Maman 2025: Aviation Recovered, but Accessible Cash Still Comes from Real Estate

Company Overview

Maman is no longer a classic listed-equity story. It is now effectively a public bond company sitting on an unusual mix of a cargo terminal at Ben Gurion Airport, logistics services, aviation services, and an income-producing real-estate layer. That matters because the right way to read 2025 is not "is the stock cheap," but whether the group can convert operational recovery into clean, durable, accessible cash. The headline numbers look strong: revenue rose 13% to NIS 1.147 billion, operating profit rose 50% to NIS 111.8 million, and net profit jumped 74% to NIS 44.0 million. But that is only the first layer.

What is clearly working now is aviation. Revenue in aviation services jumped 49% to NIS 235.2 million, and operating profit moved from a loss of NIS 1.5 million to a profit of NIS 18.7 million. That was the engine that carried the year. Covenants are also not the current problem: net financial debt to net CAP stands at only 13%, equity to assets stands at 56.2%, and the company reports an A+ rating with a stable outlook.

But the thesis is still not clean. The cargo terminal, historically the core asset, did not have a breakout year. It had a holding year. Cargo handled at the terminal rose only 3% to 211.9 thousand tons, while market share fell from 59% to 56% as foreign airlines returned and some of that recovery flowed elsewhere. Logistics, the group’s largest revenue segment, kept growing but showed weaker earnings quality. And above all, the real-estate layer did send cash upstream, but it did so alongside new leverage at Gav-Yam Maman.

That is why a superficial reading of the year is misleading. Anyone looking only at the jump in profit could conclude that Maman has already cleared the difficult period. A closer read shows something else: the recovery is real, but the residual cash after leases, investment, and debt service is still thin, and some of the value made accessible to the parent and to creditors came from real estate, not only from cleaner operating economics.

Economic Map

Events and Triggers

Aviation came back, and then got disrupted again

The main trigger in 2025 was the gradual return of foreign airlines, especially from the third quarter onward. That drove the rebound in ground handling, VIP, transport, and GSA activity. It also explains why aviation services swung back to profit. But the recovery did not arrive in a straight line. The company explicitly describes the missile event at Ben Gurion in May 2025, the full shutdown of air traffic in June 2025 during Operation Rising Lion, and then, after the balance-sheet date, another airspace shutdown starting on February 28, 2026 during Operation Roaring Lion. By the time the annual report was approved, the company was already saying that this event was expected to hurt first-quarter 2026 aviation results.

So 2025 proved that Maman has real operating leverage when aviation activity returns. 2026 starts with that same lever being tested again. This is exactly the kind of setup where the market can overreact to the positive full-year headline, or overreact to the negative headline in the next quarter.

The cargo terminal signed contracts, but the competitive structure did not improve

Two important events took place at the cargo terminal. The first was the extension of the framework agreement with El Al through the end of 2029. The second was an updated agreement with CAL, also for five years, signed in March 2025. On paper these are supportive developments: two clear anchor customers are still with the terminal.

But that is not the whole story. CAL belongs to the shareholder group of Swissport Israel, the terminal’s main competitor, and the company itself says this increases the risk that CAL may ultimately move more of its activity there. At the same time, Maman’s cargo-terminal market share kept slipping even in a year of aviation recovery. In other words, the contracts extend some visibility, but they do not eliminate the erosion in relative position.

Aviation authorizations were extended, and that removes immediate pressure

Laufer’s Airports Authority authorization for ground services was extended from January 1, 2026 for 28 months, through April 30, 2028. The VIP authorization was also extended through the same date. Tal Limousine has authorization periods through December 2028 for passenger transport and through December 2027 for airline crew transport. These are not flashy headlines, but they do remove near-term operating pressure and allow management to exploit the recovery without immediately entering another round of regulatory uncertainty.

