Rami Levy Real Estate: Can the Development Pipeline Really Bring NOI to NIS 235 Million by 2030
The main article already argued that valuation requires the development pipeline to deliver the future. This follow-up shows that the 2030 target does have a numerical bridge, but it is not built only on signed NOI: about NIS 98 million of the increase is tied to identified projects, NIS 54 million of that sits on land reserves that were still not under construction at the end of 2025, and another roughly NIS 23 million depends on growth in the existing portfolio.
The main article argued that rent supports the present while the development engine has to justify the valuation. This follow-up isolates the number management put at the center of the story, NIS 235 million by 2030, and asks a narrower question: is there a real project bridge behind it, or mostly a convenient presentation target.
The short answer is that there is a bridge, but it is less clean than the headline suggests. It is built from three different layers: additional growth in the existing portfolio, 5 assets already under construction, and 13 land-reserve projects that are supposed to mature by 2030. It is also not all NOI in the strict sense. Management presents the path under an NOI title, but the same package also includes investees, and in Nof Harakes the company presents forecast hotel EBITDA rather than NOI.
- Finding one: the move from 114 to 235 rests on about NIS 97.9 million of contribution from identified projects, plus a computed residual of roughly NIS 23.1 million coming from the existing portfolio and from layers that are not mapped to newly named assets.
- Finding two: of that NIS 97.9 million, NIS 54.0 million comes from 13 projects that at the end of 2025 were still classified as land reserves in advanced development, with an estimated NIS 466.4 million of remaining completion cost.
- Finding three: almost half of the identified project contribution, NIS 47.3 million, is supposed to arrive only in 2029 and 2030. This is a back-ended path, not a jump that shows up already in 2026.
- Finding four: the signed lease table does give visibility on directly held assets in 2026 through 2029, but it cannot validate a 2030 annual NOI number because the row labeled "2030 onward" is a cumulative amount for all years from 2030 and later, not a single-year run rate.
What Actually Sits Inside 235
Once the company’s path is broken down, the picture becomes much more concrete than the headline. The 5 assets already under construction contribute NIS 43.9 million on the company’s share basis. The 13 projects management groups as development and planning projects through 2030 contribute another NIS 54.0 million. That is not guesswork. It is almost a one-for-one match between the presentation totals and the sum of the land-reserve projects whose expected completion dates are through 2030.
What remains to get from 114 to 235 is roughly NIS 23.1 million. That is a computed residual, not a separately disclosed project line. It does fit management’s note that part of the increase is also supposed to come from same-property NOI growth and continued improvement in the existing base. In other words, the 2030 target is not built only on future assets. It also requires the 2025 base to keep improving on the way there.
This chart is the core of the follow-up. It also explains why the headline needs to be read carefully. The NIS 235 million is not a fully contracted NOI number, and it is not a number that comes only from projects already being built. It mixes incremental contribution from the current base with two very different development buckets in terms of certainty.
| Component | Expected contribution by 2030 | Remaining completion cost from December 31, 2025 | What it actually includes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assets already under construction | 43.9 | 282.4 | Dimona, Gedera 90+91, Nof Harakes hotel and commercial, Vision commercial, Rosh Haayin |
| Land-reserve projects through 2030 | 54.0 | 466.4 | 13 commercial, logistics, and industrial projects whose expected completion dates are through 2030 |
| Computed residual from the existing portfolio | 23.1 | Not separately disclosed | Same-property NOI growth, improvement in existing assets, and other layers included by management in the path |
The quality of measurement also matters. Within the NIS 43.9 million from projects already under construction, NIS 20.3 million is forecast EBITDA from Nof Harakes hotel. So even the nearer-term bucket is not entirely classic income-producing real estate NOI.
The Part Already Under Construction
The easier part of the bridge is the group of 5 assets already under construction. Here there are names, remaining costs, ownership percentages, and completion dates. But even this bucket is mixed. Only Dimona is supposed to mature as early as 2026, and the largest single piece in the group is a hotel component rather than pure retail or logistics NOI.
| Project | Ownership | Expected contribution to company share | Estimated remaining cost | Expected completion | Central caveat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dimona | 50% | 3.8 | 19.4 | 2026 | The only project in the bucket expected to mature already next year |
| Gedera 90+91 | 50% | 6.3 | 50.7 | 2027 | Meaningful contribution, but not on a fully owned basis |
| Nof Harakes, hotel and commercial portion | 100% | 20.3 | 80.2 | 2027 | Forecast EBITDA, not NOI |
| Rosh Haayin | 100% | 11.6 | 121.7 | 2028 | Large project with the highest remaining cost in the group |
| Vision, commercial portion | 100% | 1.9 | 10.4 | 2028 | Small contribution while the office component is being pushed through a rezoning effort |
Already here the path to 2030 does not look like a broad set of small assets maturing quickly. It depends on a few relatively large contributions, some of them later in the timeline, and some of them not measured as pure NOI. Nof Harakes alone accounts for almost half of this group. Rosh Haayin adds another NIS 11.6 million, but with NIS 121.7 million of remaining cost it is also the heaviest remaining-capex item in the bucket.
