Why Ashkol EBITDA Does Not Automatically Become Accessible Earnings at Dalia Energy
The 2025 presentation puts Ashkol at NIS 580 million of EBITDA, but that is only the number at the generating-site layer. After Dalia's ownership share, the heavy financing burden, the actual cash uses inside Ashkol, and the distribution gates across the structure, the figure is still far from accessible earnings at the listed-company layer.
The main Dalia article argued that the existing fleet is carrying the expansion phase for now. This follow-up isolates the point that the 2025 presentation makes easiest to misread: Ashkol's NIS 580 million of EBITDA can sound like earnings that have already landed at Dalia. That is wrong. There are three filters between that number and accessible earnings: ownership, accounting treatment, and the real cash uses inside Ashkol itself.
The NIS 580 million figure is not fake. It simply sits at the wrong layer. First, it is EBITDA at the Ashkol Yitzur site on a 100% basis. Then it has to be cut down to Dalia's share. Then it has to survive depreciation, finance costs and tax inside Ashkol Yitzur itself. Only after that does the real question begin: how much cash can actually travel through the debt stack and holding structure up to Dalia Energy.
That chart captures the point of the continuation. Ashkol Yitzur did in fact generate about NIS 573.3 million of EBITDA in 2025, and the presentation rounded that to NIS 580 million. But Dalia's share in that number is only about NIS 429.9 million because Dalia owns 75% of Ashkol Yitzur. And the story gets harder from there: after finance costs and tax, Dalia's share in Ashkol Yitzur's annual result was already negative, at about NIS 140.1 million.
| Filter | What happens in 2025 | Why it is no longer accessible EBITDA |
|---|---|---|
| Ownership | NIS 573.3 million at 100% becomes NIS 429.9 million at Dalia's share | A quarter of the site belongs to other shareholders |
| Accounting | Ashkol Yitzur ends 2025 with a net loss of NIS 186.8 million | EBITDA excludes depreciation, finance and tax |
| Cash | Even the cash that is generated is consumed by interest, principal, lease payments and capital spending | Before anything can move upstream, cash first serves the project layer |
First Filter: NIS 580 Million Is An Asset-Level Number, Not A Dalia Number
The annual presentation shows Ashkol Yitzur at NIS 580 million of EBITDA, alongside NIS 4.488 billion of senior debt outstanding as of December 31, 2025 and final maturity in December 2043. That is a legitimate operating-site presentation. It is not the same thing as a line that lands at Dalia Energy.
The company itself explains that in two separate places. In the management view of Ashkol activity, the relative EBITDA contribution from the associates comes to NIS 429.9 million at Dalia's share. And in the segment note, the company states explicitly that segment results are measured on adjusted EBITDA, with associate-company data included on a relative basis, and then adjusted back to the equity method under IFRS.
That is the key source of confusion. Ashkol can look like a full operating segment with revenue and EBITDA in the management view and still fail to become accessible reported earnings at Dalia. There is no contradiction there. It is simply the move from site economics to holding-company economics.
Put differently, even if the site generates strong EBITDA, not all of that number belongs to Dalia, and not all of what belongs to Dalia is recognized as direct operating earnings at the listed-company layer. Before a single shekel of finance cost is considered, Dalia is already down to 75% of the headline figure.
Second Filter: Inside Ashkol Yitzur, The Capital Structure Consumes The EBITDA
The next step is the one a one-page presentation cannot show. Ashkol Yitzur ended 2025 with NIS 1.510 billion of revenue and NIS 149.3 million of operating profit. But that operating profit was overwhelmed by NIS 391.5 million of net finance expense. After a NIS 55.4 million tax benefit, Ashkol Yitzur still finished the year with a net loss of NIS 186.8 million.
That is exactly why site EBITDA is not accessible earnings. It sits above the financing layer. In Ashkol's case, that financing layer is not a technical footnote. It is part of the asset's actual economics. NIS 4.488 billion of senior debt does not sit next to the EBITDA. It sits on top of it.
The implication at Dalia is straightforward. If the reader looks at Dalia's share of Ashkol Yitzur's relative EBITDA, the result is a large positive number. If the reader looks at Dalia's share of the annual result that is actually recorded in the books, the number is negative. Both numbers are correct. They are simply measuring different floors of the same structure.
