Togeder: Uganda and Export, Between Strategic Optionality and an Earnings Engine That Still Hasn't Arrived
Togeder raised its Uganda stake and kept Germany and Europe at the center of the export story, but revenue outside Israel fell to just NIS 5.4 million in 2025 and the Ugandan subsidiary remained loss-making. Until Uganda produces profit and cash flow, it remains strategic optionality rather than an earnings engine.
Uganda Got Bigger, But Export Still Isn't an Earnings Layer
The main article already established that Togeder's 2025 improvement still rested primarily on Israel. This follow-up isolates the sharpest tension inside that thesis: the company raised its Uganda stake to 80.5%, keeps presenting Europe, especially Germany, as its key export destination, yet consolidated revenue outside Israel amounted to only NIS 5.358 million in 2025, less than 5% of total revenue.
That gap does not exist because the European door is still closed. Products grown at the Ugandan farm have been sold in German pharmacies since December 2021, the Cantourage agreement remains in force, and the company still places Europe at the top of its export-priority list. Yet Europe generated only NIS 1.081 million of revenue in 2025, and the company itself says revenue under that arrangement was not material because the group focused on expanding in Israel. That is the core point: the strategic narrative remains international, but the economics remained Israeli.
The less comfortable part is that the gap widened in 2025. External revenue from Europe and Uganda combined fell to NIS 5.358 million from NIS 7.508 million in 2024, a 28.6% decline, while consolidated revenue rose to NIS 109.6 million. In other words, in the very year Togeder increased its Uganda ownership and kept talking about Europe, the layer that was supposed to validate the export story became smaller inside the consolidated numbers.
| Layer | 2025 figure | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Uganda ownership | 80.5% | Togeder now owns more of the Ugandan option, but is also more exposed to its results |
| External revenue from Europe | NIS 1.081 million | Europe still accounts for roughly 1% of consolidated revenue |
| External revenue from Uganda | NIS 4.277 million | Even together with Europe, non-Israeli revenue is still below 5% of sales |
| Ugandan subsidiary revenue before intercompany eliminations | NIS 13.373 million | There is operating activity, but not at the same scale as external revenue in the target markets |
| Ugandan subsidiary net loss | NIS 1.970 million | Uganda still is not an earnings engine for the group |
| Ugandan subsidiary operating cash flow | NIS 45 thousand | There is still barely any cash proof |
| Group loans to the Ugandan subsidiary | NIS 39.596 million | Togeder is still funding this option heavily before it pays back |
Germany Remains a Strategic Destination, Not a Sales Engine
The company's strategic wording is clear. Europe, and especially Germany, is presented as the export market with the highest potential. Management reminds readers that products from the Ugandan farm have been sold in Germany since late 2021, and the Cantourage agreement is still the main commercial channel. On a quick read, that can sound like an export business that is already proven.
But 2025 says otherwise. European revenue was up 21.1% year over year, yet still reached only NIS 1.081 million. At the same time, revenue under the German distribution arrangement is explicitly described by the company as not material because the group focused on expanding in Israel. So the issue is not just that Europe is still small. The issue is that even during the year under review, Israel remained the execution priority, not Europe.
That message also shows up in the forward plan. When the company outlines the next year, it says it intends to continue exporting cannabis from the Ugandan farm mainly to Israel, and also to Europe. That distinction matters. It means the Ugandan farm is currently meant first to support Togeder's existing Israeli revenue engine, and only then the international scaling story. That is not a strategic flaw, but it is also not the profile of an export engine that is already driving the group.
There is also an economic issue, not just a scale issue. The company itself describes German cannabis prices falling to 5 to 8 euros per gram in 2025, down from 20 to 25 euros per gram in the shortage years. So even if Europe does grow from here, it is unlikely to grow into the same pricing environment that originally supported the narrative. Uganda and Germany still provide proof of access, proof of regulatory path, and proof of supply-chain capability, but not yet proof of earnings power.
Uganda Is Producing Activity, But Not Enough Economics
The increase in ownership from 61% to 80.5% is a meaningful move. It gives Togeder greater control over an asset the company views as a cultivation, production, and export platform. It also increases Togeder's future upside if that option works. But that kind of move has to be tested not just at the strategy layer, but at the economics layer.
Here the picture is fairly direct. The Ugandan subsidiary generated NIS 13.373 million of revenue in 2025 before intercompany eliminations, but ended the year with a NIS 1.970 million net loss. Even operating cash flow, the number that should show whether the platform is starting to stand on its own, came in at only NIS 45 thousand. That is not an earnings-engine number. It is a number that says there is activity, but the activity is still far from becoming a clean value layer for the group.
The revenue trend itself is not especially encouraging. Ugandan subsidiary revenue fell 15% versus 2024, while external revenue booked in Uganda fell 35.3%. So Uganda was not only still far from becoming an earnings engine, it also did not show a 2025 acceleration strong enough to force the reader to believe the turn has already begun.
At the same time, the group is still sending more capital into that platform. Loans to the Ugandan subsidiary rose to NIS 39.596 million from NIS 14.239 million in 2024. That is a very sharp increase. The implication is that the Ugandan option requires not just patience, but capital. So the higher ownership does not automatically improve the equity story. It increases exposure to an asset that still has to prove it can generate profit and cash, not just land, greenhouses, and promise.
The Accounting Gap Is the Story
The right way to read Uganda in 2025 is to separate activity before intercompany eliminations from genuine external revenue. As noted, the Ugandan subsidiary recorded NIS 13.373 million of revenue before eliminations. In the same year, external revenue from Europe and Uganda combined was only NIS 5.358 million. That gap does not prove an accounting contradiction. It does show that a large part of the Ugandan activity is still moving inside the group structure, or ultimately serving Israel, before it becomes broad external revenue in the target export markets.
The company itself describes that mechanism. It imports Ugandan output into Israel and, in parallel, exports from Uganda to Europe through the Cantourage agreement. That means Uganda is currently first and foremost a strategic supply layer for the group. It supports the existing Israeli engine, and it also preserves an export option. But that is still very different from a situation in which Europe has already become a standalone and meaningful revenue engine.
That also explains why the story is easy to misread. Anyone looking only at the value chain, the certifications, the planned expansion, and the move to 80.5% ownership could conclude that the value has already moved from presentation slide to earnings line. The numbers show that it has not. In 2025, Uganda is still a strategic asset with industrial logic, but not an earnings engine that has already arrived.
What Has to Change From Here
First test: Europe has to move from proof of access to actual revenue weight. NIS 1.081 million is not a base on which to build an earnings engine.
Second test: external revenue outside Israel has to grow again, not keep shrinking. As long as that layer sits at 4.9% of revenue, the export story remains smaller than the rhetoric around it.
Third test: the Ugandan subsidiary has to move from losses and negligible operating cash flow to visible profit and cash generation. Without that, higher ownership in Uganda is still mainly a capital-allocation move.
Fourth test: the group has to show that loans and investment into Uganda are no longer rising faster than the external revenue the platform can actually generate. Otherwise the strategic option will remain too expensive relative to what it gives back.
Conclusion
The main article framed Uganda as an option that was not yet proven. This follow-up sharpens why. Togeder now owns more of Uganda, it has an open route into Germany, and it has a coherent export story on paper. But in the actual 2025 numbers, Israel remains the revenue center, Europe remains marginal, and the Ugandan subsidiary still does not generate the profit and cash flow needed to justify calling it an earnings engine.
So Uganda and export are currently strategic optionality with industrial logic, not a profit layer that has already arrived. Anyone who wants to see a new engine here still needs new numbers first: more external revenue outside Israel, more profit, and more cash.
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