Tadea's Centerity stake: how the preferred stack wipes out almost all of the value for common shareholders
Centerity's valuation puts $1.691 million of economic value against a $59.025 million preferred stack, so Tadea's headline stake barely translates into accessible value. In Tadea's own accounts, that already shows up as only about NIS 247 thousand at year-end 2025, down again from June.
Why The Ownership Percentage Barely Matters
The main article already established that value inside Tadea's portfolio is not automatically value that reaches Tadea's common shareholders. This follow-up isolates the clearest example: Centerity. The issue here is not just a lower valuation. It is the order of claims. A reader looking only at the headline ownership stake could assume Tadea still sits on a meaningful slice of future upside. In practice, Centerity's capital structure means that almost all of the current economic value disappears before the common layer is even reached.
The numbers are blunt. Centerity's economic value as of December 31, 2025 is estimated at $1.691 million, while the preferred liquidation stack sitting ahead of the common stock totals $59.025 million. That stack is 34.9 times larger than the economic value. In the valuation model, only $77.4 thousand is attributed to Tadea, and even that comes from the CLA layer derived from Series C preferred stock. Tadea's common shares, plus its Series B and B1 holdings, receive values that round down to almost zero.
That is why the headline "Tadea owns about 10% of Centerity" is economically misleading. Even if one accepts the $1.691 million economic value at face value, only $77.4 thousand is attributed to Tadea, or roughly 4.6% of that economic value. About 95.4% of the current economic value is absorbed before it reaches the layer that matters to Tadea's common shareholders.
What still works here is also worth saying clearly. Centerity is not an empty shell. The valuation still assumes a going concern, the company has real revenue, and the model assumes growth over the coming years. But the active bottleneck is not the product and not even sales pace on its own. The bottleneck is the capital structure. Any future operating improvement first has to serve senior claims, funding needs, and survival before it can become real value for the common layer.
| Layer | Liquidation rights | What stands ahead of the common layer |
|---|---|---|
| CLA, reflected as Series C preferred | $32.775 million | First in line, at 3x the original purchase price of $2.01 per share |
| Series B1 preferred | $17.250 million | Ahead of common at original purchase price |
| Series B preferred | $4.000 million | Ahead of common at original purchase price |
| Series A preferred | $5.000 million | Paid after C, B and B1, but still ahead of common |
| Total preferred stack | $59.025 million | This entire amount must be cleared before common participates |
| Centerity economic value | $1.691 million | Covers only 2.86% of the stack ahead of common |
| Value attributed to Tadea | $77.4 thousand | Survives only through the CLA layer, not through common equity |
That chart is the whole story. The right question is not whether Centerity has a business. The right question is who gets paid before common. In this case, the line ahead of common is much larger than the company's current economic value.
When Common Is This Far Out Of The Money, Sensitivity Stops Helping
There is another unusually important detail in the valuation: the model barely reacts to assumption changes. The sensitivity analysis shows that moving volatility 10% up or down leaves the value of Tadea's holding at roughly $77.388 thousand to $77.391 thousand. Moving the expected time to asset realization a full year in either direction also barely changes the result.
| Assumption change | Value range for Tadea's holding |
|---|---|
| Volatility, minus 10% to plus 10% | $77,388.1 to $77,390.8 |
| Time to realization, minus one year to plus one year | $77,388.1 to $77,390.8 |
That is a strong analytical signal. In most valuations, the debate is about discount rate, volatility, exit timing, or growth. Here that debate barely matters. When the common layer is this far out of the money, finer modeling does not rescue value. The problem is structural, not a third decimal place.
That leads to a practical conclusion. Anyone trying to read Centerity mainly through the lens of whether the model is a bit too optimistic or too conservative is looking in the wrong place. The first question is who absorbs value before common. Only after that does it make sense to argue about an extra half year to liquidity or another 5% of volatility.
The Balance Sheet And Forecast Do Not Offer A Shortcut
This capital structure is not sitting on top of a comfortable balance sheet. As of September 30, 2025, Centerity had $61 thousand of cash and cash equivalents, $5.097 million of current liabilities, $10.923 million of long-term shareholder loans, and total liabilities of $16.082 million against negative equity of $15.203 million. Put simply, there is no real cash cushion even at the portfolio-company level.
The valuation says this explicitly: the core assumption is that Centerity will remain a going concern, but for that to happen the company will need short-term funding or other financing sources. This is not technical footnote language. It is the intermediate layer that explains why even real business improvement would not quickly flow up to Tadea. Before common equity gets value, Centerity itself has to solve the funding problem.
The forward model does not provide a shortcut either. Revenue is projected to rise from $2.933 million in 2026 to $5.279 million in 2027 and $8.183 million in 2028, but free cash flow stays negative in 2026, 2027, and 2028, and only turns positive in 2029. In other words, even under an improving operating scenario, the path to a point where value becomes truly relevant for the common layer is still long.
The important point is not that the forecast is weak. If anything, it already assumes improvement. Yet even under that improvement, the company still needs time, funding, and execution before one can even begin talking about value that survives the preferred layers. In its current form, Centerity is first a funding and capital-structure story, and only after that an upside story.
Tadea's Own Accounts Already Reflect The Damage
The problem is not trapped only inside Centerity's stand-alone valuation. It already shows up clearly in Tadea's own reporting. The portfolio table shows that NIS 16.731 million has been invested in Centerity over time, but as of December 31, 2025 the carrying amount of the share investment is already zero, while the loan balance stands at only NIS 246 thousand. At the same time, the valuation summary in Tadea's annual report says the fair value of Molodan's Centerity holding fell to about NIS 247 thousand, versus about NIS 598 thousand on June 30, 2025, explicitly because Centerity missed its 2025 budget and cut forward expectations.
That may be the most important signal at the parent-company level. Tadea's own accounts no longer show meaningful equity value in Centerity. The year-end number is now almost identical to the loan balance. That means that, even in Tadea's accounting presentation, the surviving layer is mostly a debt-like or claim-like layer, not the common equity layer.
That chart explains why "there is still a holding" is not the same thing as "there is accessible value." After cumulative investment of NIS 16.731 million, the amount left at year-end 2025 in fair value terms is only about 1.5% of the capital that has been put in over the years. This is not just a markdown. It is evidence that the capital stack and the claim order have consumed almost the entire value layer for common shareholders.
There is also a broader lesson here for reading small holding companies. Once the portfolio company sits under a heavy preferred stack, the nominal ownership percentage stops being the relevant metric. The relevant metric is what survives after everyone senior to you gets paid. In Centerity's case, year-end 2025 says the answer is almost nothing.
Conclusion
The thesis of this continuation analysis is straightforward: Centerity is not "a roughly 10% holding." It is a tiny residual value layer sitting under a capital structure that wipes out almost everything below it. The company's $1.691 million economic value is simply too small relative to $59.025 million of preferred claims. That leaves only $77.4 thousand for Tadea in the model, while Tadea's own financial statements converge to roughly NIS 247 thousand.
That does not mean Centerity has no business and no potential. It means the question that matters to Tadea shareholders is not whether Centerity exists, but whether anything remains after the claims above them. For that reading to change in a real way, one of two things has to happen: either Centerity's value rises dramatically above the preferred stack, or the capital structure itself is reset in a way that pushes value back down the stack. Until then, Centerity is not an asset Tadea can count on at the parent level. It is a very far out-of-the-money option.
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