That timing profile is the real risk marker. Only NIS 3.8 million shows up in 2026. By the end of 2028 the bridge reaches just NIS 50.6 million, a little more than half of the identified project contribution. Another NIS 47.3 million is pushed into 2029 and 2030. So the 2030 target is not just a question of whether the projects are good. It is also a question of how little room the path has for slippage.
There is also an ownership layer that matters. Out of the NIS 97.9 million of identified project contribution, about NIS 70.7 million comes from assets the company owns at 100%, while about NIS 27.2 million comes from assets where ownership is only 33% to 50%. That does not make the bridge weaker by itself, but it does mean the presentation already shows the net company-share economics rather than gross asset economics.
The Part Still Sitting In Land And Planning
The more important analytical point sits inside the NIS 54 million that management presents for 13 development and planning projects through 2030. When the land-reserve projects with expected completion dates through 2030 are added one by one, the math lands almost exactly on the same totals: NIS 54.0 million of expected contribution, roughly NIS 656 million of project cost, roughly NIS 466 million of remaining completion cost, and about 97.6 thousand square meters.
That matters because it means the core NIS 54 million sits not on projects already being built, but on land reserves in advanced development. Several of them are only expected to start excavation and piling in 2026, 2027, or even 2028.
| Major project | Ownership | Expected contribution to company share | Estimated remaining cost | Expected construction start | Expected completion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hartuv | 100% | 9.6 | 90.4 | 2027 | 2029 |
| Rami Levy Mishor Adumim | 100% | 7.9 | 55.1 | 2026 | 2029 |
| Acre | 50% | 7.1 | 44.0 | 2026 | 2029 |
| Harish 1 | 100% | 6.7 | 52.6 | 2027 | 2030 |
| Nesher | 100% | 5.0 | 61.9 | 2026 | 2028 |
| Gedera 89 | 50% | 4.1 | 41.6 | 2028 | 2030 |
These figures show how much of the 2030 story is really a conversion story. The company already has land, rights, and planning, but what has to happen now is the move from land into execution, and then from execution into occupancy and rent.
Another detail is easy to miss in the footnotes. The gap between total project cost and remaining completion cost exists because total project cost also includes land and planning spend. So the roughly NIS 190 million already invested in this path should not be read as evidence that almost one third of the physical execution is already done. In several cases it mainly reflects land cost, planning, and project promotion while the actual works are still ahead.
This is also where it becomes clear what is not inside the 2030 line. Migdalei Topaz carries an expected NIS 30.6 million contribution on the company’s share basis, but its expected completion is only 2032, so it stays outside the 2030 target. Mixed-use projects such as Beit Shemesh and Hatachana are also outside the 235 path because their expected completions are 2031 and 2032. That is actually a point in favor of the discipline of the bridge. Management did not load every possible option into the 2030 target. But that does not make the bridge low risk. It simply means the risk is concentrated in the earlier 13 projects.
What The Signed Lease Table Actually Proves
The signed lease table is probably the easiest piece of evidence to misread. On the one hand, it is the hardest disclosure layer in the file set. On the other hand, it is not measuring the same thing as the 235 path.
The table deals with signed rent revenue for directly held assets only, excludes investees, and shows rental revenue rather than NOI. So it cannot prove the 2030 target. What it can do is answer a different question: how much hard contractual visibility already exists in the current directly held base.
What that chart shows is a base that can support stability, not a step change. Under the option-exercise case, signed revenue stays roughly in the NIS 70 million to NIS 79 million range in 2026 through 2029. Without options, 2029 already drops to NIS 39.8 million. That is not a contradiction to the 235 path, because the lease table excludes investees and excludes future development assets that are not yet leased. But it is an important reminder that the jump to 235 does not sit inside the current signed lease book. It sits mostly outside it.
That leads to the most important technical point. The row labeled "2030 onward" is not the year 2030. It is all revenue from 2030 and later combined. So the NIS 106.2 million figure in the no-option case, or the NIS 374.9 million figure in the option case, cannot be read as annual 2030 rent. Anyone doing that is manufacturing a level of certainty the company itself did not disclose.
Conclusion
The path to NIS 235 million by 2030 is not detached from reality. On the contrary, it can be rebuilt numerically with reasonable clarity. About NIS 43.9 million comes from assets already under construction, about NIS 54.0 million comes from land and development projects expected to complete through 2030, and another roughly NIS 23.1 million has to come from the existing base and continued growth within it.
But that is exactly why the path also has to be read correctly. This is not a fully signed NOI target. It is not a bridge built only on projects already under execution. And it is not a short-duration path, because almost half of the identified project contribution is already pushed into 2029 and 2030.
So the right question is not whether NIS 235 million is possible on paper. It is. The right question is how quickly 2026 through 2028 will turn that number from a development map into something supported by active construction sites, permits, occupancy, and newly signed rent. As long as NIS 54 million of the path still sits on land reserves and another NIS 20.3 million sits on hotel EBITDA, the target remains an execution target rather than a contractual one.
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