Queenco: How Much Cash Really Remains From The Cambodia Land Sales
The main article already argued that Cambodia land monetization is the key de-risking engine in Queenco. This follow-up shows why the $18.8 million headline across the two disclosed land transactions is still not the same as free cash: only one deal had closed by the report date, the land remains pledged, and the route from cash inside Rose to cash available for Queenco shareholders still runs through expenses, tax and the holding structure.
What The Headline Hides
The main article already argued that Queenco's Cambodia story currently leans more on turning land into money than on a clean operating recovery in the casino itself. This follow-up takes that idea one level deeper and asks a narrower question: how much of that money really remains after the frictions, and how much of it can actually climb from a Cambodian subsidiary to Queenco's public shareholders.
The quick read makes two mistakes. The first is to count the two disclosed transactions, $5.9 million in the sale completed in 2025 and another $12.9 million in the deal signed in February 2026, as if they were already $18.8 million on the way to the group cash box. The second is to read even the closed sale as if the full sale price stayed free. The local filings support a much tighter bridge.
By the report date, only one sale had actually closed. In the 2025 transaction, about 6 dunams were sold for $5.9 million gross, but net proceeds after selling expenses were about $5.5 million and net profit after tax was about $3.9 million. In the second transaction, signed on 24 February 2026, the headline number is $12.9 million, but only a $500 thousand deposit was received on signing. The remaining $12.4 million is due only in two stages upon registration of the parcel in the buyer's name.
| Transaction | Status by the report date | Area | Headline value | What has actually been proven so far |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 2025 sale | Closed | about 0.6 hectare, about 6 dunams | $5.9 million gross | $5.5 million net proceeds after selling expenses, and $3.9 million net profit after tax |
| February 2026 sale | Signed, not yet completed by the report date | about 1 hectare, about 10 dunams | $12.9 million gross | $500 thousand deposit received, $12.4 million still registration-dependent, and about $11 million pre-tax profit expected |
That is the number to keep in mind. What had been proven by the report date was not $18.8 million of free cash, and not even $12.9 million from the second deal. What had been proven was one closed sale and one deposit, with the rest still sitting behind registration, tax, expenses and the climb up the structure.
The Closed Sale Already Shows How Fast The Headline Shrinks
The first sale is the only bridge that can actually be measured end to end. Here the company is no longer talking about land value or expected gains. It is talking about a deal that already closed. And precisely because of that, it shows how quickly the headline compresses.
The chart combines what was disclosed explicitly with a simple arithmetic inference from those disclosures. The company said that net proceeds after selling expenses were about $5.5 million, so selling expenses were about $0.4 million. It also said that profit on the sale was about $4.8 million and net profit after tax was about $3.9 million, so the reported numbers imply a book cost of roughly $0.7 million for the parcel sold and a tax layer of roughly $0.9 million.
The distinction between the two cash layers matters. Inside Rose, after selling expenses, about $5.5 million remained. But that is still not the same thing as net profit, and it is certainly not the same thing as cash that is already available to Queenco shareholders. Net profit after tax, $3.9 million, already shows that the move from headline value to real economic value passes through two separate filters: first commercial friction and historical land cost, and then tax.
In other words, the first sale does prove that this is a real asset that can be turned into money. It also proves that the gap between gross consideration and what really remains can be material even before asking what rises from the Cambodian company to QLI and then further up the chain.
The Second Sale Strengthens Land Validation, Not Yet The Cash Box
The good news is that the February 2026 deal materially strengthens the validation of land value. A simple calculation from the disclosed numbers implies that the first sale was done at roughly $9.8 million per hectare, while the second was signed at roughly $12.9 million per hectare. That suggests a price per unit of land about one-third higher in the later transaction. From a valuation perspective, that is a strong signal.
But this continuation is not asking whether there is value. The main article already showed that there is. The question here is how much of it becomes visible cash. On that point, the February 2026 immediate report is much more cautious than its headline.
| Layer | What the local evidence discloses |
|---|---|
| Contracted consideration | $12.9 million gross, before commissions and taxes |
| Cash received on signing | $500 thousand |
| Amount payable only on registration | $12.4 million, in two stages |
| Accounting framing | the company expects about $11 million of pre-tax profit |
| What is still not disclosed | selling expenses, final transaction tax, net proceeds, and the path of the cash from Rose up to Queenco shareholders |
That point is important. Even the company did not present a net-proceeds number here. It presented a pre-tax-profit number. That wording is a reminder that the $12.9 million headline is not yet a free-cash number.
So the correct reading of the second sale is twofold. On the one hand, it confirms that there is a real market for the land, and at a stronger unit price than the first sale. On the other hand, it still does not give the reader a reliable number for how much will remain in the cash box after commissions, taxes, release of collateral and the other steps between Rose and the public parent.
The Real Friction Is Not The Size Of The Loan, It Is The Route Upward
It is easy to look at the pledge on the land and assume that this is the main bottleneck. In practice, the disclosed numbers point to something subtler. At the report date, the Cambodian bank loan stood at $560 thousand, carried a fixed 8.5% rate, and was secured by the land. That is a real friction layer, but relative to a $12.9 million sale it is not large. If the second deal closes, repayment of the loan by itself should not be what absorbs most of the money.
The heavier friction sits elsewhere: in the holding structure and the tax layers. The land is held inside Rose, a Cambodian company that, because of local land-ownership limits, sits within a 49% Cyprus and 51% Cambodian-trustee structure, and later through a formal holding by Yariv Lerner, while the company explicitly says that effective control and all economic rights remain with QLI. That does not mean the money is not economically part of the group. It does mean the money does not start at the public-company layer.
Then comes tax. The company discloses that Cambodia activity carries 14% withholding on profits distributed to Israel, and for distributed profits it presents a total tax burden of 31.2%. At the same time, the local documents do not provide a Rose-specific tax schedule for the land sale itself. So it would be imprecise to mechanically apply 31.2% to the $12.9 million transaction. What can be said with confidence is that the route from Cambodia to the top is not frictionless, and not immediate.
Currency is another noise layer. The deals are in dollars, the company does not use derivatives for hedging, and its own sensitivity analysis shows that a 10% move in the dollar changes comprehensive income by about NIS 1.1 million. That is not the main bottleneck, but it is another reminder that even after closing, the shekel story will not necessarily look smooth.
The Bottom Line
The good news in Cambodia is real. Queenco has already proven that it can sell land, and after the balance-sheet date it signed another transaction at a stronger implied unit price. Anyone who argued that the land was just a dormant historical balance-sheet line got a strong rebuttal.
But this follow-up reaches a narrower conclusion than the headline suggests. What had been proven by the report date was not a full opening of a cash pipe to shareholders. What had been proven was a real market for the land, one sale that turned into $5.5 million of net proceeds inside Rose, a second deal with only a $500 thousand deposit received so far, and a friction chain that still includes expenses, tax, collateral and an upward move through the holding structure.
That is exactly why the right question is not "how much is the land worth" but "how much of that value really reaches the top, and at what speed." On that test, Queenco has moved forward, but it has not yet closed the whole bridge.
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