Retail-Minds-Sh: How Much Cash Is Actually Accessible to Shareholders
Retail-Minds-Sh still reports positive working capital, but by year-end 2025 only NIS 435 thousand remained in cash and short-term deposits. The rest of the balance sheet shifted toward receivables and a non-current convertible-loan asset, leaving shareholders with far less accessible value than the headline balance-sheet figures suggest.
What Is Actually Accessible Here
The main article already established that Retail-Minds-Sh looks more comfortable on paper than it does in cash. This follow-up isolates the question that matters most for a shell company: how much cash is actually available to shareholders now, without another transaction and without monetizing another asset.
The right frame here is all-in cash flexibility, meaning how much cash and short-term deposits remained after the year's actual cash uses. This is not a normalized cash-generation story, because the company reported no revenue in 2025 and still posted negative operating cash flow. Under that frame, the key number is not the NIS 4.717 million of equity and not even the NIS 1.527 million of positive working capital. The key number is just NIS 435 thousand of cash and short-term deposits at year-end.
That figure is slightly less liquid than it first appears. Out of the NIS 435 thousand, only NIS 126 thousand sat as cash, while another NIS 309 thousand was held in short-term deposits that can be withdrawn on 30 days' notice. So even inside the reported liquidity balance, not everything is immediately available.
Positive Working Capital, But Not in the Bank
This is the core distortion. At the end of 2025 the company reported NIS 1.701 million of current assets against just NIS 174 thousand of current liabilities, leaving positive working capital of NIS 1.527 million. On a superficial read, that looks fine. On a cash-access basis, it is a very different picture.
Only NIS 435 thousand of those NIS 1.701 million of current assets were cash and short-term deposits. The remaining NIS 1.266 million sat in receivables and other debit balances, and that breakdown matters: NIS 231 thousand were prepaid expenses, NIS 11 thousand were institutions, and only NIS 1.024 million were classified as other receivables. That is the point. Prepaids do not fund the next period, and receivables are not the same thing as cash even if they may eventually turn into cash.
| Item | 31 Dec 2025, NIS thousands | Accessibility | Why It Matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash | 126 | Immediate | This is what actually sits in the bank |
| Short-term deposits | 309 | High, but not immediate | Withdrawable on 30 days' notice |
| Prepayments and institutions | 242 | Low | They do not create the same room as cash |
| Other receivables | 1,024 | Depends on collection | Potentially monetizable, but not cash yet |
| Convertible loan, non-current asset | 3,190 | Very low in the near term | This is balance-sheet value outside the near-term liquidity cushion |
So the positive working-capital figure is real, but it does not tell investors how much cash is genuinely accessible. It tells them that current assets exceed current liabilities. Those are not the same question.
In 2025, Cash Did Not Come From Operations
The gap between accounting value and cash accessibility becomes even clearer when looking at the year's cash movement. At the end of 2024 the company held NIS 1.787 million of cash and NIS 24.569 million of short-term deposits, or NIS 26.356 million combined. By the end of 2025, that balance was down to NIS 435 thousand.
What happened during the year is fairly clear. In January 2025 the company withdrew NIS 20 million from deposits in order to pay a dividend. The cash flow statement then shows NIS 1.465 million of negative operating cash flow and NIS 20.005 million of negative financing cash flow, almost entirely the dividend. At the same time, the company also extended a NIS 1 million loan.
The important point is the source of that cash. The company says it financed its activity mainly from the consideration generated by selling the receivable tied to the partnership-rights sale, about NIS 21.5 million. In other words, 2025 was not funded by a live operating business. It was funded by cash created when an old asset was monetized. A large part of that source then left the company through dividends, and what remained partly migrated into receivables and a non-current convertible-loan asset.
The Value Stays on the Balance Sheet, But Access to It Has Deteriorated
After all of that, the company still reports positive equity of NIS 4.717 million. But the real question for shareholders is not whether accounting equity remains. It is how much of that value is actually accessible now. The short answer is: not much.
By year-end 2025 the balance sheet was no longer built on a strong liquid position. It was built on a different mix: NIS 435 thousand of liquid balances, NIS 1.266 million of receivables, and NIS 3.19 million of a non-current convertible loan asset. That may carry economic value in the future, but it is not the same as cash that can fund the next period or be treated as readily available shareholder value.
The going-concern note stems directly from that gap. At year-end the company still had positive working capital and very low current liabilities, but it also had only NIS 435 thousand of liquid balances, a full-year loss of NIS 1.637 million, and negative operating cash flow of NIS 1.465 million. That is why management says it is acting to raise cash that will allow the company to meet its obligations in the foreseeable future. This is the point: the problem here is not only profitability. It is accessible cash.
On a simple comparison, the year-end liquid balance was smaller than the year's operating cash burn and also smaller than the NIS 1.85 million of general and administrative expense. So even if current liabilities themselves remain low, the cushion ahead of the next move is very limited.
Bottom Line
Anyone looking only at working capital or equity can miss the actual thesis. The number that matters here is NIS 435 thousand, and only NIS 126 thousand of that was immediate cash. This is no longer a story about a well-funded shell waiting for a transaction. It is a story about a shell whose remaining value sits more in accounting assets and future collections than in available cash.
Put differently, shareholders still have balance-sheet value, but access to that value is much weaker than the headline numbers imply. To change that reading, the company will need to show one of two things: either receivables and the non-current asset turn into real cash, or a new activity enters the company with an actual cash source rather than another layer of on-paper value.
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