Prime Energy: How Much Of The Storage Stack Is Truly Funded, And How Much Is Already A Procurement Commitment
Prime Energy has assembled a serious storage buildout story, but the headline numbers do not all carry the same legal weight. NIS 667 million is already backed by binding financing, another NIS 1.56 billion is still an MOU, while the Hithium agreement already puts a 1 GWh 2026 procurement clock on the company.
The main article argued that storage has become Prime Energy's main upside driver and its main execution risk. This follow-up narrows the question to one issue: how much of that storage build is already sitting on hard financing, how much still rests on a financing MOU, and how much has already crossed into procurement commitments with their own 2026 deadlines.
The key gap sits inside one headline number. The company can point to roughly NIS 2.227 billion of financing frameworks for its dual-use projects, but that headline bundles together two very different layers: NIS 667 million under a binding financing agreement, and another NIS 1.56 billion under a detailed but still non-binding MOU with Mizrahi and Hapoalim. At the same time, the Hithium purchase agreement already commits the company to order a minimum of 1 GWh during 2026, with 800 MWh due by August 31, 2026 and another 200 MWh by October 31, 2026.
That is the real bridge. Procurement is now moving faster than full financial close for at least part of the storage stack. Anyone reading the whole storage story as already "funded" is flattening together signed financing, financing that is advanced but not yet closed, and optional pipeline that still sits at the feasibility stage.
| Layer | Size | Current status | What it really means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cluster 1 | NIS 667 million | Binding financing agreement led by Bank Leumi | This is the hard-funded execution layer |
| Cluster 2 | NIS 1.56 billion | Detailed financing MOU with Mizrahi and Hapoalim | This is advanced financing, but not yet legally closed |
| Hithium procurement | Minimum 1 GWh in 2026, up to 2 GWh over 3 years | Binding framework purchase agreement | This layer already carries execution obligations and deadlines |
| Delek optionality | Up to 1.5 GWh | Non-binding MOU | This is pipeline upside, not funded build |
What Is Actually Funded Today
In March 2026 the company presented a portfolio under construction of 38 solar and storage projects, with 252 MW of solar capacity and 1.3 GWh of planned storage. On the same slide, it also showed NIS 2.2 billion of financing frameworks, full grid connection in 2026 and 2027, and full-year run-rate revenue of NIS 270 million with NIS 149 million of EBITDA.
But the annual filing breaks that story into two much more important clusters. The first cluster, roughly 13 projects, is supposed to rely on up to NIS 667 million of senior debt under a binding financing agreement signed in May 2025 with a Leumi-led consortium. The second cluster, 23 to 25 facilities including around 160 MW of solar and around 1,000 MWh of storage, sits under the January 2026 MOU for up to NIS 1.56 billion of financing from Mizrahi and Hapoalim.
The implication is straightforward: NIS 2.227 billion is a financing architecture, not a single fully closed funding stack. The hard layer today is NIS 667 million. The second layer is clearly advanced, but the company itself says the parties are still negotiating a detailed binding financing agreement, subject to approvals, diligence and documentation.
That does not mean the company entered this phase with no corporate flexibility at all. After the balance sheet date it completed a private placement for NIS 15 million, with warrants that could lift the total investment to roughly NIS 35.8 million, and it also issued Series D bonds for gross proceeds of about NIS 347 million. Those steps matter, because storage buildouts are not financed by senior debt alone. But the current disclosures do not earmark those corporate sources one-for-one against the NIS 1.56 billion second-cluster financing. The right way to read them is as support for flexibility and equity, not as a substitute for signed project financing.
Where Procurement Has Become More Concrete Than Financing
The Hithium agreement dated March 16, 2026 is the point where this story stops being just a financing slide. The company describes it as a central milestone for the construction and grid connection of dual-use projects totaling about 252 MW alongside about 1.3 GWh of storage. In the same disclosure it says those projects are already under construction, with estimated investment of around NIS 900 million and expected first full-year revenue of around NIS 170 million, EBITDA of around NIS 149 million and a project IRR of around 16.5%.
