvalim's share, the rough paper ceiling is about NIS 236.8 million. That is still below 2026 bond principal, before timing, project debt, partners, pledged accounts, and lender discretion are taken into account.

The Current Balance Sheet Looks Fine, Liquidity Less So

The first misleading number at Yuvalim is NIS 1.275 billion of current assets against NIS 1.253 billion of current liabilities. On a quick read that looks almost balanced. On a bondholder read, it is much softer.

The reason is simple: most current assets are not a debt-service wallet. NIS 350.4 million sits in customers and contract receivables, meaning accounting recognition based on project progress running ahead of collection pace. Another NIS 140.3 million sits in short-term maturities of loans to equity-accounted companies. NIS 117.8 million sits in other receivables, and part of the increase there came from loans to Yu-Park partners and a defects-indemnity asset. NIS 595.5 million sits in construction inventory and land rights. Those can all be good assets. They are not a substitute for available cash.

That chart is the core of this continuation. Less than 5% of current assets sit in cash, designated cash, and deposits. Only NIS 18.9 million is free cash. So the working-capital headline does not answer the debt-service question on its own.

The cash-flow statement says the same thing. Operating activity generated about NIS 76.3 million in 2025, but after NIS 50.5 million used in investing and NIS 43.1 million used in financing, total cash, designated cash, and cash equivalents fell by NIS 17.3 million. So there is operating cash generation, but the overall cash cushion still shrank. That is not an accounting weakness. It is simply a reminder that debt service is measured after all cash uses, not before them.

The 2026 Wall: Yu-Park Is Close, Yamim A Is Late

The principal ladder is not smooth. Bond principal due stood at NIS 251 million in 2026, NIS 54.7 million in 2027, NIS 158.8 million in 2028, NIS 59.8 million in 2029, and NIS 119.6 million in 2030. The first clear wall is July 2026.

The closest source that can help in 2026 is Yu-Park. The project received its occupancy certificate and completion certificate on 30 October 2025, and at the 100% project level it carries projected withdrawable surplus of NIS 212.3 million. At Yuvalim's 50% share that is about NIS 106.2 million. That is important, but it does not move straight into Yuvalim's cash box.

Yu-Park first carries project debt. Its cash credit has a final maturity date of 31 July 2026. The condition for releasing surplus is the repayment of all project credit and the cancellation of guarantees, and even then the lender may release surplus at its discretion based on progress and sales. In other words, the project that is closest to turning into cash is also the one whose plumbing runs directly into the same mid-2026 window as the July 2026 bond wall.

That is not the only friction. Yuvalim states that it is meeting Yu-Park's covenants except for project profitability, while also saying no breach indication was received from the lender. In plain terms, the lender has not opened an event, but the project is not sitting on a clean profitability line. On top of that, Yu-Park surplus rights are pledged in favor of Series C holders, so here too the cash first passes through the trust and collateral layer.

Yamim A looks, at first glance, like the second 2026 cushion. At the 100% project level it shows projected withdrawable surplus of NIS 261.2 million, and at Yuvalim's share about NIS 130.6 million. The problem is timing. The company expects withdrawal during the three quarters following the start of occupancy, and occupancy is expected only in the third quarter of 2026. In simpler terms, on the filing's own timetable Yamim A is at best a second-half-2026 and beyond source, not money that is already sitting in front of July 2026.

The debt plumbing matters here as well. Under the Series B trust deed, an irrevocable instruction was given to the financing bank to transfer all surplus of Yuvalim Netanya to the pledged account, and the right to receive those surplus proceeds was pledged as well. So even once the surplus starts moving, it first reaches the debt-service layer and only afterward, if anything remains, becomes freer value.

The practical implication is that 2026 rests mainly on two nearby sources, Yu-Park and Yamim A, but both first travel through banks, trustees, partners, and timing gates. That is much better than having no sources at all. It is still not clean cash.

The Stated Surplus Is Large, but Part of It Is Equity Coming Back

The most confusing line in the project tables is "projected withdrawable surplus." It sounds like fresh value ready to move upward. In practice, in a meaningful part of the cases it also includes equity that has already been invested, and at times even equity that has not yet been invested.

That chart changes the read. In Yamim A, Yuvalim's share of projected withdrawable surplus is about NIS 130.6 million, but only about NIS 88.0 million of that is expected economic profit. About NIS 42.7 million is simply equity already put into the project and expected, if all goes well, to come back. In Yu-Park the picture is similar: roughly NIS 106.2 million of Yuvalim-share surplus, of which about NIS 72.8 million is economic profit and NIS 33.3 million is equity return.

Yamim B makes the gap even clearer. Yuvalim's share of projected withdrawable surplus reaches about NIS 112.4 million, but about NIS 14.7 million of that reflects equity that had not yet even been invested as of 31 December 2025. So part of the "surplus" in Yamim B is not money waiting to come back. It is money that still has to go in before it could come back.

