BIG: Do Petah Tikva and Ashkelon really justify the next investment wave
BIG already proved in 2025 that it can bring projects across the finish line. But Petah Tikva and Ashkelon require the market to underwrite years of future execution, and the evidence suggests that Petah Tikva is the real test while Ashkelon is still more of a supporting leg.
The main article already argued that 2025 was BIG's operating proof year. This continuation isolates one question only: do Petah Tikva and Ashkelon, the two Israeli projects BIG is now putting at the center of its development pipeline, really justify the next investment wave?
The short answer is that they do not carry the same weight. Petah Tikva already looks like a project that can carry the narrative if today's marketing rates turn into an on-time and on-budget launch. Ashkelon looks more like a supporting project with attractive paper economics, but not the same level of commercial proof. So the real question is not whether BIG still has more land and more presentations. The real question is whether Petah Tikva can move from a 2025 promise into a yielding 2029 asset, and whether Ashkelon can add another leg without reopening the investment case.
Three points are worth fixing up front:
- The decline in property under development is a phase transition, not a capital release. In 2025 BIG reclassified NIS 2.60 billion from property under development into yielding investment property, yet the group still ended the year with NIS 3.70 billion of property under development.
- Petah Tikva is not just another center. For Phase A, the company shows NIS 1.344 billion of remaining construction cost after NIS 596 million already accrued, for an expected 2029 launch and projected NOI (net operating income) of NIS 164 million. That is an underwriting test, not a branding exercise.
- Ashkelon cannot hold the story by itself. On paper it carries a projected 9.1% yield, but BIG owns only 50% of the project, and the project page does not disclose a marketing rate comparable to the one shown for Petah Tikva.
The Base Year Is Already Behind Us
In one sense, BIG has already passed its first delivery test. Migdal Ha'emek, Glilot, Or Akiva, and Gedera received completion certificates in November 2024, January 2025, and February 2025, and opened to the public within days or weeks. That matters, but it also needs to be placed correctly: these were projects that were already close to the finish line before 2025, not projects still 3 to 4 years away from yield.
The note on property under development makes that clear. Opening balance stood at NIS 4.78 billion. During the year BIG added NIS 1.05 billion of new investment and recorded a net fair-value increase of NIS 361.9 million, but at the same time it reclassified NIS 2.60 billion into yielding investment property. That is why the closing balance fell to NIS 3.70 billion. This is not a story of pipeline relief. It is a story of one wave being delivered while another still needs capital.
The analytical point is that 2025 mainly proves BIG can take the tail end of a project and convert it into yield. It does not yet fully prove that BIG can manage several years of execution, marketing, and cost control on projects whose launch dates sit in 2028 and 2029. That is a meaningful gap between what opened this year and what the market is now being asked to underwrite.
There is also an important nuance here. Glilot, one of the key 2025 openings, was not a pure copy of an open-air retail center. BIG notes that about NIS 40 million of the office building above the center was reclassified into property, plant and equipment for its own headquarters. That matters because Petah Tikva Phase A is also a mixed office-and-commercial project, not just another standard retail opening.
Petah Tikva Is The Real Test
Petah Tikva is where BIG is asking the market to make its biggest conceptual leap. At year-end 2025 the company presents fair value of NIS 754 million, accrued cost of NIS 596 million, remaining construction cost of NIS 1.344 billion, projected NOI of NIS 164 million, and an expected launch date in 2029. The project page also shows 40 thousand square meters of offices with a 76% marketing rate and 65 thousand square meters of commercial space with a 58% marketing rate.
If one adds the accrued cost and the remaining construction cost, Phase A implies roughly NIS 1.94 billion of project cost. That is not a headline figure the company presents on a standalone basis. It is simply the arithmetic of the data the company itself gives. That arithmetic matters because it shows that most of the investment still sits ahead of BIG, not behind it.
The Petah Tikva and Ashkelon grid makes the contrast immediate:
| Project | Fair value at year-end 2025 | Accrued cost | Remaining construction cost | Projected NOI | Expected launch | What is already visible |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Petah Tikva Phase A | 754 | 596 | 1,344 | 164 | 2029 | 76% office marketing, 58% commercial marketing, BIG share 100% |
| Ashkelon | 51 | 28 | 414 | 40 | 2028 | BIG share 50%, no marketing rate shown |
But that is still not the full picture. On the land-bank page, BIG presents land value in Petah Tikva of NIS 235 million on BIG's share basis and a future planning reserve of 180 thousand square meters across commercial, employment, and hospitality uses. The current Phase A covers only 105 thousand square meters. In other words, even on the company's own presentation, the economics now being disclosed are only one front end of a larger site. If Phase A works, it strengthens the broader Petah Tikva read. If it struggles, the debate about the rest of the site only begins there.
That is why the footnote on the project page matters. The remaining construction cost in Petah Tikva excludes a proportionate share of parking-construction costs attributable to phases B through D. So even the already large NIS 1.344 billion figure is still a Phase A number, not the full capital story of the entire site. Petah Tikva can therefore justify the next wave, but only if readers understand that what is disclosed here is the first proof point, not the complete Petah Tikva bill.
Ashkelon Adds Yield, But Not The Same Level Of Proof
Ashkelon is a smaller project, an earlier-stage project, and a different kind of proof point. The company presents fair value of NIS 51 million, accrued cost of NIS 28 million, remaining construction cost of NIS 414 million, projected NOI of NIS 40 million, and an expected launch in 2028. The project includes 10 thousand square meters of offices and 37 thousand square meters of commercial space, and BIG owns 50%.
Here too, the simple arithmetic of the company's own data implies roughly NIS 442 million of total project cost and a projected yield of 9.1%. On paper that looks attractive, and arguably a bit more aggressive than Petah Tikva. But there are two meaningful caveats.
The first is the ownership structure. Ashkelon is not a project in which BIG captures the full economics on the same basis as Petah Tikva, so even if it works, not all of the projected NOI sits with BIG in the same way. The second is disclosure quality. Unlike Petah Tikva, the Ashkelon project page does not provide marketing rates. So investors trying to underwrite the project currently get a yield model and a launch date, but less visible commercial evidence on the ground.
That is the key difference between the two projects. Petah Tikva already gives the market an initial marketing base, so the debate can focus on execution versus expectation. Ashkelon still looks more like a yield promise than like a commercial story that is already starting to be proven. That does not make it a weak project. It does mean it adds optionality, but not yet the same level of confidence.
So Do They Really Justify The Next Wave
If the question is whether BIG has a reasonable basis to keep investing, the answer is yes. The four openings of early 2025 give it real operating credibility, and the presentation shows that Petah Tikva already has an initial marketing base as well. But if the question is whether Petah Tikva and Ashkelon have already proved that the next wave will create value with the same clarity that 2025 already showed in delivered openings, the answer is still no.
Petah Tikva looks like a project that can justify the appetite. It is large, it is already marketing a meaningful part of both the office and commercial components, and it sits on a broader site that can become a major anchor. But precisely because of that, it is also the project concentrating the execution risk. Ashkelon can improve the picture with a higher projected yield and an earlier launch, yet at the current level of disclosure it cannot carry the next-wave thesis on its own.
So the right read today is this: the next wave is justified as a thesis, but not yet as proof. What will determine the quality of that thesis over the next 2 to 4 quarters is not another broad growth story, but three much more concrete things: further marketing progress in Petah Tikva, clearer early commercialization evidence in Ashkelon, and continued movement from development into yield without reopening the budget and timing question.
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