That chart takes the argument one step further, from earnings to cash. Ashkol Yitzur generated NIS 326.0 million of cash flow from operations in 2025. But on an all-in cash-flexibility basis, meaning after the period's real cash uses, the picture changes completely: NIS 242.6 million of interest paid, NIS 230.1 million of bank principal repaid, NIS 17.9 million of lease principal repaid, and NIS 66.9 million of capital spending. After all of that, the residual is negative, about NIS 231.4 million.
That is the decisive filter. Even if the reader ignores the equity-method accounting issue and looks directly at the cash profile of Ashkol Yitzur itself, the EBITDA still does not become free cash. It first serves debt, interest, leases and ongoing investment in the asset.
That also explains why there is no contradiction between a favorable operating slide and a weak bottom line. In Ashkol's case, EBITDA says the station is working. It does not say the cash is available to shareholders higher up the structure.
Third Filter: Even If Cash Exists, It Does Not Flow Straight Up To Dalia
Now assume Ashkol Yitzur were generating more residual cash than it does today. The path to Dalia would still not be open. The company states explicitly that it depends on receiving cash flows from the lower layers through dividends, shareholder-loan repayments or capital-note repayments, and that the ability to receive those flows can be limited by distribution restrictions under financing agreements.
At Ashkol Yitzur itself, distributions are allowed only if several cumulative conditions are met: excess cash, fully funded reserve accounts, and coverage-ratio tests. As of year-end 2025, Ashkol Yitzur was in compliance with the financial covenants under its financing agreement, so this is not a distress case. But it is not an unrestricted cash faucet either. Cash can move upward only after it clears the project's gates.
The issue does not stop there. Inside the Ashkol structure, cash is already being allocated across layers. Ashkol Yitzur pays Ashkol Energies monthly rent of NIS 2.5 million, or NIS 30 million per year during the first 30 months. After the steam units shut, that rent is supposed to fall by half. The agreement even allows payment deferral if coverage pressure emerges. In other words, even the cash that moves from the operating layer to the land layer does not flow freely. Lender protection comes first.
And above the land layer sits Ashkol Energies with NIS 770 million of debt outstanding as of December 31, 2025 and a bullet maturity in December 2030. So even if the rent from Ashkol Yitzur is paid, it is still not the same thing as accessible cash at Dalia. It first supports the real-estate layer, its pledges and its own debt.
One more point matters. The December 2025 amendment cancelled the mechanisms for transferring cash from Ashkol Yitzur to Ashkol Energies, but left in place transfer mechanisms to Ashkol Avshal until the new-unit loan is repaid. In other words, even after the company reorganized the Ashkol structure, cash can still be trapped inside the expansion layer before it becomes accessible higher up.
Bottom Line
The right way to read Ashkol in 2025 is not through one question but through a sequence of three. First, how much of the EBITDA actually belongs to Dalia. The answer is not NIS 580 million but roughly NIS 430 million. Second, what survives after depreciation, finance and tax inside Ashkol Yitzur. The answer is that the operating company still finished the year with a net loss, and Dalia's share in that result was negative. Third, how much cash can actually move through the debt and holding structure. The answer is that there is no shortcut there either, because the cash first serves the project layers below.
So Ashkol EBITDA is an important operating metric, but it is not accessible earnings. It says the site can work. It does not say Dalia can already enjoy that number in reported earnings, and it certainly does not say the cash is available at the listed-company layer.
What would change that reading? Either the financing structure at Ashkol starts shrinking faster, or Ashkol Yitzur begins generating stronger residual cash after interest, principal and capital spending, or Dalia starts to show consistent actual upstream cash transfers. Until one of those things happens, any read that treats NIS 580 million as if it were already accessible earnings at Dalia is skipping too many floors on the way up.
Disclosure: Deep TASE analyses are general informational, research, and commentary content only. They do not constitute investment advice, investment marketing, a recommendation, or an offer to buy, sell, or hold any security, and are not tailored to any reader's personal circumstances.
The author, site owner, or related parties may hold, buy, sell, or otherwise trade securities or financial instruments related to the companies discussed, before or after publication, without prior notice and without any obligation to update the analysis. Publication of an analysis should not be read as a statement that any position does or does not exist.
The analysis may contain errors, omissions, or information that changes after publication. Readers should review official filings and primary sources before making decisions.