RIBL: How Much of Carasso’s Value Is Actually Accessible, and When

The main article already established that RIBL is the core source of embedded value at Carasso Real Estate, but also its main unresolved friction point. This follow-up isolates only that question: how much of RIBL’s value is actually accessible to the company and to shareholders, and when. The short answer is fairly sharp. The value is real, but it is not liquid yet. Between the NIS 702.5 million appraisal headline and value that can actually be captured stand three separate gates: what exactly was appraised, what the market has or has not agreed to buy, and how much time remains until permit, financing, and execution.

The first point to keep in mind is that the most eye-catching number in the story, NIS 702.5 million, is not a transaction price. It is a point-in-time appraisal of Carasso’s rights in parcel 211 at RIBL 24-26, as of December 31, 2025. That matters because the most concrete monetization attempt the company disclosed did not concern that asset on its own. It concerned 49% of the company’s rights in the broader “RIBL complex.” So from the start there is already a gap between the object that was appraised and the object the company actually tried to monetize.

The second point goes deeper. In Carasso’s liquidity discussion, RIBL is presented as one of the layers supporting financial flexibility: 100% ownership and the ability to bring in an investor or partner. But on February 19, 2026 the most concrete disclosed attempt so far, advanced negotiations with an institutional party over a sale of 49% of the rights in the complex, ended without a term sheet and without binding agreements. That is not proof that the asset lacks value. It is proof that planning value and accessible value are still not the same thing.

The Number That Triggers The Imagination, And The Gap That Starts Right After It

To read RIBL properly, you need to separate three different layers of value. The first is what already sits in the accounts. The second is what the appraisal says could be worth more after planning allocation and rights realization. The third is what can actually be turned into a transaction, financing, or cash.

What matters most is not only the size of the NIS 702.5 million appraisal, but the gap versus the NIS 460.461 million shown for RIBL 24-26 in the annual asset table. That implies about NIS 242 million of planning upside above the figure at which this component is carried inside the 2025 year-end picture. That is exactly the layer of value the market still has not validated through a signed transaction.

It also matters what stands behind the NIS 702.5 million number. The appraiser is valuing Carasso’s rights in parcel 211 after a relative 53.54% allocation into plot 201A, net of NIS 2 million for protected-tenant evacuation. In other words, this is already a number that runs through the logic of the plan, the allocation, and a project that still has not received a building permit. It is not based on signed rent, realized cash flow, or a term sheet with a counterparty.

That is why the sensitivity table matters less than its headline. The appraiser’s sensitivity analysis moves the value by NIS 35.125 million in either direction for a 5% change in the value of plot 201A. That is useful disclosure, but it still lives inside a model. The market test that actually mattered was different: could the company bring in a third party willing to sign around the complex now. As of February 2026, the answer was still no.

The Failed Transaction Matters More Than The Sensitivity Table

The immediate report dated February 19, 2026 deserves more weight here than it may seem to deserve on first read. The company said that the advanced negotiations with an institutional body over a principles document for the purchase of 49% of its rights in the “RIBL complex” ended without maturing into a signed principles document or binding agreements. At the same time, it said it intends to keep advancing the project and to consider other partnerships if suitable ones are found.

This matters for two reasons.

First: this was the most concrete disclosed attempt to turn RIBL from planning value into a financing event. At the thesis level, that matters more than another discussion over whether the discount rate should be slightly higher or lower.

Second: the object that failed in negotiations is not identical to the object the appraiser valued. The NIS 702.5 million appraisal refers to Carasso’s rights in parcel 211 at RIBL 24-26. By contrast, the failed negotiations concerned 49% of the company’s rights in the wider “RIBL complex,” which the annual report defines as including Migdal Carasso, Beit Reno, RIBL 24-26, and also the company’s land at RIBL 18-20, which is classified as inventory. So even if the appraisal gives a sharp number for one asset, the market was being asked to assess a broader and more complex package, and it still did not sign.

That distinction is critical because it means it would be wrong to take NIS 702.5 million and treat it as if it were already a market-cleared price for what the company tried to sell. It is not. It is an appraised number for one part of the package, whereas the failed monetization attempt involved a broader rights set, with more components and more complexity.

In that sense, the failed negotiations do not erase the appraisal. They simply put it back in the right place. The appraisal says there is substantial value if the plan advances and becomes a buildable project. The failed negotiations say that value has not yet been closed into price, counterparty, or financing.

