Blender's Technology Story: What Has Become A Business And What Is Still Only Potential
Blender reported just NIS 198k of technology-services revenue in 2025. The Amdocs and Sapiens channels, the stopped U.S. development MOU, and the new service bureau show commercialization infrastructure, but not yet a proven technology business.
What This Follow-Up Is Actually Testing
The main article argued that Blender's 2025 improvement came mainly from BNPL growth, the exit from Europe, and lower costs, not from a software engine that already stands on its own. This follow-up isolates the second question: has the technology layer already started to become a business, or is it still mostly a collection of channels, agreements, and promises?
That question matters more now because in January 2026 Blender stopped originating new P2P loans and explicitly framed BNPL and technology sales as the activities where it still has a competitive advantage. In other words, technology is no longer just an auxiliary story. It is supposed to become the second leg of the company after lending.
Four findings sit at the center of this read:
- In 2025 Blender reported only NIS 198k of technology-services revenue. That is less than 0.5% of the NIS 41.8m gross revenue from continuing operations.
- The technology line does not appear as a segment at all. It sits under "adjustments (other)" in the segment note, which means it still does not carry independent reporting weight.
- The two most visible channels, Amdocs and Sapiens, are sales and distribution routes, not disclosed paying customers.
- The only concrete 2025 case that was disclosed, the U.S. financial-institution MOU, generated an immaterial stage-A payment and then stopped before the project company was even formed.
What Has Actually Become Revenue
The core number here is NIS 198k. That is the full 2025 amount booked as other revenue from technology services. Against NIS 26.1m of gross revenue from Israeli lending and NIS 15.5m from credit-brokerage fees, it is still a negligible line.
That chart captures the gap between the narrative and the accounting reality. Blender is already talking about technology sales, a service bureau, and international commercial partnerships, but in 2025 technology still was not a revenue layer that can reasonably be called a business. It remained a very small add-on to the two domestic credit engines.
There is another important detail here. Technology revenue is not reported as a third segment. It is booked inside "adjustments." That is the real tell. When a new activity still does not stand on its own in segment reporting, the point is not just that the revenue is small. The deeper point is that management and the accounting presentation still do not show it as a distinct operating engine with independent weight.
The Commercialization Pipeline: Channels Without Conversion Yet
The 2025 presentation lays out an ambitious picture: technology sales to global companies, a technology credit bureau in Israel, and distribution agreements with Amdocs and Sapiens. That is a useful strategic map. It is still not commercialization proof.
| Channel | What already exists | What still does not exist in the filings | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amdocs | A July 2023 distribution and cooperation agreement to market Blender's technology to international financial institutions through Amdocs' banking division | No disclosed end customer and no disclosed revenue tied to that channel | Amdocs is a route to market, not revenue proof |
| Sapiens | A May 2024 distribution and cooperation agreement to sell and market the technology to international financial institutions in insurance and pension management | No disclosed paid project or revenue pace here either | It expands potential, but does not prove conversion |
| U.S. MOU | Signed in March 2025, stage A was completed, and Blender received an immaterial payment | The project company was never formed, and the engagement was stopped | This is the cleanest example of how far an announcement can travel before it becomes a business |
| Israeli service bureau | In January 2026 Blender signed an agreement to establish a SaaS service bureau with a broad service stack | No reported revenue, no disclosed customers, and no disclosed sales pace yet | This may be the most interesting route, but it is still at the starting line |
The key analytical point is that Amdocs and Sapiens show up as distribution and marketing partners, not as converted sales. That distinction matters. A distribution partner can open doors, but until the filings disclose a paying customer or an active project, there is still no way to tell whether those doors have actually opened or are simply available in theory.
The U.S. case is even sharper. Blender signed an MOU to provide technology-development services for a financing platform for car dealers and vehicle financing, completed its stage-A work, and received an immaterial payment. The partner then informed Blender that the project company had not been established for internal reasons, and the engagement was stopped. That is exactly why not every technology announcement should be read as a business. Until there is an operating entity, a paying customer, or recurring revenue, this remains a business option, not an operating engine.
The Service Bureau: The Most Interesting Promise, But Not Clean Economics
If there is one route that looks more substantial than the others, it is the service bureau agreement signed in January 2026. It matters for three reasons.
The first is product breadth. The bureau is supposed to provide not only software access, but also technology services, operating services, regulatory services, professional services, integration, software licenses, and end-customer credit-management capabilities. In plain terms, Blender is not trying to sell a software file here. It is trying to sell a full credit-operations layer.
The second is the strategic signal. Blender frames the move as an expansion of its technology-sales setup in Israel as part of its plan to increase technology-sales revenue. Management is explicitly saying this route is meant to carry part of the next chapter.
The third is where the analysis needs to stay disciplined. The service bureau is a jointly owned company, not a wholly owned software subsidiary. Blender owns 40%, the partner owns 40%, and a third party owns 20%. So even if the venture succeeds, Blender does not capture the full upside. It should benefit through two layers: the management and technology-development services it will provide, and its proportional equity interest. That matters. Even if value gets created, not all of it will flow to Blender shareholders in the same way it would from a fully owned software product.
There is a deeper implication as well. The disclosed service stack suggests that the first economics may look more service-heavy than software-heavy. Even if revenue starts coming through, it may initially come through customization, integration, operations, and regulatory support before it comes through pure recurring software licensing. That is not necessarily bad. But it does change the quality of revenue, the likely speed of scaling, and the eventual margin profile.
What Needs To Happen Before This Can Be Called A Business
The 2025 filings and the early-2026 disclosures leave very little room for ambiguity. For the technology story to move from promise to business, four things need to become visible.
The first is recurring revenue that no longer looks incidental. Not another immaterial payment, not another NIS 198k line, but a revenue pace that shows up across consecutive quarters.
The second is conversion from a distribution route into a paying customer. That could come through Amdocs, Sapiens, or the service bureau. Without that conversion, the distribution story remains evidence that Blender can generate interest, not evidence that it can generate revenue.
The third is clarity on revenue quality. If most of the money ends up coming from implementations, customization, and operating services, that will be a very different layer of economics from what investors may imagine when they hear "SaaS" or "technology sales." To judge the quality of the business, readers need to know what part of revenue is licensing or recurring software and what part is still human-intensive work.
The fourth is an accessibility test for shareholders. In the case of the service bureau, it will not be enough for the venture itself to sign customers. The real question is what Blender keeps through management and development fees and through its equity share. Otherwise the company may create value inside a shared platform without that value showing up fully in Blender's own results.
Conclusion
Blender's technology story has not yet become a business. It has become a commercialization pipeline with several possible exits: two distribution routes, one development MOU that stopped, and a new service bureau that could open a market in Israel. That is not trivial. But it is also not what a first read of the presentation could lead someone to assume.
In economic terms, 2025 still tells a very simple story: almost all revenue came from credit activities, and technology contributed less than 0.5% of gross revenue. In strategic terms, 2026 already tells a more interesting one: after the P2P shutdown, technology has become one of the routes Blender wants to build the next phase around. The problem is the transition period. The gap between the story and the numbers is still wide.
So the thesis here is straightforward: until recurring and measurable technology revenue appears, until a paying customer or active project is disclosed, and until it becomes clear whether this is primarily software economics or largely service work, Blender's technology layer is better read as option value, not as a proven business.
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