Real estate sent cash upstream

The most interesting event, and the easiest one to miss, happened in the real-estate layer. Gav-Yam Maman distributed a dividend of NIS 60 million in 2025, meaning Maman’s share was NIS 30 million, and that amount indeed supported group operating cash flow. But in that very same year Gav-Yam Maman also received a new long-term bank loan of NIS 60 million. That is not a typo. Value did move upstream, but it did so through a leveraged route.

Efficiency, Profitability, and Competition

Aviation services were the true improvement engine

The aviation-services segment was what turned 2025 from a survival year into a recovery year. Revenue jumped to NIS 235.2 million from NIS 157.5 million in 2024. Operating profit rose to NIS 18.7 million from a loss of NIS 1.5 million. Even versus 2023, when segment revenue was NIS 239.3 million, 2025 is still slightly lower on revenue but materially stronger on operating profit. That suggests the group benefited from sharp operating leverage as activity returned.

The important point is that this is not just a demand story. In ground services the group holds about 37% share by international flights at Ben Gurion, excluding airlines that self-handle. It is a competitive market, but authorizations, certifications, and live operational capability create a practical barrier to entry. That is why aviation recovery did not translate only into higher revenue. It also translated into the return of operating leverage.

That chart explains why the macro headline is not enough. Fourth-quarter revenue was close to the annual high, but net profit was only NIS 4.1 million. Activity came back, yet costs, valuation effects, finance expense, and one-offs were still enough to compress the bottom line sharply.

The cargo terminal remains a strong asset, but it no longer explains the whole company

The cargo terminal is still an important operating anchor. Maman operates a terminal with estimated handling capacity of about 250 thousand tons per year, under an authorization running through March 31, 2029 with an Airports Authority option to extend by up to four more years, and it remains a recognized monopoly in air-cargo terminal services. But this is exactly where the paradox sits.

On one hand, it is a strong infrastructure asset with clear anchor customers. El Al accounted for 30.5% of the tons handled at the terminal in 2025, and CAL accounted for another 24.7%. Together they represented 55.2% of terminal tonnage. On the other hand, that same concentration is also a risk, especially when CAL is connected to the main competitor. In addition, the company is not free to price as it likes: a large part of cargo-terminal tariffs remains regulated, while the company says competitors do not face the same pricing restrictions.

In 2025, Ben Gurion handled 380.8 thousand tons, up from 347.7 thousand tons in 2024. Maman’s terminal handled 211.9 thousand tons, up from 205.5 thousand tons. But market share fell to 56%. That means the terminal participated in the market recovery, but it did not capture a larger piece of it.

At the profit level, the terminal generated NIS 11.3 million of operating profit versus NIS 8.1 million in 2024. That improvement is real, but it also needs to be read carefully. In the fourth quarter of 2024 the company recorded a NIS 5.5 million expense from a withholding-tax audit. So part of the fourth-quarter improvement is operational recovery, and part of it is an easier comparison base.

Logistics kept growing, but at the expense of earnings quality

This is probably the biggest friction point in Maman’s 2025 result. Logistics services generated NIS 678.2 million of revenue, more than any other segment, and still grew 7%. Yet operating profit fell 4% to NIS 43.5 million. In the fourth quarter the contrast was much sharper: revenue of NIS 167.0 million versus NIS 158.5 million, but operating profit of only NIS 6.5 million versus NIS 20.5 million in the prior-year quarter.

Here the company is quite explicit. The erosion came from updated municipal tax rates, retroactive municipal tax assessments, higher wage expense, and a flattered 2024 comparison base that included a roughly NIS 9.3 million gain from derecognition of a lease asset and lease liability. This is a classic example of a segment that can look healthy through the revenue line while looking much less clean when earnings quality is unpacked.

That matters because logistics is labor-heavy and lease-heavy. In other words, it is a volume engine with relatively sticky cost layers. If pricing and efficiency do not improve quickly enough, revenue growth does not flow through to profit.