The Timeline Already Says The Cash Is Further Away Than The Headline

Even without the failed negotiations, the timeline alone is enough to explain why NIS 702.5 million is not an accessible-here-and-now number. In the annual report, the company said that subject to receiving permits, works were expected to start toward the end of 2026 and be completed by the end of 2032. A few days later, in the March 31, 2026 capital-markets presentation, the timeline was shown more explicitly:

The move from “toward the end of 2026” in the annual report to a first-quarter 2027 permit/start target in the March 2026 presentation is not dramatic on its own, but it does show where the story actually stands. This is not an asset that sits one step away from a sale, and it is not a project with signed construction financing. It is an asset that has already passed plan approval, passed the design-plan approval stage in July 2025 subject to final completions, and still remains pre-permit.

One line from the annual report matters more than any other in the accessibility debate: as of the report date, the company had not yet entered into a financing agreement for the construction of the project. That is the difference between planning value and accessible value. Planning value can be recorded now. Construction financing, a signed partner, and a permit are what begin to turn it into something the company can actually capture.

The interim economics of the complex tell the same story. The existing assets, Migdal Carasso, Beit Reno, and RIBL 24-26, are leased during the interim period, but NOI from interim use fell to NIS 7.441 million in 2025 from NIS 8.954 million in 2024. So there is an existing income layer here, but it is small relative to the future-value headline attached to the project.

Where RIBL Sits In Carasso’s Liquidity Bridge

This continuation matters because RIBL is not only an NAV or appraisal story. It sits directly inside Carasso’s liquidity bridge. In the annual report, under the liquidity section, the company explains why it believes there are no warning signs despite continued negative cash flow from operations and negative solo working capital over 12 months. Among the layers it points to are about NIS 132 million of cash at year-end 2025, about NIS 170 million of unused credit lines at year-end, about NIS 340 million of such lines close to the signing date, expected annual NOI of about NIS 74 million from income-producing assets, and NIS 2.256 billion of investment property at average leverage of about 33%.

But alongside all of that, there is one more layer: 100% ownership of the RIBL complex and the ability to raise capital by bringing in an investor or partner into projects under planning and construction, including RIBL. That is a subtle but important point. RIBL is presented not only as an asset with paper value. It is also presented as a liquidity option.

That leads directly to the main conclusion of this follow-up. February 2026 did not break Carasso’s liquidity option around RIBL, because the company still owns the asset, can still keep advancing it, and can still look for other partners. But it did show that the option is not available at the press of a button. Put simply, RIBL currently supports the narrative of flexibility more than it supports the cash balance itself.

So How Much Of The Value Is Actually Accessible, And When

The cleanest way to answer that question is to separate value that exists, value that can support financing, and value that can already be turned into cash.

Value that exists: yes. Both the annual report and the dedicated appraisal make clear that RIBL carries very material weight inside Carasso’s real-estate value.

Value that can support financing or a financing narrative: partly. That is exactly how the company itself uses RIBL in its liquidity discussion. But even here, there is still no signed construction financing agreement, and the concrete attempt to bring in an institutional partner did not close.

Value that is already accessible to shareholders today: limited. At this stage, what is truly accessible is the interim cash flow from the existing assets and the fact that the complex supports broader financial flexibility. The bulk of the NIS 702.5 million appraisal still sits in the future, after permit, after financing, after partner selection or the lack of one, and after the start of execution.

That is also why the question “how much of the value is accessible” is not well answered through a theoretical discount or a sensitivity table. It is answered through very concrete checkpoints:

1. Whether Carasso can bring in a new partner, and on what terms.
2. Whether the building permit really arrives around Q1 2027.
3. Whether signed project financing is secured to connect the planning value to an execution path.
4. Whether the market eventually accepts a transaction around the complex or part of it that gives the appraisal number an external anchor.

Until that happens, RIBL remains an asset that carries a large part of Carasso’s thesis, but still does not close its monetization test. That is the core gap: RIBL’s value is already large enough to change how the company is read, but still not accessible enough to solve on its own the question of liquidity, financing, and value conversion into cash.

Conclusion

RIBL is not an accounting fiction. The NIS 702.5 million appraisal, the NIS 928 million fair value of the full complex, and RIBL’s central role in Carasso’s story make it clear that there is real asset value here. But for now that value remains mostly planning value and optional value, not value the company has already locked in through a transaction, financing, or free cash.

The implication for anyone reading Carasso through RIBL is fairly straightforward. The debate is not whether value exists. The debate is whether that value has already passed the only test that really matters, the conversion test. As of April 2026, after advanced negotiations that ended without signature, without signed construction financing, and with a permit target only in 2027, the answer is still no.