Suprin 2025: Why profit and backlog still have not become cash
Suprin returned to a 2025 net profit of ILS 7.1 million and lifted signed backlog to ILS 181 million, but negative ILS 77.8 million operating cash flow shows that the money is still trapped in receivables, land inventory, and future-project costs.
What This Follow-up Is Isolating
The main article already made the core point: Suprin's backlog has started to open, but the real cash test is still ahead. This follow-up does not go back over the business mix, the debt story, or the recurring-income layer. It isolates one question: how a company that ended 2025 with ILS 7.1 million of net profit and ILS 181 million of signed backlog still burned ILS 77.8 million in operating cash flow.
The short answer: profit was recorded before the cash arrived, while cash was pushed forward into three very visible buckets. The first is revenue receivable and other receivables, the second is land inventory, and the third is future-project costs. Each bucket makes sense on its own. The problem is that all three expanded in the same year, so profit and backlog stayed on paper much longer than the headline suggests.
The numbers leave little room for interpretation. In its own liquidity disclosure, the company says the negative operating cash flow mainly reflected a ILS 38.969 million increase in land inventory, a ILS 67.579 million increase in revenue receivable plus debtors, and a ILS 8.75 million increase in costs accumulated for future projects. That is no longer just timing. That was the cash model of 2025.
That chart makes the point quickly. The bottom line returned to profit, but each passing year pushed the meeting point between earnings and cash further out.
The Profit-to-Cash Bridge
If you take the 2025 cash bridge the way management itself frames it, the picture is sharp. This is not a bridge between weak profit and strong profit. It is a bridge between recorded profit and cash that has still not been collected.
The meaning of that bridge is straightforward. Suprin did not lose cash because of an accounting loss. It lost cash because in 2025 it prepaid for land, advanced project spending, funded project stages, and recognized revenue faster than it collected the money.
| Balance-sheet or working-capital item | 2024 | 2025 | What actually changed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue receivable from projects | ILS 84.5m | ILS 112.1m | Revenue was recognized, but cash was not yet collected |
| Other receivables | ILS 2.7m | ILS 23.6m | Part of the increase is reimbursements from purchase groups, meaning cash already spent and still waiting to come back |
| Land inventory | ILS 40.9m | ILS 73.8m | Land and project execution absorbed cash |
| Costs on account of projects and other receivables | ILS 10.5m | ILS 27.2m | The company is funding part of the next years' backlog today |
That is also why the ILS 117.1 million working-capital surplus does not really settle the issue. Accounting-wise, current assets are higher than current liabilities. Cash-wise, a large part of that surplus sits in exactly the items that are hardest to turn into quick cash.
Where The Cash Is Stuck
Revenue receivable: Migdalei Atid is the center of gravity
The heaviest bucket is revenue receivable from projects, ILS 112.1 million at the end of 2025 versus ILS 84.5 million a year earlier. In the receivables note, the company explicitly says the balance includes about ILS 91.7 million from Migdalei Atid, versus about ILS 79.4 million at the end of 2024. In the commitments note it says the same thing from a different angle: Suprin Projects was entitled, at the reporting date, to about ILS 91 million of unpaid engineering-management fees, including indexation and before VAT.
That is the core gap. Migdalei Atid already produced accounting revenue, but it has not produced cash at the same pace. So as long as collections there do not move, backlog opens into earnings and the balance sheet swells, while the cash box does not benefit at the same rate.
This is also why signed backlog does not solve the issue automatically. In purchase-group backlog, signed agreements represented ILS 181 million of expected revenue at the end of 2025, of which ILS 75 million was scheduled for 2026. That is a strong number. But when ILS 112.1 million is already sitting as revenue receivable, the right focus shifts from signature to collection.
Debtors and purchase-group reimbursements: Ashdod has not become cash yet either
Debtors and other receivables jumped to ILS 23.6 million from ILS 2.7 million. In the note, the largest new balance is ILS 16.9 million of receivables for reimbursements from purchase groups. In the board report, the company explains that the increase mainly reflects payments it made on behalf of purchase-group members, primarily in Technopark Ashdod, which are expected to be collected in 2026.
That wording matters, because it means the company already spent the cash for the project before the reimbursement came back. Again, there is no deep economic problem if those reimbursements arrive on time. But until they do, Suprin is financing the path to backlog out of its own balance sheet.
There is another Ashdod layer on top of that. At year-end, Suprin Projects was also entitled to about ILS 15 million of unpaid engineering-management fees. So here too, there is already recognized revenue and profit, but part of the money has still not moved.
