Yunik-Tech: How Credible Is The NAV, And How Far Can The Benchmark Method Really Carry It

The main article already established the core gap at Yunik-Tech: the portfolio is improving, but at the public-partnership level time is still being bought through raises, warrants, and support from the general partner. This follow-up isolates the question underneath that gap, how much of the end-2025 NAV is a base the reader can trust, and how much is still an accounting number waiting for a real transaction.

The short answer is fairly sharp. Yunik-Tech's NAV is not fiction, and it does not look crudely inflated. Some of the key holdings are still marked below cost, and the partnership explicitly refuses to use thin secondary-platform quotes as if they were market prices. But almost all of the value sits inside Level 3 measurement, benchmark-based marking, and a portfolio concentrated in four holdings. So this is a NAV that can hold an accounting line between real market events, but it is still far from proof of realizable value.

What The NAV Measures Here, And What It Does Not

At the end of 2025 the partnership reported financial assets of $ 3.586 million. Out of that amount, $ 3.575 million were unquoted investments in target companies, while only $ 11 thousand related to Silexion, the only holding measured using a quoted share price. In other words, almost the entire portfolio depends on unquoted valuation.

That chart matters because it shows that the issue is not just whether BigID, Dataminr, or Motive are worth more than a year ago. The issue is what kind of price this really is. When only an immaterial portion of the portfolio rests on a quoted market price and the balance sits in Level 3, the NAV is not an exit price. It is an estimate.

The partnership effectively says as much. It states that, other than Silexion, the target companies are characterized by a lack of quoted share prices in an active market, by the absence of financing rounds during the 12 months before the report date, and by limited publication of key financial data to investors. On that basis, it says the uncertainty around fair value is high. That is the center of the story. Anyone reading the NAV as if it were a current market-clearing price is reading the wrong number.

The Benchmark Method Adds Discipline, But It Is Still An Interim Model

The attached valuation appendix does not pretend to build a full operating model for each portfolio company. Its stated objective is narrower: to bring relevant equity indices that can be used to revalue the holdings, and to measure how those indices changed from the acquisition date of each position through December 31, 2025. In the material disclosure, the model is described as applying an equal return based on relevant benchmark indices.

That distinction matters. The partnership is not saying that each company now has a fresh, deep, company-specific transaction price. It is saying something else: in the absence of an active market and in the absence of recent funding rounds for most companies, it selects public-equity benchmarks that appear relevant and maps their change onto the value at which each holding was acquired.

The role of the external valuer also needs to be read carefully. Moore explicitly says it relied on the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of information received from the partnership and from parties connected to the companies' activities, that it did not perform due diligence, and that it did not independently verify that information. So there is an external valuer here, but not a full independent underwriting of the private-company data itself.

That is not necessarily a criticism of the choice. In a thin secondary market, a relatively transparent benchmark framework is preferable to leaning aggressively on rumor or on weak trading indications. But the reader still has to understand what comes out the other side: Yunik-Tech's NAV is mainly the product of benchmark selection, entry-point anchoring, and case-specific adjustments, not direct price discovery.

The table below sharpens another important point: the method is not simply marking everything up. It does distinguish between holdings that now sit above cost and holdings that still sit below cost.

This is why it is too simplistic to call the valuation merely inflated. Mapbox and Motive are still marked below cumulative cost, and Carbon 3D is even further below cost. So the problem here is not one-directional generosity. The problem is different: even a relatively disciplined benchmark method still does not solve the liquidity gap.

Where The Partnership Itself Draws The Boundary Of The NAV

One of the most important points in the filing is also one of the most technical. The partnership says it does not rely on secondary-platform indications when determining fair value. The reasons it gives are strong: those platforms are not an active market under IFRS 13, transaction volume in a specific name is limited and may amount to only a few deals a year, the indications reflect quotes rather than completed transactions, there is wide dispersion across quoted prices, and some brokered deals are not publicly reported.

Those reasons are prudent and sensible. But they also define the boundary of the NAV. If there is no active market, if the quotes are not actual deal prices, and if even completed deals are not always fully visible, then the year-end NAV cannot be read as an executable exit price. This is not a side weakness of the method. It is the method's own definition.

Another easy-to-miss data point reinforces that limit: every investment in the portfolio is below 1% of the issued and paid-up capital of the target company. That matters because even if the estimate itself is reasonable, the partnership does not control exit timing, exit terms, or the priorities of larger shareholders. NAV without control is inevitably NAV that waits for an external window.

Concentration Turns NAV Quality Into A Thesis On A Few Names And A Few Benchmarks

The second problem is concentration. The four largest holdings, BigID, Dataminr, Mapbox, and Motive, add up to $ 3.122 million, about 87.1% of the entire portfolio.

The implication is not just business concentration. It is methodological concentration as well. If four holdings carry almost all the value, then the question of NAV quality effectively rests on the quality of benchmark selection and case-specific adjustments in those same holdings. This is no longer a discussion about "the portfolio" as one block. It is a discussion about a very small number of names that can move the whole reading.

The 2025 fair-value gain was also much narrower than the headline suggests. BigID contributed $ 224 thousand, Dataminr $ 216 thousand, and Motive $ 97 thousand. Together they produced $ 537 thousand, more than the entire annual gain. Mapbox alone offset $ 160 thousand. So the improvement did not come from broad uplift across the portfolio. It came from a few large holdings that covered weakness elsewhere.

In that sense, NAV quality at Yunik-Tech is not only an accounting-prudence question. It is also a diversification question. When diversification is this limited, even a reasonable benchmark framework produces a more fragile overall reading.

How Far The Benchmark Method Can Really Carry The NAV

This is where two different functions of the method have to be separated.

On one side, it can carry the NAV between real market events. In the absence of current transactions, it gives the partnership a more consistent framework than thin secondary indications would. It also imposes some discipline, because it does not have to mark every holding above cost. In that sense, it serves a legitimate accounting purpose.

On the other side, it cannot carry the monetization argument on its own. It cannot say at what price a holding can actually be sold tomorrow morning. It does not prove there is a ready buyer for the partnership's block of shares. And it does not solve the fact that the value is concentrated in a few very small ownership positions. Once the public vehicle itself depends on realizations to fund time, that gap becomes critical.

So the right question for 2026 is not whether the method is "right" or "wrong." The right question is what can replace it with a stronger anchor. Three kinds of events can do that:

• A fresh financing round or an actual secondary transaction in one of the four largest holdings.
• An IPO, sale, or realization event that generates an external price rather than an internal mark.
• A sequence of actual exits that occur near carrying values, rather than well below them.

Until one of those things happens, the benchmark method can support an accounting NAV. It cannot, on its own, turn that NAV into liquid value.

Conclusion

Yunik-Tech's end-2025 NAV is a number the reader can understand, but not one the reader should read simplistically. It does not look invented, and it is not built on blind optimism. Some of the holdings are still marked below cost, and the partnership itself is careful not to call thin secondary indications a market. That is a point in the method's favor.

But the gap between a credible NAV and a realizable NAV is still wide. Almost the entire portfolio sits in Level 3, the valuer relies on information supplied by the partnership rather than full independent diligence, and the value itself is concentrated in four holdings that carry almost the whole portfolio. So the benchmark method can carry the NAV as long as there is no better external anchor. It cannot, by itself, carry the argument that this value is already ready to turn into cash.