Spacecom After Amos 3: What is left in 4W and what the orbital slot is really worth
After Amos 3, Spacecom is left at 4W with a small bridged business through leased third-party capacity and little more than option value in the orbital slot. Until spectrum coordination with the state is finalized and a funded replacement plan wins anchor demand, 4W is no longer a standalone earnings engine.
The main article argued that the debt restructuring bought Spacecom time, but did not settle the question of where the next leg of value will come from. This follow-up isolates one thread only: 4W after the end of Amos 3.
That distinction matters because three different things can easily be collapsed into one story: yes staying on in a reduced format, leased third-party capacity at 4W that is currently 100% occupied, and an orbital slot that is still registered to the company. Those are not the same economic asset. After March 2026, 4W is no longer a full satellite business. It is, at best, a combination of a small bridge business and a strategic option that still depends on regulatory clearance and state coordination.
The short version: what is left at 4W does not look large enough today to support a replacement satellite on its own. What still has value in the slot is not current cash flow but future optionality, and only if three pieces close together, spectrum, regulatory approval, and anchor demand.
What is actually left at 4W
The first number to keep in view is the erosion that had already happened before Amos 3 reached end of life. 4W service revenue fell to $31.6 million in 2025 from $50.4 million in 2024, a decline of roughly 37%. That is not a future event. It is already in the rear-view mirror.
Inside that $31.6 million, concentration was extreme. yes contributed $19.0 million, about 60% of 4W revenue. The Israeli government contributed another $7.1 million, roughly 22%. In other words, more than 82% of 4W in 2025 depended on two names. All other customers together contributed just $5.5 million.
The problem is not only concentration. The problem is that even those two anchors no longer look like a base that continues in the same form. The company says explicitly that after Amos 3 ends it is trying to retain only a small part of its customers by moving them to satellites owned by third parties, in contract volumes that are not material to the company. At the same time, it says that it currently provides services at 4W to only a limited number of customers through a third-party satellite, including yes.
There is an easy trap here. The company also says that all of the leased capacity it has taken at 4W is currently 100% occupied. On first read that sounds constructive. That is the wrong takeaway. Full utilization on a small leased base is not evidence that 4W has returned as a meaningful business unit. It only means Spacecom has managed to compress a bit of bridge activity into capacity bought from someone else. Once management itself adds that the scale is not material, 100% occupancy does not automatically translate into large economic value.
That is why 4W after Amos 3 now looks more like a thin service layer than a self-standing satellite platform.
The new yes contract is a thin bridge, not a replacement for Amos 3
To understand what is really left at 4W, yes has to be taken apart. According to the board report, yes received services through 12 transponder equivalents on Amos 3 and Amos 7 until the end of February 2025. From March 1, 2025 it received services through 10 transponder equivalents on Amos 3 until the end of its commercial life. Management then says explicitly that this reduction, together with the end of Amos 7 and Amos 3, cuts annual revenue by about $29 million.
The important part comes immediately after that. The expected effect on profitability is not material, because the company will no longer carry Amos 7 lease expense, Amos 3 depreciation, and Amos 3 operating expense. So 4W loses a lot of revenue, but much less economics.
That distinction matters. Anyone looking at 4W as a $30 million revenue activity and translating that straight into orbital-slot value or replacement-satellite value is missing the underlying economics. A large part of that legacy turnover simply does not survive as a meaningful profit layer.
The new yes contract reinforces that reading. In March 2026 the parties signed a new 34 month agreement based on capacity leased by Spacecom from a third party. Maximum expected revenue is $10.5 million for the full term, while minimum revenue, if yes terminates early without cause, is $5.55 million.
To understand the scale, that total has to be converted into an implied average annual pace. That is an analytical calculation, not a company-disclosed annual figure. At the top end, $10.5 million over 34 months implies about $3.7 million per year. At the bottom end, $5.55 million implies about $2.0 million per year. That is nowhere near the $19.0 million that yes contributed to 4W in 2025.
| yes activity layer | Disclosed figure | Economic meaning |
|---|---|---|
| yes revenue in 4W during 2025 | $19.0 million | The last full revenue base before Amos 3 ended |
| New agreement from March 2026, maximum revenue for full term | $10.5 million | A bridge contract that is much smaller than the legacy activity |
| New agreement from March 2026, minimum revenue for full term | $5.55 million | yes retains a termination right that materially reduces certainty |
| Implied average annual pace, analytical calculation | About $2.0 million to $3.7 million per year | A bridge service, not a replacement for Amos 3 |
The yes customer base itself points in the same direction. The board report says that, according to Bezeq's annual report as of December 31, 2025, roughly 88% of yes TV subscribers already use internet-based transmission, including subscribers who still use satellite in parallel. So the new contract is not a revival of the satellite model. It is a paid tail of a transition that is already far advanced.
