NewMed: What Actually Has to Happen for Leviathan to Reach 21 BCM

What The Main Article Already Settled

The main article already made the core point: Leviathan remains NewMed's value engine, but after the FID the story has shifted from harvesting an existing asset to executing and funding a new growth cycle. This follow-up isolates a narrower question, and arguably the more important one now: what exactly has to happen between the completion of the third gathering line and first gas in the second half of 2029 for the 21 BCM headline to become real commercial capacity.

The good news is that two heavy gates are already behind the project. The updated development plan has been approved, and on January 15, 2026 the partners took FID on the first expansion phase. On March 1, 2026 the third gathering line was also reported as completed, after first gas on February 25, 2026, with total spend of about $480 million, around $90 million below the approved budget. The less comfortable part is that these are opening conditions, not the end of the execution map.

The key point is that the 21 BCM headline mixes two very different stories. One is a field-and-platform story: wells, subsea equipment, and additional processing capacity. The other is a transport, export, and regulatory story: how the gas gets to customers in Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and under which conditions. Only if both stories close together does 21 BCM become an operating fact rather than a presentation number.

Five Things The 21 BCM Headline Hides

First: the third gathering line does not take Leviathan to 21 BCM. It takes the system to roughly 14 BCM per year, and the presentation adds that the production system's performance will only be evaluated once production resumes. Even the interim step still has to prove itself in live operations.

Second: the first expansion phase is not "just another pipe". The documents describe it as a package of three additional production wells, expanded subsea systems, and added processing capability on the platform. It is a roughly $2.36 billion project at 100%, with first gas only in the second half of 2029.

Third: even after the platform is expanded, the documents do not describe 23 BCM as the commercial output number for phase one. They say something more precise: installed platform capacity can reach roughly 23 BCM, but total project production capacity in phase one is expected to reach only about 21 BCM, partly because of subsea pipeline constraints.

Fourth: higher exports to Egypt no longer depend only on a signed contract. The Blue Ocean export amendment is already in force, but the second tranche still sits on a chain of projects, production thresholds, and domestic-market priority rules.

Fifth: the path to 21 BCM does not run through Leviathan alone. It also depends on EMG, the Jordan-North system with the FAJR compression project, and the Nitzana line. Those are external bottlenecks with separate schedules.

That chart matters because the regulatory framework is not a generic "more exports are allowed" approval. It is a staged structure. Without 1,350 MMSCF per day, the new permit cannot even be activated. At 1,850 MMSCF one step opens. At 2,100 MMSCF the full step opens. So 21 BCM is not just an engineering target. It is also a regulatory threshold.

Bottleneck One, 14 BCM Is Only An Interim Station

Completing the third gathering line is an important event, but only if it is read correctly. It does not complete the expansion project. It prepares the base layer for it. The presentation explicitly says the project was completed successfully, with roughly $90 million of savings versus an approved budget of about $570 million, and that production capacity rose to 14 BCM per year. The March 2, 2026 immediate report adds that the project also included upgrades on the platform.

That distinction is the one investors can easily miss: the third line solves the 14 BCM bottleneck, not the 21 BCM bottleneck. It is part of the expansion system, not the expansion itself. The annual report says the new wells in phase one will connect to the platform through piping and subsea equipment that largely builds on the existing production system, including the third gathering line. In other words, the third line is foundation, not shortcut.

There is also an operational caveat that deserves to stay front and center. The presentation says production system performance will be evaluated only once production resumes. So it is fair to say the works are finished, but still too early to treat 14 BCM as a capacity level already proven through a full export operating regime. For anyone drawing a straight line from March 2026 to 21 BCM, that detail matters.

Bottleneck Two, 21 BCM Requires More Than Adding Wells

Phase one of the expansion project received FID on January 15, 2026. At headline level, that sounds like the point where Leviathan is already "on the way to 21 BCM". In practice, FID only shifts the story from approval to execution.

The documents are quite clear about what sits inside that package: three additional production wells, each with capacity of up to roughly 400 MMCF per day, added subsea infrastructure, and added platform-side capability through a Regional Export Module. The presentation translates that into two new processing trains on the platform. First gas is expected only in the second half of 2029, and total phase-one budget is about $2.36 billion at 100%.

One important consequence of the FID is that most of the contingent resources that were previously carried at Leviathan were reclassified into reserves. That reduces uncertainty on the resource-classification side. It does not remove the physical bottlenecks. The problem shifts from classification to execution.

There is also a sharper point in the documents that can easily get lost in the 21 BCM headline. The platform and the field do not open up at the same speed. The documents say the platform can reach installed capacity of up to roughly 23 BCM per year, while in the same breath they say phase one is expected to take total project production capacity only to about 21 BCM, partly because of subsea pipeline constraints. So even if the platform gets more room on top, the subsea system still limits total flow. Anyone reading 23 as the phase-one commercial output number is reading too quickly.

