Sunflower: How Exposed Poland’s Recurring Earnings Are to Power Prices, Green Certificates, and New Financing
The main article showed that Poland remains Sunflower’s core recurring engine. This follow-up shows that 2026 wind economics are largely locked through the power agreement, but the green-certificate layer has already shrunk to only NIS 2.9 million to NIS 3.1 million, while the newly acquired solar portfolio is still presented before financing that could materially reshape the equity economics.
Where the Real Exposure Sits
The main article already established that asset sales bought Sunflower time. This follow-up isolates the narrower question left behind by that balance-sheet cleanup: how much of the recurring operating profit that remains in the group really sits in Poland, and how much of that is locked, market-exposed, or still missing a financing layer.
The company’s own 2026 forecast immediately shows where the weight sits. For Poland it guides to NIS 55.9 million to NIS 61.9 million of revenue and NIS 39.1 million to NIS 43.3 million of EBITDA. Of that, wind alone accounts for NIS 51.4 million to NIS 56.9 million of revenue and NIS 36.4 million to NIS 40.3 million of EBITDA, while the acquired solar portfolio adds only NIS 4.5 million to NIS 5.0 million of revenue and NIS 2.7 million to NIS 3.0 million of EBITDA. Even after the 19.5 MW solar acquisition, more than 90% of Poland’s visible recurring base in 2026 still comes from wind.
That is the core point. A broad debate about “Poland” misses that the exposure there is not uniform. Wind in 2026 looks close to contracted on the power line, 2027 reopens to the market, green certificates have shrunk from a meaningful layer to a tail, and the new solar portfolio has not yet been tested after financing.
2026 Is Largely Contracted, 2027 Reopens Price Risk
On the wind side, the near-term pricing question is no longer a pure spot-market question. In December 2024 Sunflower completed a new set of agreements with Energa under which all black-power output from the Polish wind farms is sold in 2025 and 2026 at PLN 400 and PLN 421 per MWh, respectively. That means the 2026 wind forecast is built on a signed contract for the electricity layer, not mainly on a market guess.
That also explains why Poland should not be read through a simple macro headline on power prices. The average Polish market power price rose in 2025 to PLN 447 per MWh from PLN 423 in 2024, yet the company still says Polish revenue was hurt by updated contract economics and weaker green-certificate pricing. In other words, even in a stronger market backdrop, Sunflower did not capture the upside in the same way.
The more important point is what comes next. The company assumes PLN 421 per MWh for wind power in 2026 and then only PLN 380 in 2027. In both years it assumes only PLN 25 per green certificate. That flows straight into the revenue line: wind revenue is forecast at NIS 51.4 million to NIS 56.9 million in 2026 and then NIS 46.5 million to NIS 51.2 million in 2027, a drop of roughly 10% already embedded in management’s own assumptions.
The conclusion is fairly sharp. For wind, 2026 is not really a year of testing open-market power pricing. It is a year of operational delivery, FX, and the smaller certificate layer. 2027 looks different. That is when price risk comes back.
Green Certificates Are No Longer the Cushion
At the end of 2025, the agreement for selling green certificates expired. The company explicitly says it expects the prices it will obtain from 2026 onward to be lower than the prices in the expired agreement. That is not a technical footnote. In 2024 and 2025, green-certificate revenue amounted to about NIS 18 million and NIS 17 million, respectively, or about 10% and 12% of total company revenue in those years.
Against that, the 2026 and 2027 forecast for the wind farms attributes only NIS 2.9 million to NIS 3.1 million per year to green certificates. That is a decline of more than 80% versus 2025. The financial-instruments note reinforces that reset: the financial asset created by the agreement covering about 70% of green certificates was fully settled by December 31, 2025, and no balance remained at year-end.
So green certificates have not disappeared, but they are no longer the buffer a quick reader might imagine from looking at the historical story. From here, they are much more of a small tail than a layer that can materially smooth the wind economics.
The New Solar Portfolio Looks Fine Operationally, but the Shareholder Economics Are Still Open
On March 31, 2025 Sunflower completed the acquisition of two subsidiaries holding about 19.5 MW of operating solar assets in Poland. Out of that total, about 15 MW are eligible for index-linked CFD income for up to 15 years. Consideration amounted to about EUR 15.7 million, roughly NIS 65 million including about NIS 1 million of transaction costs, and the closing also activated EPC and O&M agreements.
But this is exactly where the gap between operations and equity economics begins. In the company’s income-producing-assets table, that portfolio is presented with only partial price protection, zero bank debt as of December 31, 2025, and a 2026 forecast of NIS 4.5 million to NIS 5.0 million of revenue and NIS 2.7 million to NIS 3.0 million of EBITDA. Put simply, the filing shows the asset-level EBITDA, but not yet the final return left for shareholders after debt service.
That is not a footnote. The financial-instruments note says that in 2025 the solar projects in Poland were fully exposed to market power prices, and that the CFD mechanism covers about 75% of capacity but is expected to enter into full effect only in 2029. That is why the company’s 2026 and 2027 assumptions here still rely on estimated market prices of PLN 283 and PLN 296 per MWh, not on a hard tariff the way 2026 wind does.
At the same time, the company says it is in advanced negotiations with a leading Polish bank for roughly PLN 30 million of project financing, but as of the report date there was no certainty the financing would actually close. The missing line is the most important one: the filing still gives no pricing spread, amortization schedule, or future hedging structure for that debt.
| What is already disclosed | What is still missing |
|---|---|
| The portfolio includes 19.5 MW, of which about 15 MW are eligible for CFD | The terms of the requested roughly PLN 30 million financing |
| At year-end 2025 the portfolio had no bank debt | Whether the debt will be hedged, and to what extent |
| 2026 forecast stands at NIS 4.5 million to NIS 5.0 million of revenue and NIS 2.7 million to NIS 3.0 million of EBITDA | How much of that EBITDA remains after interest and principal |
| The price-protection layer is only partial, and CFD is expected to be fully effective only in 2029 | What the effective spot-price exposure will be until then |
It also matters to separate existing debt from debt that has not yet been born. In the current structure, 76% of the Polish subsidiary loans are hedged through interest-rate swaps, and the company says a 10% increase in the rates applying to the group would reduce pre-tax profit by only about NIS 431 thousand. So current WIBOR is not the immediate pressure point. The next pressure point is whether and when new debt is added to the solar portfolio, and on what terms.
Conclusion
Sunflower’s Polish exposure is not one story. Wind in 2026 looks very close to contracted economics on the electricity layer, but it no longer carries the old green-certificate cushion. 2027 starts to look like a market-price year again. The new solar portfolio adds a real operating base, but it is still being shown before the financing layer that will decide how much of that value actually reaches shareholders.
That is why the next important question is not whether Poland is “good” or “bad.” The real question is what replaces 2026 wind economics in 2027, and whether the financing for the 19.5 MW portfolio will be closed on terms that strengthen equity returns or absorb a meaningful part of the EBITDA already shown today. Until those two issues become clearer, Poland remains Sunflower’s recurring engine, but one that has to be read through contracts, certificates, and capital structure rather than through a generic renewable-energy headline.
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