Strix: Does Unicorn's Main Valuation Anchor Really Hold
The main article identified Strix as Unicorn's valuation anchor. This follow-up shows that there is already real commercialization, customers and revenue behind the story, but the year-end mark still relies mainly on a June valuation model rather than on a fresh external price point.
What This Follow-up Is Testing
The main article argued that the real debate around Unicorn is not the size of NAV, but its quality. This follow-up isolates the holding that carries almost half of that argument: Strix. If its mark holds, a meaningful part of Unicorn's discount can be read as excessive skepticism. If it does not, a large part of the reported NAV goes back to being a model number that still lacks external proof.
The good news is that Strix no longer looks like a pure concept-stage story. By the report date, its first-generation products had been completed, initial systems had already been ordered and supplied during 2021 through 2025, it had 5 finished products and 2 more still in development, and it had 7 customers using its products, mostly in the US and Israel. In addition, one material customer from the US defense system generated about $3.5 million of revenue in 2025, and Strix's US subsidiary signed a 2025 supply agreement for a first-stage $2.15 million system order.
The less comfortable point is that the year-end mark still does not rest on a new funding round, a sale, or any other fresh external market transaction. The partnership relies on a very material valuation as of June 30, 2025, prepared on July 30, 2025, and says that no material changes occurred afterward that would materially alter the model's conclusions. In other words, commercialization supports the mark, but it does not replace the model.
The four non-obvious findings are these:
- There is now real commercial substance here. 7 customers, 5 finished products, and roughly $3.5 million of revenue from one material customer are no longer just a slide-deck story.
- But the price point anchoring the mark is still not the market. At the end of 2025 there is no new external pricing event, only a reuse of the June valuation.
- The model range itself is wide. The valuation spans $12 million in the downside case and $29 million in the upside case, with equal weighting.
- Even inside the positive read there is visible concentration. The company says it has no dependence on a single customer, yet in the same section discloses one customer above 20% of revenue and warns that losing its main customer could endanger continued operations.
Why Strix Carries So Much Weight Inside Unicorn
This continuation deserves to stand on its own because Strix is simply too large relative to the wrapper. The carrying value of Unicorn's holding in Strix stood at NIS 13.286 million at the end of 2025. That equals about 43.5% of the whole fair-value portfolio, about 30% of Unicorn's total assets, and roughly 66% of Unicorn's market cap on April 3, 2026. In practical terms, anyone arguing about the credibility of Strix's mark is arguing about the core of the Unicorn story.
That chart explains why the market is not willing to be casual here. A public partnership can live with several small Level 3 marks. That is not this case. When one holding carries this much of the portfolio and this much of the listed value, every question about its quality immediately becomes a question about the whole story.
The gap to cost is already meaningful as well. Cumulative investment cost in Strix stands at NIS 6.783 million, versus a fair value of NIS 13.286 million at the end of 2025. That means the mark is already almost double cost, and also about 70% above the NIS 7.812 million carrying value at the end of 2024. That does not prove the mark is wrong. It does mean the burden of proof is higher now.
What Has Already Moved Beyond A Pure Model
There Is Commercialization Here, Not Just Potential
Strix's anchor is not sitting on an empty promise. According to the portfolio-company section, the first generation of products had already been completed, initial systems had already been supplied across 2021 through 2025, and by the report date the company had 5 finished products: several docking systems, a package-delivery solution, a tactical airport product, and the Lotus system for larger aircraft. At the same time, 2 more products were still under development, and the company estimated that the next milestone, completion of Defender development, was expected in the fourth quarter of 2026 at an estimated cost of about $1 million.
That matters because it places Strix in a more precise middle ground. This is no longer a pure dream-stage company, but it is also not yet a fully proven commercial engine. There is product, there are customers, there is revenue, and there is still a development pipeline that needs time and money.
The strongest commercial validation in the filing is that one material customer from the US defense system generated about $3.5 million of revenue in 2025, meaning more than 20% of the company's revenue. In addition, Strix's US subsidiary entered into a 2025 agreement with an American aerial-infrastructure company to supply systems through the end of 2025, with first-stage consideration of $2.15 million. That is no longer a one-off demo. It shows the product has a user, a price, and a real customer.