The practical meaning is simple: yes remains at 4W, but not as an anchor capable of funding the next satellite by itself. It stays more as a way to preserve the commercial relationship and monetize the long tail of the migration.
What the orbital slot is really worth
This is the more interesting question. If the operating business at 4W has shrunk that far, perhaps the real value sits in the slot itself. The answer is yes, but only as an option, not as a freely monetizable asset that can be priced as if it were already in use.
The first reason is that the state is already inside the picture. In July 2025, Dror 1 was launched to 4W. The company says it cannot assess whether the government satellite will satisfy all of the government's needs. At the same time, it says the government is already using part of the spectrum in the networks the company registered at 4W, and that the use has not yet been finally settled between the parties.
The second reason is regulatory. Under the company license, it may not deploy a new satellite, change orbital position, or use the frequencies for another satellite without prior written approval from the regulator. So even if Spacecom holds rights and registered networks, it does not hold the slot the way someone holds a vacant plot that can be developed at will.
The third reason is operational. The company says explicitly that it is still examining alternatives, including a plan for the next satellite at 4W and possible cooperation with the government. That wording alone says the plan is not closed. Just as important, it also says other possible uses for Amos 3, such as moving it to another orbital point in inclined orbit until end of life, are not expected at this stage to generate revenue.
In other words, there is no hidden asset here that is already producing cash. There is a strategic option that still waits on three conditions.
| What has to happen for 4W to become economic value again | What already exists | What is still missing |
|---|---|---|
| Anchor demand | yes remains in a reduced format and government agreements still exist | A contract large enough to justify dedicated capacity or a replacement satellite |
| Spectrum and usage settlement | The government is already using part of the company's spectrum at 4W | A final settlement between the parties on allocation and terms |
| Execution path | The company is evaluating a next satellite and possible cooperation | An approved, funded, and regulator-cleared plan |
That is what the title question should really lead to. The slot is worth an option. That option could become important, especially if cooperation with the government is signed or if a new anchor customer appears. But until then, it cannot be read as though it were already a revenue-producing asset.
The backlog map says value has already moved elsewhere
The easiest way to see that is through beginning-of-2026 backlog. The company presents total backlog of $72.2 million. Out of that, Amos 3, which is effectively 4W, contributes only $4.4 million. Amos 4 contributes $21.3 million, Amos 17 contributes $44.4 million, and other activity contributes $2.2 million.
Analytically, that means 4W represents only about 6% of the backlog the company entered 2026 with. That does not mean the orbital slot has no potential. It does mean that the potential is not embedded in the current backlog, so it should not be read as though it were a continuous part of the current business.
It also explains why management keeps talking about alternatives and possible cooperation instead of presenting a closed continuation path. The backlog says the company's operating future is already being managed through Amos 17 and Amos 4. If 4W becomes material again, it will be through a new project, not through automatic rollover of what used to be there.
Conclusion
After Amos 3, two things are left at 4W, and they are very different. The first is a small bridge business, through leased third-party capacity, including yes in a reduced format. The second is a strategic option, an orbital slot and spectrum position that could still become a new platform in the future, but only if settlement with the state, regulatory approval, and economic demand all line up.
That is why anyone trying to value 4W today should avoid two mistakes. The first is to think that full occupancy on a small leased-capacity base means the issue is solved. The second is to think that the orbital slot itself is already worth the same as a ready-to-operate asset. Both readings are wrong.
The more accurate read is that 4W has stopped being a major revenue engine, without necessarily taking much profitability with it, and has turned into an option zone. That option may carry value, but for now it is still not cash on hand, not meaningful backlog, and not a funded replacement satellite. Until those pieces close, 4W remains a story of rights and potential, not a self-standing business.
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