Real estate supports the story, but NOI, revaluation, and cash must be separated

The real-estate segment looks strong on the surface. Revenue rose 8% to NIS 26.8 million, and operating profit rose 29% to NIS 33.5 million. But that profit includes NIS 10.9 million of real-estate revaluation gains within the segment, and another layer comes through the company’s share of profit from the jointly controlled company.

If the activity is translated into cleaner real-estate language, same-property NOI on Maman’s share rose to NIS 28.6 million from NIS 26.2 million in 2024. That is a real improvement. But anyone trying to translate that directly into cash available to the group still has to ask whether that cash actually comes up as a dividend, and at what financing cost.

Cash Flow, Debt, and Capital Structure

The all-in cash picture is weaker than the profit statement

The central story of 2025 is that profit recovered faster than residual cash. Operating cash flow rose to NIS 194.6 million from NIS 140.0 million in 2024. That is a sharp improvement, and it was also supported by an approximately NIS 30 million dividend from a jointly controlled company. If the analysis stops there, the picture looks comfortable.

But the cash bridge needs to be defined carefully. The relevant frame here is all-in cash flexibility, not normalized cash generation. The company does not disclose maintenance capex, so a credible normalized bridge cannot be built without guesswork. The actual cash uses, however, are visible.

In 2025 the group invested about NIS 58.2 million in fixed assets and intangibles, mainly for a move to a new building in logistics. It also paid about NIS 112.8 million of lease principal. After those two items, only about NIS 23.6 million remained from operating cash flow. After loan and bond amortization of about NIS 63.5 million, the all-in picture was already negative by about NIS 39.9 million, before new borrowing. That is why cash and cash equivalents fell from NIS 160.6 million to NIS 128.0 million.

That is the core issue. There is no immediate liquidity problem here, but there is a clear gap between the operating rebound and the cash that truly remains after the hard commitments embedded in the model.

Financial debt is not tight, but leases define the discipline

The group’s financial debt, excluding leases, actually fell to NIS 236.5 million from NIS 299.2 million. That is a good data point. But it would be wrong to treat leases as noise. Lease liabilities ended 2025 at NIS 966.6 million, versus NIS 829.0 million at the end of 2024. The increase came from entering and extending lease agreements, mainly in logistics.

Net finance expense jumped 37% to NIS 59.0 million. The company explains this through a combination of NIS 9.9 million of higher finance expense on lease liabilities, a NIS 5.3 million foreign-exchange loss, and NIS 3.5 million less interest income from deposits. In other words, the group is not trapped by classic bank debt. It is paying a heavier price for a lease-intensive operating structure.

Real estate creates value, but access to that value is leveraged

This is where created value has to be separated from accessible value. Gav-Yam Maman reported NIS 27.7 million of revenue in 2025, NIS 14.7 million of fair-value gain, and NIS 26.9 million of net profit. Those are good numbers. But in that same year Gav-Yam Maman also distributed NIS 60 million and raised a new long-term bank loan of NIS 60 million. As a result, equity fell from NIS 230.3 million to NIS 197.2 million, while noncurrent liabilities jumped from NIS 58.5 million to NIS 116.3 million.

That means the group did succeed in pulling cash up from the real-estate layer, but it was not simple free cash in the cleanest sense. It came together with incremental leverage at the joint-venture level. That is not necessarily wrong, but it is not the same quality of cash as a dividend funded entirely out of unlevered operating surplus.

Outlook

The hot engine is aviation services, not the cargo terminal.

Logistics is holding volume, but not yet proving earnings quality.

Real estate is creating value, but part of the accessible cash came through added leverage.

Covenant headroom is wide, so 2026 is a quality test, not a survival test.

This is still a proof year. On one side, the operating base entering 2026 is better than it was entering 2024. Aviation services have already shown they can swing back to profit, key authorizations were extended, and the company starts the year without visible covenant stress. On the other side, the blow already recorded in early 2026 in aviation means the 2025 rebound was not enough to turn Maman into a shock-resistant story.

