Lapidoth-Heletz: How Much Of The Cash Is Really Free, And How Much Is Already Tied To Waiting And Restart
The main article established that Heletz is still trapped behind permits. This follow-up shows that out of NIS 132.5 million of liquid assets, only NIS 104.1 million is cash and cash equivalents, while the rest sits in securities exposure, booked provisions, a US$2 million guarantee, and a first development step that requires US$8.09 million.
What This Follow-Up Is Isolating
The main article already framed the core bottleneck: Heletz is still waiting for permits, which makes the balance sheet look richer than the operating reality. This continuation isolates a narrower question, but it is the one that matters if the reader wants to know how much value is actually close to the unit holder: how much of the liquidity stack is genuine cash access, and how much is already exposed to capital markets, tied to environmental liabilities, or needed just to get the field moving again.
That is the point of this piece. Profit language is not the right lens here. Neither is long-range field value. The right frame is all-in cash flexibility: what remains once the analysis separates real cash from marketable securities, then layers in the commitments already visible on the balance sheet and the first dollars required if Heletz moves into development.
The distinction matters because the screen can tell a very misleading story. On the last trading day the participation unit traded at 138.7 agorot, on turnover of only NIS 4.9 thousand, implying a market value of roughly NIS 97 million. Against that sits NIS 132.5 million of liquid assets at year-end 2025. That gap invites the easy read that this is simply cash trading below cash. It is not that simple.
NIS 132.5 Million Of Liquidity Is Not NIS 132.5 Million Of Free Cash
Liquid assets reached NIS 132.467 million at the end of 2025, up from NIS 125.221 million a year earlier. But once the notes break the number down, it is clear that the figure has two very different layers: NIS 104.124 million of cash and cash equivalents, and another NIS 28.343 million of short-term deposits and investments measured at fair value through profit or loss.
That distinction is the whole thesis. The NIS 104.1 million is the cash core. The NIS 28.3 million is not dormant cash in the bank. It is securities exposure. Roughly NIS 24 million of the liquid means was held in VAR Equity, LP, while the rest of the portfolio also sits in equities, bonds, and shekel and dollar deposits. So a meaningful part of what first looks like a cash pile is actually a market-linked portfolio.
That also explains why the increase in liquidity should not be read as field economics funding themselves during the waiting period. Cash flow from operating activity in 2025 was only NIS 128 thousand. This is not an operating asset generating its own bridge money while permits are pending. It is a financially managed balance sheet waiting for the regulatory process to move.
What Is Already Tied Up Before The First New Well
The common mistake is to stop after separating cash from securities. Even if the securities are taken at full carrying value, the pool is still not fully free.
First, the balance sheet already carries NIS 5.149 million of provisions: NIS 3.782 million current and NIS 1.367 million long term. The notes make clear that these mainly relate to soil contamination treatment and well sealing. In other words, the partnership already acknowledges through its own balance sheet that part of the liquidity is not really free capital.
Second, above the balance sheet sits a US$2 million autonomous bank guarantee in favor of the state, meant to secure compliance with the production lease terms. The guarantee has been extended again, most recently through December 31, 2027. It is true that this is not a current profit and loss charge, but that is exactly why it matters for accessibility rather than accounting: keeping the option alive requires real balance-sheet support behind the lease.
The table below organizes the constraint layers that are already visible:
| Layer | Amount | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents | NIS 104.124 million | The closest layer to immediately usable liquidity |
| Short-term securities | NIS 28.343 million | Liquid, but still market-exposed rather than pure cash |
| Of which in VAR Equity | About NIS 24 million | A meaningful concentration inside the securities layer |
| Booked provisions | NIS 5.149 million | Environmental and well-sealing uses already recognized |
| Lease-related guarantee | US$2 million | An off-balance-sheet constraint required to keep the regulatory option alive |
The analytical implication is straightforward: even before development is discussed, the NIS 132.5 million is not one homogeneous pile of cash. Part is cash, part is a securities portfolio, and part is already spoken for by obligations that do not create immediately accessible value for unit holders.
The First Step Back Into Heletz Starts With A Cash Hole
This is the easiest point to miss if the reader looks only at the headline liquidity number. The reserve cash-flow tables do not begin with value extraction. They begin with capital needs.
Even under the proved reserves case, and also under the 2P case, 2027 carries US$8.09 million of development cost. Against that, forecast 2027 revenue is only US$2.92 million in 1P and US$3.67 million in 2P. The result is that the first operating year still stays negative after tax. In 1P, un-discounted after-tax cash flow for 2027 is negative US$6.94 million. In 2P it is negative US$6.47 million.
The table matters not only because of the US$8.09 million number, but because of the sequence. Investment comes first, then cash generation maybe follows. This is not a case where a large cash pile is immediately matched by a producing field. It is a case where liquidity first has to bridge a regulatory waiting period, carry existing obligations, and then fund a first operating year that still opens with negative cash flow.
There is also an internal tension in the filing worth flagging. The descriptive part of the reserve opinion says the working assumption is a return to production during 2026. But the oil-asset note says that by year-end 2025 the expected return to production was updated to 2027. The reader does not need to decide which sentence sounds better. The cash model already says enough: it shows no revenue in 2026, and it places the meaningful development spend ahead of value realization.
So How Much Is Really Free
The right way to read Lapidoth-Heletz after this filing is through three layers rather than one number.
The first layer is near-cash liquidity: NIS 104.124 million of cash and cash equivalents. That is a real cushion.
The second layer is liquidity with volatility: NIS 28.343 million of short-term securities, with about NIS 24 million concentrated in one fund. That is still liquid capital, but it is not the same thing as risk-free cash.
The third layer is money already tied to patience: NIS 5.149 million of booked provisions, a US$2 million guarantee needed to keep the lease standing, and a first development step that demands US$8.09 million in 2027 before the scenario starts to look cash generative.
That is where the continuation thesis comes from. Lapidoth-Heletz is not a partnership facing an immediate liquidity crisis. But it is also not a clean cash shell that the market can translate one-for-one into accessible value. Part of the value sits in securities, part of it is already tied to environmental and regulatory obligations, and part of it will be needed to finance the waiting period and the first move back into development.
Conclusion
The main article described a company whose asset value is trapped behind permits. This follow-up sharpens the point by showing that the cash itself is partly trapped inside the same waiting game. The NIS 132.5 million number is real, but it is not a pure free-cash number for unit holders.
The thesis now: Lapidoth-Heletz has enough liquidity to keep waiting, but not a liquidity position that eliminates the gap between paper value and value that is actually accessible to unit holders.
What the market may miss is not a lack of cash, but the price of waiting: as long as there is no regulatory certainty, even a large cash stack slowly turns into a mix of obligations, guarantees, and market-exposed assets, and once development finally begins, the first step still starts with capital going out before cash can come back in.
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