Living Stone: How Much Cash Actually Reaches the Parent
By the end of 2025, almost all consolidated cash was already sitting at the parent. But the parent-only statements show that this cash pile was built mainly through equity and bond issuance, not through a steady upstream flow from the properties. That distinction matters because Living Stone's public layer is the parent bond, not a listed equity line.
The main article already established that Living Stone's operating platform can grow rents, maintain occupancy, and keep building a residential portfolio. This follow-up isolates one narrower question: how much of the 2025 cash actually reached the parent from the assets themselves, and how much arrived from the top through equity and debt.
That is not a technical distinction. Living Stone meets the public through one bond series, not through a listed equity line. So the practical question is not only whether the asset base is creating value. It is whether the parent layer can turn that value into cash that can service interest, support acquisitions, and preserve a buffer without reopening the capital markets.
Three facts frame the issue immediately:
- The parent ended 2025 with EUR 14.26 million of cash, almost the same as consolidated cash of EUR 14.76 million.
- But the parent cash flow statement shows only EUR 474 thousand of operating cash flow, versus EUR 20.86 million from financing activities.
- In the parent-only balance sheet, EUR 57.06 million, about 77.7% of assets, sits in related-party balances and investments in subsidiaries rather than in cash.
That is the point. By year-end there is barely a stock gap between consolidated cash and parent cash. The real gap is in the path the cash took to get there.
The Cash Sits at the Top, but the Upstream Flow Is Still Thin
On a surface read, the accessibility problem may look solved. If the parent ends the year with EUR 14.26 million of cash, almost all consolidated cash, then perhaps the value has already moved from the assets into the public layer. The parent cash flow statement says otherwise.
On a consolidated basis, operating cash flow reached EUR 3.77 million in 2025. At the parent, the same line was only EUR 474 thousand. At the same time, parent investing activity consumed EUR 7.40 million, so the cash pile at the top was not built by operating inflow. It was built because financing activities added EUR 20.86 million.
This chart explains why the cash balance alone can mislead. In stock terms, the cash is already at the top. In process terms, it still is not being built there organically.
The parent waterfall is even sharper. Opening cash of EUR 329 thousand, operating cash flow of EUR 474 thousand, minus EUR 7.40 million of investing outflow, plus EUR 20.86 million of financing inflow, ending at EUR 14.26 million. The buffer was not built by the asset base. It was built by capital markets and financing sources.
The composition of financing makes that even clearer. The parent received EUR 10 million from an equity issuance and EUR 25.54 million from the bond issuance net of deferred costs, while repaying EUR 14.04 million of long-term debt. This is not the cash profile of a mature platform upstreaming excess cash from its properties. It is the cash profile of a parent layer still being built through equity and debt.
Parent Profit Looks Fine, but It Still Is Not Accessible Cash
The parent-only income statement sharpens the divide between value created lower in the structure and cash actually reaching the top. In 2025 the parent itself generated only EUR 105 thousand of revenue, with EUR 601 thousand of G&A and EUR 623 thousand of net finance expense. Before the line for the parent share in profits of subsidiaries, the parent was effectively at a pre-tax loss of EUR 1.12 million.
What turned that picture into EUR 1.49 million of net profit was EUR 2.34 million of the parent share in profits of subsidiaries. That is an important accounting line, but it is also the easiest place to overread the cash story. In the parent cash flow statement, that same subsidiary-profit line is fully reversed as a non-cash adjustment. In other words, more than the entire net profit of the parent came from a line that did not arrive as cash in the parent during the year.
| Parent-level item | 2025, EUR million | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 0.105 | The parent itself generates very little income |
| Operating loss | (0.496) | The holding layer still consumes cash rather than producing it |
| Net finance expense | (0.623) | The financing layer eats what little income exists |
| Share in profits of subsidiaries | 2.337 | This is what turns the loss into profit, but not into cash |
| Net profit | 1.489 | It looks more comfortable than the cash flow |
| Cash flow adjustment for subsidiary profits | (2.337) | Explicit confirmation that the profit did not reach the cash balance in that year |
That also explains why the company explicitly says FFO does not reflect the cash it holds or its ability to distribute it. At the asset layer one can talk about NOI, FFO, and fair value gains. At the parent layer, the harder question is how much of those figures stops on the way up and becomes an accounting profit line rather than free cash.
The Parent Balance Sheet Is Built on Claims to Value, Not on Readily Available Liquidity
The parent-only balance sheet looks strong at first glance. Total assets stand at EUR 73.44 million, equity at EUR 47.14 million, and public debt at EUR 25.76 million. But the composition of assets is the real story.
Out of EUR 73.44 million of assets, only EUR 14.26 million is cash. Against that, EUR 32.80 million is recorded as related-party balances and EUR 24.27 million as investments in subsidiaries. Together that is EUR 57.06 million, close to four fifths of the balance sheet.
That does not mean the value is weak or that the assets are poor quality. It does mean that most of the parent balance sheet is not immediate liquidity. It is a claim on value sitting lower in the group. For that value to become real flexibility at the parent, it has to turn into dividends, repayment of intercompany balances, or monetizations. Until that happens at a sufficient pace, a strong balance sheet on paper is not the same thing as cash that is truly available for debt service and new moves.
The Bond Layer Sits Exactly Where the Cash Flow Is Still Not Enough
This is where the public angle becomes concrete. At year-end 2025 the parent had EUR 26.18 million of non-current liabilities, of which EUR 25.76 million was bonds. That is effectively the company's public debt layer. The bond was issued in October 2025, carries a fixed annual coupon of 7.18%, is unrated, unsecured, and amortizes 10% at the end of 2027, 10% at the end of 2028, and 80% at the end of 2029.
This is where the accessibility test bites. In 2025 the parent paid EUR 709 thousand of interest and received EUR 152 thousand of interest. Even if one combines that interest income with the parent's operating cash flow, the result is only EUR 626 thousand. That is still below cash interest paid. So even before new acquisitions, new intercompany lending, or any additional growth step, the regular cash stream at the top still does not cover financing cost on its own.
The other side also matters. This is not an immediate distress picture. The company says it is in compliance with all material bond indenture obligations, that no immediate repayment trigger exists, that consolidated equity stands at EUR 47.14 million, and that net financial debt to CAP stands at 63.5%. In other words, 2025 does not point to a liquidity crisis. It points to a structure where the public bond layer is already sitting at the top, while the mechanism that feeds cash upward has not yet matured to the same degree.
Conclusion
2025 solved the cash-balance question temporarily, not the flow question structurally. The parent cash pile now looks real, but it was built mainly through equity issuance and bond issuance. In the same year that parent cash jumped to EUR 14.26 million, parent operating cash flow stayed at only EUR 474 thousand, while net profit leaned heavily on subsidiary-profit recognition that was reversed in the cash flow statement.
That is why the next chapter for Living Stone will not be decided only by asset values, occupancy, or NOI. The real test is whether 2026 and 2027 show that profit and value created at the asset level begin to move upward as a stable cash stream, rather than mainly as equity, accounting profit, or financing events. Until then, the value is there, but its accessibility to the parent remains the decisive issue.
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