What has to happen over the next 2-4 quarters for the read to improve? First, the return of foreign airlines needs to continue even after the first-quarter 2026 disruption. Second, logistics has to show a better translation from revenue growth into profitability, otherwise it will continue to look like a segment that fills volume but consumes cash. Third, the cargo terminal has to stop losing share. If the air-cargo market recovers but more of that volume goes through competitors, the value of Maman’s historic infrastructure position weakens.

And what would break the thesis? A combination of three things: another interruption in aviation recovery, another year of weak logistics profitability, and continued dependence on the real-estate layer to release value through leverage rather than through stable NOI and ordinary distributions. If all three happen together, 2025 will look in hindsight more like an accounting rebound than a structural improvement in business quality.

Risks

Concentration at the cargo terminal is still high

El Al and CAL together account for more than half of the tonnage handled at the terminal. That is comfortable while both customers stay. It is painful if one of them shifts volume or uses its commercial weight to improve terms. In CAL’s case, that risk is larger because the company itself highlights the link to Swissport’s shareholder group.

The company is not free to price like a normal private operator

Maman has a strong asset, but it also carries a heavy regulatory frame. A large portion of cargo-terminal tariffs remains regulated, and the company emphasizes that competitors do not face the same pricing limits. That means the infrastructure advantage comes together with a constraint on pricing freedom.

Legal and tax matters are not shaking the story, but they are not zero either

The group carries a total provision of about NIS 10.1 million for various claims. Beyond that, there are several open fronts: the Airports Authority demand for NIS 18.6 million plus VAT based on its own calculation, while the company argues the justified repayment is much lower; a VAT assessment at Laufer of about NIS 16 million plus linkage and interest, for which a provision was recorded; and a material aviation-related lawsuit against Laufer. These are not existential risks at the moment, but they do add noise, expense, and uncertainty.

Authorizations are an asset, but also a structural dependency

Both the cargo terminal and the ground and VIP operations rely on Airports Authority authorizations. Those authorizations were extended, which is positive. But it is still a model that depends on a regulator, an airport, and a volatile security environment. Demand alone does not determine the outcome here.

Conclusions

Maman finished 2025 in a better place than it appeared to be a year ago. Aviation services returned to profit, covenant headroom is wide, and the group still sits on real infrastructure and service assets with genuine demand. But the central bottleneck did not disappear: the cash left after leases, investment, and debt service is still tight, and part of the value made accessible right now comes from the real-estate layer through added leverage.

So this is not a distress year, but it is not a clean-up year either. It is a proof year. Over the next 2-4 quarters the market will need to see that aviation recovery is holding, that logistics stops diluting profitability, and that the real-estate layer can support the group without becoming a permanent financing plug for the cash gap.

Current thesis: Maman has already proven that aviation can bring profit back, but it has not yet proven that this rebound translates into clean, accessible cash at a pace that removes dependence on the real-estate layer.

What changed: In 2024 the problem was demand and aviation disruption. In 2025 the problem is translation quality: who actually generates the profit, who dilutes it, and what part of accessible cash still depends on real estate and leverage.

Counter-thesis: One can argue that the hardest part is already behind the company, that the logistics weakness is mostly temporary, and that a fuller return of foreign airlines will clean up the cash picture faster than it currently seems.

What could change the market reading in the short to medium term: first-quarter and second-quarter 2026 results. Those reports will show whether the new aviation hit is only temporary noise, and whether logistics can absorb municipal taxes, wage pressure, and leases without continuing to damage earnings quality.

Why this matters: Maman owns businesses that, at their core, are real service and infrastructure assets. The key question is no longer whether activity exists. It is whether that activity leaves cash at the end that does not depend on revaluation, fresh leverage, or a one-off dividend from a jointly controlled company.

What has to happen now: steadier aviation recovery, stabilization in cargo-terminal share, and a return of logistics margins to a more reasonable level. What would weaken the story is another round of aviation disruption without a quick recovery, together with another year in which logistics grows in revenue but not in quality.