Midas Investments: How much of the US value is already leased, and how much still depends on re-leasing?
Midas already has a leased floor in its US logistics book, mainly in the two Vericast assets. But almost all of the upside the company presents in NOI and value sits in Virginia, Washington and Norton, where the next leg still depends on re-leasing and rent resets.
What Is Already Leased, And What Still Remains An Operating Option
The main article already established that Midas's US logistics portfolio is one of the company’s main value anchors. This follow-up does not go back to the parent-company liquidity question. It isolates a narrower issue that matters just as much for how the US book should be read: how much of the value already rests on live leases, and how much still depends on re-leasing vacant space or resetting rents toward market.
The answer is sharper than the summary slide suggests. There is a real floor in the US portfolio, but it is relatively narrow. The two Vericast assets in Livonia and Durham are the part that is already largely signed. By contrast, almost all of the upside management asks the reader to capitalize sits in Virginia, Washington and Norton. That value still has to be earned through lease-up, occupancy gains and higher rents.
In the March 2026 presentation, the two Vericast assets generate current NOI of about $2.27 million and rise to only about $2.37 million in the two-year scenario. That is just about $0.10 million of uplift. The other three assets, Virginia, Washington and Norton, move together from about $12.3 million of current NOI to about $18.8 million. That is about $6.5 million of uplift. In other words, almost all of the NOI upside shown in the deck still rests on three assets where the story is not yet contractually locked.
That chart matters precisely because it does not show five similar assets. It shows the opposite. The US portfolio is no longer just a theoretical option book, but it is also far from being fully contracted cash flow. If the reader wants the floor, the answer is mainly Vericast. If the reader wants the upside, the answer is clearly future leasing.
| Asset | Current NOI in the presentation | NOI in the two-year scenario | What really sits behind it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Livonia | $1.189 million | $1.244 million | Fully leased asset with contractual rent steps |
| Durham | $1.082 million | $1.131 million | Fully leased asset with contractual rent steps |
| Virginia | $1.6 million | $4.4 million | Recovery from partial occupancy through re-leasing |
| Washington | $6.2 million | $8.2 million | Mix of leasing already achieved and further lease-up |
| Norton | $4.5 million | $6.2 million | Existing partial lease plus assumed leasing of the vacant area |
The Floor: The Two Vericast Assets
The two assets held through Vericast Holdco, Durham and Livonia, are the most clearly leased part of the US book. Both were at 100% occupancy in 2025. Both are leased to Vericast under 12-year leases with about 7 years remaining, and both include annual rent escalators of 2.25%. Economically, these are not lease-up stories. They are contract stories.
That is exactly why they form the floor. In the annual report, 2025 NOI was about $1.091 million in Durham and about $1.203 million in Livonia. Even in the presentation, the gap between current NOI and the two-year scenario is very small: about $49 thousand in Durham and about $54 thousand in Livonia. This is not an asset-repositioning thesis. It is a stability thesis.
There is still a small yellow flag here. Stable does not mean diversified. Both assets depend on the same tenant, Vericast. So it is correct to treat them as a solid contracted base, but not as a broadly diversified tenant mix. The floor in the US portfolio is signed, but part of it is concentrated in one name.
That is why Vericast should not carry the upside multiple of the whole portfolio. If those two assets keep behaving as they did in 2025, they give the company a base. They are not the reason the story changes.
The Three Assets Where The Upside Still Needs To Be Signed
Virginia
Virginia is the clearest case where the gap between what already exists and what the reader is asked to capitalize is still wide. In December 2025, a tenant left, and occupancy fell to 61%. The annual report shows 2025 NOI of about $1.484 million, while the valuation table already builds a different path: 58% occupancy in year one, 100% in year two, and representative NOI of about $3.392 million for valuation purposes. In the presentation, the same asset appears with current NOI of $1.6 million and a two-year scenario of $4.4 million.
This is the center of the issue. Virginia is not an asset where value comes mainly from normal contractual escalators. It is an asset that still has to refill. That means the move from $52.5 million of value to $60 million in the presentation rests on execution. Until the space is actually re-leased, that value remains a scenario, not a floor.
Washington
Washington is already somewhere between floor and option. On the one hand, there is existing rent in place: two US corporate tenants were paying about $3.3 million per year together. On the other hand, the company itself says that full lease-up could take annual rent to about $7 million. This is no longer a simple contractual escalation story. It is a story about re-leasing vacated space and resetting rents toward market.