But the other side needs to stay in view. There is no disclosure on collection, on profitability, or on whether that US agreement was fully delivered and expanded into follow-on phases. Put differently, there is an initial layer of commercial proof here, but not yet proof of a durable commercial engine.
| What is already proven | What is still not proven | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| 5 finished products and systems supplied across 2021 through 2025 | No disclosure on operating profitability or cost structure | It is clear there is a product, but not yet clear how economically strong the growth is |
| 7 customers using the products, mostly in the US and Israel | The full revenue base is not disclosed | It is hard to judge how diversified the business really is beyond the visible material customer |
| A material US defense customer generated about $3.5 million in 2025 | One customer still accounts for more than 20% of revenue | Commercialization exists, but revenue concentration remains meaningful |
| A first-stage US supply agreement of $2.15 million | No disclosure that the phase was fully delivered, collected, or followed by new orders | The agreement supports the mark, but it is not yet a new pricing anchor |
Even The Supportive Data Comes With A Caveat
There is one more small but important point: the disclosed order-backlog table comes with an explicit caveat that the data were provided by Strix, prepared by Strix, and were not audited or reviewed by either Strix's or the partnership's auditor. That does not make the data useless. It does mean the backlog cannot be treated as a hard anchor on the same level as an audited financial line or an external funding event.
The same is true for the customer-dependence language. Strix says it has no dependence on a single customer or on a narrow group of customers, yet immediately adds that if its main customer stops ordering or materially cuts orders, continued operations could be put at risk. That is not a technical contradiction. It is a reminder that the company is already commercial, but still not broad enough for the model to ignore concentration risk.
Where The Value Still Rests On The Model
This is where the core disagreement sits. Regulation 8B does not present a new valuation work for year-end 2025. Instead, it incorporates by reference the very material valuation of Strix as of June 30, 2025, prepared on July 30, 2025, and adds that, to the partnership's knowledge, there had been no material changes since then that would materially alter its conclusions.
That is not a minor detail. If accounting rules had not required a change in value, the value of the subject holding immediately before the valuation would have been $2.142 million. The valuation work set the value of the partnership's holdings in Strix at $4.165 million. In other words, the core step-up in 2025 came from a valuation work that nearly doubled the holding value in dollar terms.
The model itself is a discounted cash flow framework with only two scenarios: a downside case of about $12 million, an upside case of about $29 million, and a 50-50 weighting that produces a weighted Strix company value of about $20.4 million. The discount rate used was 24%, and the representative-year growth assumption was 3%.
What matters is not only the range, but also the way it remained in force. According to Note 5(e), by December 31, 2025 no quantitative or qualitative indicators had been identified that would point to a material change in fair value, so the partnership concluded that the June valuation still represented a reliable year-end estimate. That is why the fair value of the holding at year-end was set at NIS 13.286 million, versus NIS 14.045 million at June 30, 2025.
That is the real test. The year-end mark does not mean the market provided a new price. It means the company believes the commercialization progress since June was enough not to require a material change in the model. In the positive case, that says operating progress is beginning to validate the valuation assumptions. In the negative case, it says the mark is still highly exposed to the possibility that the next layer of proof does not arrive.
What The Market Still Needs To See
The first step is an external pricing anchor. That could be a new financing round, a secondary transaction, or any other outside price point consistent with the roughly $20.4 million company value. Without that, the mark remains mostly model-derived.
The second step is conversion of the first commercial signal into a chain of revenues. The $2.15 million US agreement is a strong start, but what matters now is whether it turned into full delivery, actual collection, and follow-on orders.
The third step is broader revenue diversification. As long as one customer generates more than 20% of revenue and the company itself acknowledges that losing that customer could endanger operations, it is hard to argue that the valuation already sits on a broad enough base. The market will look for more customers, not just more wording.
The fourth step is a move from partnership-reported information to harder evidence. As long as an important part of the support case comes from unaudited backlog and from company-provided operating disclosures, skepticism will not disappear entirely.
Conclusion
The answer to the title question is yes, but with a meaningful qualification. Strix is no longer a holding built only on imagination, because by 2025 there are already products, customers, revenue, and a US supply agreement behind it. So it would be wrong to describe its value as if it were based on a model floating above reality.
But the other side is just as important: this is still an estimate anchor, not a market anchor. Year-end 2025 did not provide a new price point. It provided a reuse of the June valuation, based on the judgment that the commercialization accumulated since then was enough not to undermine it. Anyone treating NIS 13.286 million as a closed and fully proven number is skipping the most important part of the discussion.
What will decide the read over the next 2 to 4 quarters is not another optimistic phrasing, but Strix's ability to move into a stage the market can test from the outside: another transaction, another meaningful customer, an external round, or simply a revenue trajectory that becomes harder to explain only through a model. If that happens, Strix can continue to serve as Unicorn's valuation anchor. If it does not, the same concentration that lifted NAV on paper can start to work in reverse.
Disclosure: Deep TASE analyses are general informational, research, and commentary content only. They do not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, a recommendation, or an offer to buy, sell, or hold any security, and are not tailored to any reader's personal circumstances.
The author, site owner, or related parties may hold, buy, sell, or otherwise trade securities or financial instruments related to the companies discussed, before or after publication, without prior notice and without any obligation to update the analysis. Publication of an analysis should not be read as a statement that any position does or does not exist.
The analysis may contain errors, omissions, or information that changes after publication. Readers should review official filings and primary sources before making decisions.