One Technologies: How Much Cash Really Remains After Dividends, Leases, and Acquisitions?

When The Cash Pile Looks Too Large, The First Question Is Which Cash Pile

The main article already established that One entered 2026 not as a company short of oxygen, but as a company whose central question has shifted from resilience to capital-allocation quality. This follow-up isolates the cash layer itself. Not how much cash appears in the balance-sheet headline, but how much cash actually remains after the uses already pulling on it, and where the cash really sits when the company decides on dividends, buybacks, and acquisitions.

The right lens here is not a normalized cash number before strategic uses. It is all-in cash flexibility. That is why this piece uses only two frames. The first is the group-wide all-in cash picture, including total lease-related cash outflow rather than lease principal alone. The second is parent-level cash, because that is the layer from which dividend, buyback, and per-share capital-allocation decisions are actually made.

The good news has not changed. One is nowhere near covenant pressure. Equity stood at NIS 994 million at year-end 2025 versus a NIS 100 million minimum, the equity-to-assets ratio stood at 36.7% versus a 16% requirement, and net debt coverage stood at minus 1.03 versus a threshold of 3. In plain terms, this is not a bank-pressure story.

But that is exactly the point. When there is no financing stress, the question is no longer whether the company is allowed to distribute or repurchase. The question is which layer funds it, and what cushion is really left afterward.

This chart looks almost too simple, but it is the core of the thesis. NIS 641.9 million is group cash. NIS 137.0 million is the cash that sat at the parent at year-end. NIS 711.5 million is the legal profit base referenced in the March 2026 buyback report. And NIS 50 million is only the ceiling of the repurchase authorization approved in March 2026. These are not the same money, and they do not sit in the same drawer.

The All-In Cash Bridge: After Real Uses, The Cushion Looks Very Different

If the question is how much real flexibility remained for the group after the cash uses that already happened, the answer begins with the cash-flow statement, not with the balance-sheet line called cash and cash equivalents.

In 2025 the group generated NIS 448.8 million from operating activity. On its face that is a strong number, and it also exceeded net profit. But this is where the real test starts. In the same year, NIS 75.1 million went to investing activity, NIS 100.5 million of total negative lease cash flow went out, NIS 175.6 million was paid as dividend to shareholders, NIS 42.1 million went to long-term debt repayment, and another NIS 16.6 million went to minority buyouts and contingent-consideration payments tied to business combinations.

After all of that, only about NIS 38.9 million was left. That is an analytical bridge built from the reported cash-flow lines rather than a reported subtotal, but it is the number that matters here. It says the business did produce a large amount of cash, but most of that cash had already been assigned.

This chart also sharpens another important point. In the group bridge, I am using total lease-related cash outflow, NIS 100.5 million, because that is the figure the lease note itself discloses. That is a wider frame than lease principal alone, and it is the right one here because the thesis is about total financing flexibility, not about narrow IFRS 16 presentation.

This also explains the big jump in year-end cash. The group finished 2025 with a NIS 215.8 million increase in cash, but NIS 173.3 million of that came from the December 2025 private placement, net. In other words, the rise in cash was not the pure result of cash retained inside the business after real uses. It was materially supported by the capital markets as well.

That is not a flaw, and it is not a sign of weakness. It simply requires a more precise reading. There is a real difference between a business that retains a large internal cash surplus and a business that reports a large cash balance after also raising equity.

At Parent Level, The Picture Gets Even Sharper

This is where the story becomes much less comfortable for anyone reading only the consolidated balance sheet. The parent company, meaning the layer from which dividends, buybacks, and acquisitions are actually decided, ended 2025 with NIS 137.0 million of cash and cash equivalents. That is far below the NIS 641.9 million group number.

That gap is not cosmetic. It means the cash pile that looks very large at group level mostly sits inside the operating subsidiaries, not at the layer where per-share capital allocation is actually decided.

The sharpest line in this table may be the NIS 4.3 million of parent operating cash flow. The parent itself generated very little operating cash. In practice, the 2025 dividend, acquisition spending, lease repayment, and debt repayment were funded mainly by two other sources: NIS 162.9 million of dividends from held companies and NIS 173.3 million from the private placement.

That is exactly why the line “One has NIS 641.9 million of cash” is factually correct but analytically incomplete. At the level of per-share capital allocation, One behaved in 2025 much more like a parent that gathers cash from subsidiaries and adds an outer equity layer, than like an entity funding all distributions and deals from freely retained cash produced at the parent on its own.

This is also where the One Line acquisition falls into the right proportion. In the separate statements, cash paid for business and activity acquisitions reached NIS 47.9 million, while the One Line transaction alone accounted for about NIS 33.6 million. So even without any transformational deal, the acquisition pipeline had already become a meaningful parent-level cash use.

What The Buyback Really Says, And What It Does Not

The March 2026 immediate report matters here not because of the headline alone, but because of what it reveals about the board’s own logic.

On March 15, 2026 the board approved a repurchase program for ordinary shares of up to NIS 50 million. The program is scheduled to start on March 22, 2026 and run through March 21, 2027, and it may be executed on or off the exchange, from the company’s own sources. The board wrote explicitly that it reviewed forecast cash flow, repayment sources, and unused credit lines. It also stated that the company had profits within the meaning of Section 302 of the Companies Law in the amount of NIS 711.517 million.

What does that mean? It means One is nowhere near a situation in which a NIS 50 million buyback would endanger the company. What does it not mean? It does not mean there is a segregated NIS 711.5 million cash box sitting there waiting to be spent.

That distinction matters. Distributable profits are a legal and accounting test. They are not the same thing as free cash. The board itself did not rely on the distribution test alone. It explicitly added an examination of forecast cash flow, future obligations, and unused credit capacity. In other words, even in the board’s own framing, distributable profits do not answer the execution question on their own.

There is another useful way to see this. The December 2025 private placement brought in NIS 173.3 million net, while the authorized buyback cap approved in March 2026 stands at only NIS 50 million. So even if the buyback is executed in full, it is equal to only about 29% of the net equity raised a few months earlier. This is not a reversal of dilution. It is a capital-discipline signal, and possibly an opportunistic tool if the stock price justifies it, but not a full unwind of the equity raise.

That is even clearer if the two March 15, 2026 capital-return signals are placed side by side. On the same day, the board also approved a NIS 42.3 million dividend. Together, the announced dividend and the buyback authorization amount to NIS 92.3 million. Against NIS 137.0 million of parent cash at year-end 2025, that is already a meaningful layer, especially if the Strauss acquisition later closes and consumes additional cash. That does not mean the company cannot execute the moves. It does mean that timing and discipline matter much more here than the headline approval.

Bottom Line: One’s Cash Story Has Become A Discipline Story

One is not a stressed company. It is also not sitting close to tight covenants, and the board did not approve a buyback out of financing pressure. But the large consolidated cash balance hides a much more layered reality of cash accessibility.

At group level, after investment, lease cash, dividends, and debt repayment, the 2025 surplus was much smaller than the headline suggests. At parent level, the cash layer that actually decides per-share capital allocation stood at only NIS 137.0 million, and it was built mainly from upstream dividends and the December private placement. That is why the next real test for One is not whether it can announce a buyback, a dividend, or a deal. The test is whether it can execute all three without turning each move into another exercise in equity raising or heavier dependence on cash remittances from subsidiaries.

That matters because this is where the distinction between a strong balance sheet and strong capital allocation becomes clear. A strong balance sheet creates options. Strong capital allocation proves that those options are turned into cleaner per-share value rather than into another layer of transactions that looks good in the headline.