But the Hithium agreement does something more important. It converts part of the plan into a real execution obligation. Prime Energy committed to buy a minimum cumulative 1 GWh during 2026. Of that amount, 800 MWh must be covered by purchase orders no later than August 31, 2026, with the remaining 200 MWh no later than October 31, 2026. The agreement ceiling is broader, up to 2 GWh over 3 years at a total value of up to $200 million, but the 2026 minimum is already a commitment, not just an option.
The payment mechanics make that distinction even sharper. The company must pay Hithium an advance of 5% of the minimum-quantity purchase price within 30 days of signing, subject to receiving an autonomous bank guarantee from Hithium. Purchase orders also have to be placed at least 6 months before shipment, and the agreement includes liquidated damages if delivery slips beyond the guaranteed date. This is no longer a loose strategic ambition. It is a supply-chain clock with deposits, order cutoffs and delivery risk.
There is another small but important clue when the financing and procurement disclosures are read together. The Mizrahi-Hapoalim financing MOU says that if the company procures the equipment itself, lenders may require a company guarantee of up to 5% of equipment purchase cost. The Hithium agreement requires a 5% advance on the minimum quantity. The filings do not tie those two numbers together one-to-one, so they should not be turned into a single accounting conclusion. But they do signal that part of the bridge between equipment ordering and debt drawdown may have to run through the corporate layer, not only through non-recourse project debt.
What matters even more is that the company does not present the Hithium agreement as a tool meant only for the dual-use projects already under construction. It explicitly says the agreement is also a meaningful part of the infrastructure needed for additional storage projects in Israel over the next two years, including stand-alone storage and the Delek sites. That is why the 2 GWh ceiling should not be read as a fully financed build plan. It is a broader procurement umbrella laid over projects with very different certainty levels.
Delek Is Still Optionality, Not A Funded Layer
That is exactly why the Delek thread needs to be separated from the financed stack. On one level, it is clearly strategic upside. The company is talking about up to 1.5 GWh across fuel-station and commercial sites, about 65 potential sites, roughly NIS 930 million of investment, around NIS 227 million of first full-year revenue, around NIS 107 million of EBITDA, and a planned 2027 build year.
But its legal and economic status is nowhere close to Hithium or the first financing cluster. This is still a non-binding MOU. Prime Energy has 6 months of exclusivity to negotiate, then feasibility work that can last up to 12 months after a framework agreement is signed, and only then would site-specific option agreements be executed, each with a 36-month option period. On top of that, all development, construction and operating costs are meant to sit with the company, and the transaction also needs the approvals required for a deal involving a company controlled by the controlling shareholder's group.
In other words, Delek expands the opportunity set in a major way, but it is still not a funding layer and not a hard procurement layer. That is also why the big 6.3 GWh total storage-capacity headline in the March 2026 presentation has to be mentally broken apart. Inside that number sit projects already in construction, projects already under a procurement umbrella, and projects that still depend on feasibility work and site options.
What The Filings Still Do Not Close
The current disclosures are enough to answer who is hard and who is soft, but they still do not provide a full all-in cash bridge for the storage stack. There is no detailed site-by-site mapping of storage capacity to exact financing sources. There is also no full breakdown of the equity bridge required for each cluster after senior debt, bond proceeds, the private placement and procurement advances.
So the right answer is neither "everything is funded" nor "nothing is closed." The more accurate read is that Prime Energy already has one meaningful hard-funded layer, one additional financing layer that looks advanced but is not yet closed, and a procurement commitment that is already real and time-bound even before the second financing leg has moved from MOU to signed documentation.
Bottom Line
Prime Energy is not selling an empty storage narrative. It has a real construction stack, binding financing for the first cluster, a detailed financing MOU for the second cluster, and a procurement agreement that shows the company intends to execute. But that is exactly why the hierarchy matters. NIS 667 million is the hard funding floor. NIS 1.56 billion is still future financing, even if it is well advanced. Hithium is already an execution commitment. Delek is still optionality.
What will drive the market reading over the next few months is not another large capacity headline. It is three simpler proofs: signing a binding Mizrahi-Hapoalim financing agreement, meeting the Hithium ordering deadlines, and giving the market a clearer bridge between procurement advances, equity needs and debt drawdowns. Until then, storage remains the company's main growth engine, but also the place where one large headline still hides the biggest execution gap.
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