This also leads to another important gap between accounting value and lender-relevant cash. In Yamim A, the expected economic profit presented by the company is about NIS 22.5 million below the December 2025 monitoring report, mainly because of financing costs capitalized before project launch, higher financing expenses, and higher construction costs. In Yamim B, the gap versus the monitoring report is about NIS 5.1 million and comes from additional land and financing costs. In Yu-Park the direction is reversed: the expected economic profit presented by the company is NIS 32.3 million above the monitoring report, mainly because developer fees are recognized outside the monitoring report, offset by cost additions and linkage differences not borne by buyers.

That is critical. Projected withdrawable surplus is not one clean number. It sits on a mix of economic profit, equity return, and at times adjustments relative to the lender's own monitoring reports. It is a reasonable measure of value creation inside a project. It is not a clean measure of what is already ready to serve debt at company level.

2028 to 2030: Yamim B Is a Late-Cycle Option, Not a 2028 Bridge

Yamim B matters a great deal to the thesis, but not at the date at which one would most like to use it. The project shows NIS 224.8 million of projected withdrawable surplus at the 100% level and about NIS 112.4 million at Yuvalim's share. At the same time, its cash credit line stood at zero usage out of NIS 160 million at year-end 2025, while guarantees already issued reached about NIS 330 million. That means the project is still in the stage where financing and execution capacity are being built, not in the stage where cash is already flowing upward.

The sales base is also still too soft to call this a near-term liquidity source. By the end of 2025 only 58 contracts had been signed out of 296 saleable units, and all of those contracts were conditioned on a full building permit. In three of them even 5% of consideration had not yet been paid by the balance-sheet date. Only in January 2026 was the first full permit received, and even that covered only two buildings, 174 units out of the six planned buildings in the phase.

The expected timing of Yamim B surplus release is during the two quarters following project completion, and project completion itself is expected only in the fourth quarter of 2028. That makes Yamim B more relevant to 2029 and 2030 than to 2028. This matters especially because 2028 bond principal stands at NIS 158.8 million and falls mainly on 5 January 2028. In other words, Yamim B is not a bridge to the 2028 wall. At best, if execution and marketing progress as planned, it can become a later support layer for the 2029 to 2030 stretch.

The combined implication is sharp: even if all three projects are taken together, Yuvalim's share of projected withdrawable surplus is about NIS 349.2 million. That is a large number. It is still below the bond principal remaining from July 2026 through 2030, about NIS 621.0 million after the January 2026 Series C repayment. So even at the paper ceiling of those three projects, this is not full coverage of the bond cycle. It is certainly not full coverage once that paper value is translated into real-time accessibility.

Covenant Room Looks Fine, the Financial Web Is Still Tight

Anyone reading only the covenant pages can relax too much. As of 31 December 2025, the adjusted equity-to-balance-sheet ratio stood at 22%, above a 15% threshold. The collateral-to-debt ratio stood at 179% for Series B, 144% for Series C, and 157% for Series D, all above their respective thresholds. That means the company was not sitting on the covenant edge at year-end.

But covenants are not cash. They only tell you how much air remains before an event. At the same time, the company had two loans with cross-default clauses totaling about NIS 104.9 million at year-end 2025, and near the report date it had seven loans that qualify as material debt totaling about NIS 887 million, company share, excluding unused credit lines. In addition, the trust deeds for Series B through Series E include acceleration triggers if material debt of the company or a consolidated company is accelerated.

At that point this is no longer a question of one project's margin of safety. It is a question of network structure. Sitting on top of all this is about NIS 870.5 million of floating-rate credit, company share, with prime at 5.5% near the report date plus an average margin of 0.9%. In other words, Yuvalim is not only waiting for value to be released. It is also paying for the financing that holds that value in place until release.

Conclusion

The answer to the headline question is: less than the project tables imply. Not because the value is fake, but because it first passes through layers that narrow it, delay it, or earmark it. At the end of 2025 Yuvalim had little free cash at company level, while the 2026 wall remained large. Yu-Park is the nearest source, but it first has to clear its own bank and collateral plumbing. Yamim A should help, but on its own timetable it comes too late to sit cleanly in front of July 2026. Yamim B is much more an option for 2029 and 2030 than a solution for 2028.

So the right read is neither "there is no coverage" nor "the surplus is already there." The right read is that the company holds a real project-value base that can support the bond cycle, but 2026 and 2028 still look more like years of moving value through the pipes than years of collecting clean free cash at company level. Only if Yu-Park actually releases surplus, Yamim A moves from occupancy into release, and Yamim B matures without reopening the equity gap will the 2029 to 2030 stretch look materially cleaner.