Tectona After 2025: How Long the Cash Really Lasts, and What More Dilution Could Cost
Tectona ended 2025 with roughly $4.8 million of cash and another $1.1 million of short-term deposits, but operations and investing consumed about $9.7 million and further funding commitments already sit above that balance. At a share price of 186.2 agorot, another equity round could still be very expensive in dilution terms.
How Much Cash Really Remains After 2025
The main article already established that Tectona's end-2025 story is less about proven revenue and more about time, funding, and approvals. This follow-up isolates only the cash question: how much hard banking liquidity is really left after stripping out customer money, what additional funding layers already sit on top of it, and what it would mean if the company has to come back to the market.
The first number that matters is not total assets. It is hard liquidity. At the end of 2025 the company had $4.761 million of cash and cash equivalents and another $1.141 million of short-term deposits. Against that, $10 thousand of designated cash is matched by an equal liability to customers, so it is not free balance-sheet room. That means the banking-liquidity base for any runway discussion is about $5.9 million.
There is also a meaningful layer of self-owned crypto assets on the balance sheet, with $5.122 million of current fair-value crypto assets and another $5.573 million of non-current crypto assets. That can help if markets cooperate, but it is market exposure, not bank cash. Treating the two as identical is the easiest way to overstate runway.
Under the right frame here, all-in cash flexibility, 2025 did not build a cash pile. It mostly bought time. Operating cash flow was negative $4.481 million, investing cash flow was negative $5.214 million, and together they absorbed $9.695 million. Against that sat positive financing cash flow of $9.214 million. That is why the company ended the year with $4.771 million of cash and cash equivalents, almost the same order of magnitude as where it started. Lease cash was real as well, with $259 thousand of lease principal and another $30 thousand of lease interest paid during 2025.
That chart says something simple. 2025 did not prove that Tectona can fund itself. It proved that Tectona can raise capital in time to keep the story alive. That is a very different thing. At a 2025 operating-burn pace, the hard banking liquidity at year-end covers only about 1.3 years, and that is before investing uses. At the pace of operating plus investing cash uses, it does not work without outside capital or without liquidating market-sensitive assets.
What Already Sits Above The Cash Balance
Tectona Product is the first clear example that this discussion is not theoretical. Under the PalWallet agreement, the venture's initial funding is meant to come through a shareholder loan of up to $1.4 million. In the held-companies disclosure as of December 31, 2025, Tectona already shows a loan balance of $1.389 million to Tectona Product. In other words, this is no longer just an optional commitment. Almost the entire initial funding envelope has already become an actual loan balance.
Mirrorly adds a different commitment layer. In the acquisition agreement the company undertook to provide Mirrorly with a credit line of up to $2 million for 36 months for its ongoing activity. On paper that looks like useful optionality. Between the lines it means further cash support for growth is already built into the structure. And it matters even more because of the dividend mechanics: during the contingent-consideration period Mirrorly is supposed to distribute all of its profits as dividends and then 70% of profits, but only subject to repayment of loans taken from that line and subject to legal distribution tests. So even if Mirrorly performs well, it is not obvious that value becomes quickly accessible cash at Tectona level.
This chart has to be read correctly. The first two bars are relatively hard liquidity. The last two are not immediate bank debt, but they do show how much capital has already been deployed or reserved to support the growth layer. That is exactly the point the main article hinted at and this continuation isolates: some of the new value Tectona built in 2025 still needs funding before it creates flexibility.
There is an important paradox here. On one side, Mirrorly's contingent consideration protects cash at the start because it is payable only out of dividends received from Mirrorly. On the other side, the same agreement allows Mirrorly to consume funding first and distribute later. So the protection on day one can come at the expense of how quickly cash becomes reachable later.
The Dilution Already In The Story, And The Dilution Still Ahead
2025 was already a heavy dilution year. The August 2025 private placement was built on 9,257,576 shares and 9,257,576 non-tradable warrants with an exercise price of NIS 4.10. The additional tranche that closed in December 2025, after the Capital Markets Authority permit for Alex Rabinowitz, by itself added 1,888,450 shares and 1,888,450 warrants for NIS 6,231,883. Before that, the September 2024 placement had already left behind 4,069,697 warrants at an exercise price of NIS 5.45. Taken together, the 2024 and 2025 financing rounds left 13,327,273 financing-related warrants outstanding.
That is a heavy number. Relative to the 33.108 million issued shares at the end of 2025, it implies potential share expansion of about 40.3%.
| Dilution layer | Warrants outstanding | Exercise price | Potential cash if fully exercised | What it means today |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| September 2024 private placement | 4,069,697 | NIS 5.45 | About NIS 22.2 million | Older dilution layer, but still alive through September 2026 |
| 2025 private placement | 9,257,576 | NIS 4.10 | About NIS 38.0 million | Includes the additional tranche unlocked after the permit |
| Total | 13,327,273 | - | About NIS 60.1 million | Potential dilution of about 40.3% versus the current share base |
On paper, that can even look encouraging: if all of those warrants were exercised, the company could receive about NIS 60.1 million. The problem is that as of April 3, 2026 the share price was only 186.2 agorot. That is far below both exercise prices, NIS 4.10 and NIS 5.45. So this warrant layer is currently more of an equity overhang than a near-term liquidity solution.
That brings the analysis back to future dilution. If the 2025 burn is translated into shekels using the year-end 2025 dollar-shekel rate, covering the negative operating cash flow alone at a share price of 186.2 agorot would imply roughly 7.7 million new shares. That is about 23% of the current base. If the company had to cover both the 2025 operating and investing cash outflows at the same price, the requirement rises to about 16.6 million shares, slightly above 50% of the current base.
This is not an academic exercise. On April 3, 2026 daily turnover was just NIS 6,882. In a stock like this, even if the company can find demand through private placements, the economic price of another round could be far higher than the accounting price. So the critical sentence here is not "the company can always raise." It is "at what equity cost it can raise."
There is another way to see the same balance of power. The 2025 private placement, NIS 30.55 million, is almost half of the company's market value on April 3, 2026, NIS 61.6 million. In other words, even the financing round that already happened was very large relative to the size of the stock. If Tectona needs another comparable move before the new products turn into fees, dilution will again sit at the center of the story.
Bottom Line
The short answer is that the cash lasts, but not comfortably. At the end of 2025 Tectona had roughly $5.9 million of relatively hard banking liquidity against one year of operating burn of $4.481 million. That is before investing cash uses, and alongside a structure that has already almost consumed the initial Tectona Product funding envelope while keeping another up-to-$2 million line available to Mirrorly.
The strongest counter-thesis is real. The company is not facing a heavy conventional debt wall, and it also holds a meaningful layer of self-owned crypto assets. If 2026 launches start converting spending into fees, if Mirrorly scales without consuming the full credit line, and if management is willing to monetize part of its market assets, runway can extend materially without another raise.
But that is exactly where the distinction between cash and flexibility matters. As long as the share price stays far below the warrant strikes, the warrants are mostly future dilution. As long as daily turnover stays tiny, the equity market remains an expensive source of funding. And as long as the new products are still building their revenue path, part of the value remains trapped inside the launch phase. So as of April 2026, Tectona still looks like a company whose runway depends much more on reducing burn and converting launches into fees than on the theoretical value already sitting on the balance sheet.
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