Rimoni: How much real room is left between the dividend and parent-level cash
This follow-up isolates Rimoni's parent-company cash position: the solo statements show only NIS 1.37 million of cash at the end of 2025, after NIS 42.4 million came up from subsidiaries and NIS 45.5 million went out to shareholders. The issue here is not whether the group creates value, but how much of that value remains accessible at the parent after distributions.
Where The Gap Really Opens
The main article argued that Rimoni's industrial core is holding up, but the dividend is already stretching the cash cushion. This follow-up isolates that question at the parent-company level: not how much cash exists somewhere inside the consolidated group, but how much cash actually sits in the entity that pays shareholders.
That is a material difference. At the consolidated level, Rimoni ended 2025 with NIS 14.05 million of cash and cash equivalents and NIS 43.16 million of operating cash flow. At the solo level, the year closed with only NIS 1.369 million of cash. In other words, the group can look comfortable when read through the consolidated statements and still have a very thin buffer in the layer from which the dividend is paid.
The point is not that Rimoni is in a liquidity crunch. The sharper point is this: at the parent level there is almost no excess cash. The group's value is created lower down, inside the subsidiaries, and only a small part of it reaches the top and stays there. That means the right question is no longer just whether the business earns money, but whether cash that reaches the parent remains there long enough to create a real margin for error.
The key numbers that frame the thesis are:
| Item | 2025 | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Parent-company year-end cash | NIS 1.369m | Very small cash cushion in the dividend-paying entity |
| Consolidated year-end cash | NIS 14.050m | The consolidated view looks more comfortable than solo |
| Dividends received from subsidiaries | NIS 42.393m | This is the parent's main cash source |
| Dividend paid to shareholders | NIS 45.465m | More cash went out than came up from subsidiaries |
| Parent profit before the share of subsidiary earnings | NIS 0.474m | The parent's own activity does not fund a payout of this size |
What The Solo Statements Show, And The Consolidated View Blurs
The first key point sits in the solo balance sheet. Out of NIS 177.7 million of assets, NIS 162.0 million, a little over 91%, is recorded as an investment in subsidiaries. Current assets total only NIS 4.089 million, against current liabilities of NIS 5.988 million. That is not the picture of a parent rich in idle cash. It is the picture of a small holding-company layer whose value mostly sits below it, not in the cash box above it.
This is exactly where the consolidated reading can mislead. The consolidated statements tell a true story about the health of the industrial business, but they do not by themselves tell the reader how much is left at shareholder level after cash moves up the chain and then back out as a dividend. When the consolidated balance sheet shows NIS 14.05 million of cash, it is easy to assume there is a comfortable buffer. The solo statements show that less than 10% of that amount sat at the parent.
That gap matters even more because the parent has only a limited direct business of its own. In 2025 it recorded NIS 15.457 million of revenue, NIS 3.187 million of gross profit, and only NIS 0.474 million of profit after financing expense and before its share of subsidiary earnings. Put differently, the parent company's own earnings are far too small to support a payout measured in tens of millions of shekels. The distribution depends overwhelmingly on the subsidiaries' ability to move cash up.
Who Really Funded The Dividend
This is where the accounting heart of the story sits. The solo income statement shows annual profit of NIS 34.321 million, but NIS 33.959 million of that came from the parent's share of subsidiary earnings. That line is meaningful and valid accounting, but it is not the same as cash sitting at the parent. It describes value created inside the group, not cash that remains accessible after money moves up and then out.
The cash that actually came up to the parent from subsidiaries was NIS 42.393 million. Against that, NIS 45.465 million went out to shareholders. So even before looking at 2026, the parent distributed NIS 3.072 million more than it received from subsidiaries during the year. The parent's own operating cash flow, NIS 3.749 million, closed part of that gap, which is why the year still ended with positive cash. But that is exactly the point: even after more than NIS 42 million came up from subsidiaries, only NIS 1.369 million remained in the parent's cash balance.
That changes the meaning of the dividend policy. On paper, the policy calls for distributing at least 50% of annual distributable profit, subject to no material harm to cash flow and business needs. In practice, the 2025 declared dividend was NIS 45.465 million, above annual profit, which means the right read is not that the company is distributing from a large idle cash reserve. The right read is that it is passing through most of the cash that reaches the parent almost immediately.
This is not an argument against paying the dividend. It is an argument about cushion. As long as the subsidiaries keep upstreaming cash on a similar scale, the mechanism can work. If the pace weakens, if one of the subsidiaries needs to retain more cash for its own activity, or if the board wants to keep paying at a similar level in a less clean year, the parent-level safety margin will prove very thin.
Why March 2026 Sharpens The Question
After the balance-sheet date, on March 25, 2026, the board already declared another cash dividend of about NIS 10.085 million. That amount is 7.4 times the cash that sat at the parent at the end of 2025. This is not proof that the payment cannot be made. It is proof that the existing cash balance is not what carries the distribution. To make that payment without stretching the cushion further, more cash has to keep moving up from the subsidiaries after year-end.
That brings the argument back to the most important distinction in this continuation. Rimoni is not struggling to create value. The group remains profitable and still generates operating cash. The tension sits in how much of that value is actually available to shareholders at the parent level, when it becomes available, and how much is left after it is paid out. In large holding companies this often becomes a solo-debt and covenant question. In Rimoni's case it is quieter, but no less real: how much cash is truly left at the top after aggressive distributions.
Conclusion
The right way to continue reading Rimoni is not through whether the dividend is "covered" by annual profit, but through whether it is backed by a real cash cushion at the parent company. In 2025 the answer is that most value was created below, most cash that came up was pushed out almost immediately, and very little was left in the parent cash box itself.
So the core insight of this continuation is straightforward: Rimoni is not being tested on the group's ability to create value, but on its ability to retain value at the parent. If high dividends from subsidiaries keep flowing up in 2026, the company can keep distributing. If not, the gap between value created and value accessible to shareholders will start to look larger than the consolidated view suggests.
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