That is also why phase two matters as a boundary line, not as a natural continuation. Phase two, which could take Leviathan to roughly 23 BCM, already requires additional regulatory approvals, additional investment, and a fourth pipeline between the field and the platform. As of the report date, FID for that phase is only expected in coming years. For this continuation, the implication is simple: if the question is 21 BCM, the fourth line is not part of the answer. If the question moves to 23 BCM, the story opens again.

Bottleneck Three, Without Export Routes 21 BCM Stays A Paper Number

Even if the field and platform land on schedule, 21 BCM has to move, not just be produced. Here the documents are clear that the project depends on several transport routes, each adding another layer to the execution chain.

The presentation simplifies the regional connectivity map well: full EMG use through the Ashdod-Ashkelon section should provide Leviathan roughly 650 MMCF per day in the third quarter of 2026. The FAJR and compression project should lift Leviathan-relevant capacity to about 725 MMCF per day in the second half of 2026. The Nitzana line should add another roughly 250 MMCF per day in the fourth quarter of 2028. Together, that is around 1,625 MMCF per day of expected export capacity for Leviathan.

The annual report fills in the operating detail behind those headlines. At EMG, INGL has already raised capacity to about 650 MMCF per day using two compressors, but the move to 850 MMCF per day at the line level still depends on the new offshore Ashdod-Ashkelon segment, whose completion was delayed and is now expected in the third quarter of 2026. In the Jordan-North system, current transport capacity is about 7 BCM per year, and after the compression project it is expected to rise to about 11 BCM. Nitzana, with a compressor station in Ramat Hovav, is expected to add at least about 6 to 7 BCM per year to the transport system toward Egypt, but first flow there is expected only in the fourth quarter of 2028.

The analytical implication is straightforward: the path to 21 BCM depends on synchronizing an upstream project with a regional midstream build-out. The field can be ready, but if EMG, FAJR, or Nitzana slips, the expansion cannot be fully monetized on time. That matters because the Egypt export amendment is built around higher daily flow, not just around resource availability in the reservoir.

Bottleneck Four, The Export Permit Does Not Open Automatically

The most common reading mistake around the Egypt export amendment is to assume that once the document is in force, the path is open. The documents say something much stricter.

Yes, the two conditions for the second tranche have already been completed. Phase-one FID was taken on January 15, 2026, and the INGL transport agreement for Nitzana was signed back in September 2025. But the new export approval adds several practical limits, each of them its own execution test.

First, the new permit cannot even be used before Leviathan's daily production capacity reaches at least 1,350 MMSCF. That is an entry condition, not just a ceiling.

Second, the permit gives absolute priority to the domestic market. Before any additional export volume can go out, the rights holders must supply the full quantities ordered by Israeli customers, both under firm contracts and binding spot orders. So 21 BCM is not a target detached from domestic demand.

Third, the expansion steps in the permit are built around 1,850 MMSCF and 2,100 MMSCF per day. Up to the first expansion step, the cumulative additional export allowance is about 20.7 BCM. Up to the second expansion step, it rises to about 95.6 BCM. Only after the second expansion step does it reach about 130.9 BCM. In addition, the commissioner may reduce those quantities if producible volume falls below 535 BCM in the 2P+2C categories, or if the development plan is not being executed with due diligence.

This is no longer standard export-license language. It is a framework that ties engineering delivery, resource base, regulation, and execution discipline together.

Bottleneck Five, The Schedule Has Less Cushion Than It Looks

On paper, the time chain looks orderly: EMG in the third quarter of 2026, FAJR in the second half of 2026, Nitzana in the fourth quarter of 2028, and first gas from phase one in the second half of 2029. But the sequence itself shows how little cushion the system has.

If Nitzana slips, the exact route that is supposed to help absorb the post-expansion volume comes under pressure. If the third line proves less stable than hoped, the 14 BCM interim step looks less solid. And if drilling, subsea equipment, or platform expansion slips, FID stays a document milestone for longer instead of becoming an operating one.

Even at NewMed's own level, FID did not close the funding question. The immediate report says the partnership intends to fund its share of phase-one development, among other things, through internal sources and existing credit facilities, while continuing to evaluate additional alternatives including bank loans, bonds, and equity instruments. In other words, the funding test did not disappear. It simply moved from "can FID happen?" to "can the chain be carried through 2029 without financing itself becoming a new choke point?"

The Execution Map Into 2029

Conclusion

The thesis in this continuation is simple: for Leviathan to reach 21 BCM, it is not enough that the third line is complete, and it is not enough that FID has been taken. The 14 BCM interim level has to prove itself, three new wells and added subsea equipment have to arrive on time, export routes through EMG, FAJR, and Nitzana have to hold their schedules, the new permit has to open through all of its thresholds, and neither domestic demand nor funding can become the new bottleneck.

What the documents actually say is that 21 BCM is no longer a distant aspiration, but it is also very far from being a "locked-in" number. This is a synchronization test. The reservoir, the platform, the export routes, the regulatory permit, and the partnership balance sheet need to arrive in almost the same place at almost the same time. That is why the completion of the third line is good news, but not the end of the story. It simply made the execution map easier to see.