This is also where the most interesting analytical point appears. The valuation the company received as of June 30, 2025, at roughly $101 million, was driven mainly by the exit of one tenant that had been paying a very low rent of about $4 per square foot, versus market rent of about $14.5 per square foot in the area. In other words, part of the value was already written on the assumption that the market would absorb the space at a materially higher rent. By the time the annual report was approved, part of that space had already been re-leased, occupancy had risen to about 68%, and expected NOI had reached about $6.2 million. That is exactly the number the presentation uses as “current” NOI, while the two-year scenario rises further to $8.2 million.
Washington therefore is not an asset with no signed value at all. Part of the path has already been traveled. But it is also far from being a Vericast-type asset. The incremental value still has to pass through additional signed leases, not just through valuation marks.
Norton
Norton is probably the easiest asset to over-read on paper because the presentation shows a move from $65 million of current value to $100 million in two years. But it is also the clearest case in terms of character: this was acquired only after the balance-sheet date, in February 2026, so there is not even a 2025 in-group base here.
The asset is partially leased to a US corporation for about 15 years, with annual rent of about $4.5 million and 3% yearly escalation. That is the existing base. But here too the company states explicitly that the managing partners will work to lease the remaining vacant space, and that annual rent could reach about $6.2 million once the asset is fully leased. So Norton also carries a meaningful piece of value that still depends on what has not yet been signed.
That is exactly why Norton should be read carefully. It adds a large asset with an existing tenant, but also an asset where part of the economics is still pro forma. It is a positive addition, not a full proof point.
That chart organizes the read better than any general sentence. The two Vericast assets together add only about $2.6 million in the presentation scenario. Virginia, Washington and Norton together add about $71.3 million. So even in value terms, not just NOI terms, nearly all of the next layer of upside still sits in three assets where occupancy and rent still need to prove out.
The Problem With The Word “Current”
The presentation uses the same visual language for all five assets: current NOI versus NOI in two years. That is clean visually, but much less clean analytically. The word “current” does not mean the same thing in every asset.
In Durham and Livonia, presentation current NOI is very close to the 2025 NOI in the annual report. These really are stable assets with a contracted base. In Virginia, current NOI already reflects the post-tenant-exit disruption, so it is a weaker base. In Washington, the gap is much larger: 2025 NOI in the annual report was about $3.1 million, while the presentation’s “current” figure already jumps to $6.2 million because it relies on partial re-leasing that happened after the valuation date and on expected NOI, not only on the 2025 result. In Norton, there is no 2025 NOI inside the group at all, because the acquisition happened only after the balance-sheet date.
| Asset | 2025 NOI in the annual report | “Current” NOI in the presentation | The right way to read it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Durham | $1.091 million | $1.082 million | Essentially the same contracted base |
| Livonia | $1.203 million | $1.189 million | Essentially the same contracted base |
| Virginia | $1.484 million | $1.6 million | A base already affected by a tenant exit and still needing repair |
| Washington | $3.1 million | $6.2 million | The presentation already includes expected NOI after partial re-leasing |
| Norton | No 2025 in-group base | $4.5 million | Post-balance-sheet acquisition with an existing partial lease |
This is not a technical footnote. It is the right way to read the whole portfolio. The summary slide creates the impression that all five assets sit on the same path, from current to two years out. In reality, some of the numbers are already running contracted cash flow, some are expected NOI after partial leasing, and some are acquisition-day in-place rent from an asset that only entered the group after year-end. So anyone trying to answer “how much of the value is already leased” cannot stop at the portfolio summary line.
Bottom Line
Midas’s US portfolio already has a real base. It is not built only on appraisals and not only on a slide deck. The two Vericast assets provide a floor of fully leased buildings with clear leases. Washington and Norton also have existing rent in place, not empty shells. But almost everything that turns the portfolio from “base” into “upside” still sits on a lease-up and rent-reset process.
That means the right read is not binary. This is not a choice between “everything is already there” and “everything is still a dream.” The existing, contracted part of the portfolio is relatively concentrated, mainly in Vericast. The part that can change the size of the value sits in three assets that still have not passed the full-contract test. Anyone valuing the US book as if the entire two-year scenario were already signed is getting ahead of the evidence. Anyone ignoring the Vericast floor is being too harsh.
For Midas, that distinction matters more than usual. A small company with a pressured parent layer cannot afford to blur the line between NOI that already sits in a lease and NOI that still has to be signed. There is already real value in the US book. But almost all of the next jump still depends on leasing.
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