Land inventory: Yosseftal pushed cash forward
Land inventory rose to ILS 73.8 million from ILS 40.9 million. The sharpest increase came from Yosseftal in Bat Yam, which jumped to ILS 33.4 million from just ILS 4.1 million at the end of 2024. The note explains why: in December 2024 Suprin Nechasim signed for the acquisition of the rights in Yosseftal 8 for total consideration of ILS 27.8 million, and by the end of 2025 had already paid the full amount using roughly ILS 22 million of bank debt. At the same time, Neve Shamir in Beit Shemesh increased to ILS 21.0 million from ILS 19.0 million.
This is exactly the kind of cash that gets absorbed well before the company produces delivered units or full collections. In Yosseftal there is not even an accounting debate. The cash has already left. It is simply now sitting in land and permitting stages.
Future-project costs are eating cash too
The line for costs on account of projects and other receivables rose to ILS 27.2 million from ILS 10.5 million. That is not a noise item. It is an increase of more than ILS 16 million in one year, and it says the company is funding today the early stages of the next project wave.
The largest component is the Tiberias compound in Petah Tikva, ILS 10.0 million at the end of 2025. The note says the company committed to provide a shareholder loan of ILS 15.65 million to the project company, of which ILS 5.65 million was already recognized as an asset for accumulated project costs, and by the date the statements were approved the full loan had already been advanced. Ha'em in Ramat Gan, Danya in Rehovot, Jesse Cohen in Holon, and Rashi in Rishon LeZion had also already pulled in several more millions of shekels.
This is where backlog quality matters. Backlog built through planning work, signatures, and shareholder advances is not cash backlog. It is backlog that still needs time, capital, and sometimes more debt before the income statement and the cash statement finally meet.
The presentation and Appendix A say the same thing
There are two more evidence layers that sharpen the same conclusion without adding a different story.
The first is the 2025 investor presentation. In the partial proportionate-consolidation balance sheet, management shows ILS 484.8 million of current assets against ILS 376.0 million of current liabilities and ILS 156.0 million of equity. In the same presentation, it shows ILS 156.3 million of revenue, ILS 69.7 million of gross profit, ILS 34.3 million of operating profit, and ILS 7.1 million of net profit.
The presentation does not change the accounting treatment, but it does reinforce the pattern: more activity, more current assets, more current liabilities, and equity that barely moved. So even when management chooses to show the broader operating footprint, the conclusion is the same. Scale grew faster than the cushion.
The second layer is Appendix A on Suprin Nechasim. There the picture is arguably even sharper. Suprin Nechasim ended 2025 with negative operating cash flow of ILS 31.2 million and negative investing cash flow of ILS 38.7 million, while needing ILS 83.6 million of financing cash flow. In the same appendix you can also see what consumed the money: inventory of units for sale increased by ILS 32.7 million, investment in future projects by ILS 13.8 million, and investment property by ILS 19.6 million.
That is the decisive point of this continuation analysis. The gap between profit and cash is not just a one-off issue in the consolidated statements. It also appears in the subsidiary layer that holds much of the land, inventory, and future-project investments. That makes it harder to read 2025 as a temporary distortion that will fix itself without visible collection and a slowdown in working-capital absorption.
Why backlog still is not cash
The natural temptation is to look at ILS 181 million of signed backlog and say the cash will simply arrive a little later. That may still happen, but it is not proof yet. For that claim to become true in practice, three things need to happen at the same time.
First, revenue receivable, especially in Migdalei Atid, has to start coming down through collections that show up in the cash-flow statement, not only through continued accounting progress. Second, Technopark Ashdod has to move from reimbursements and accrued income to actual cash returned to the company. Third, the land and future-project buckets have to stop growing faster than earnings.
Until then, Suprin remains a company whose backlog proves demand and activity, but not yet high-quality conversion from profit to cash. That is a material difference. Backlog opens an outlook. Cash resolves a test.
Conclusion
The lesson of 2025 is not that Suprin cannot generate profit. The lesson is that the profit still came with a heavy cash cost. ILS 112.1 million of revenue receivable, ILS 23.6 million of debtors, ILS 73.8 million of land inventory, and ILS 27.2 million of future-project costs all say the same thing in four different lines: the company pushed capital into projects faster than it got it back.
That is why this continuation compresses the main article's conclusion into one line. Backlog has opened, but cash has not opened with it. Until collections in Migdalei Atid and Technopark show up in the cash-flow statement, and until land plus future-project costs stop expanding faster than the bottom line, Suprin remains a story of earnings being recorded before cash is proven.
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