Anshei Ha'ir: Which Part of the Backlog Is Near-Term Value and Which Part Is Still Just an Option?
The main article already showed that permits at Anshei Ha'ir are moving faster than profit. This follow-up splits the backlog into three layers: signed and in-construction value that is already close, 2026 projects that are advancing but still need sales and execution, and long-dated options such as La Guardia and Ibn Gabirol.
The main article already established that permits at Anshei Ha'ir are advancing faster than profit. This follow-up breaks that broad thing called "backlog" into three very different layers: near-term value already supported by construction and signed contracts, a 2026 middle bucket that is clearly advancing but still not in hand, and long-dated options that are still too far away to belong inside the company’s close-in read.
That distinction matters because at Anshei Ha'ir, the biggest number is not necessarily the closest number. The larger and more exciting projects tend to sit further out on the timeline, while the layer that actually supports 2026 through 2028 is smaller, more signed, and much less dependent on another permit, another legal majority, or another conditions-precedent milestone.
The Near-Term Value Already Sits In Projects Under Construction And In Signed Contracts
If the goal is to find the part of the backlog that is closest to economic value, the starting point has to be the projects already under construction. As of the report date, the company had 162 units in projects under construction, inventory carried at NIS 220.8 million, and expected gross profit of NIS 72.6 million. That does not mean the whole amount drops into earnings tomorrow. It does mean this part of the business has already cleared the permit, financing, and execution-entry tests.
The cleanest measure here is not the unit count but the schedule attached to signed contracts. For binding sale contracts already signed, the company expects NIS 100.9 million of revenue recognition and NIS 133.7 million of expected advances and payments. Of that, about NIS 40.0 million is scheduled for recognition through 2026 and about NIS 69.8 million is expected to be collected during the same year. That is the slice of backlog sitting on relatively hard ground.
So the truly near-term layer at Anshei Ha'ir is not "the whole backlog." It is mainly what is already in execution and what already carries binding signatures. That is also why the more impressive headline numbers attached to planning projects should not automatically be pulled into the 2026 read. They are still not sitting at the same level of certainty.
Yehuda Gur, Epstein, And Manna Are Advancing, But They Have Not Yet Become Near-Term Backlog
The second layer is the most interesting one, because this is where projects start leaving pure-option territory without yet becoming value in hand. In the planning-project table, Yehuda Gur 7, Epstein 4, and Manna 4 already appear with project financing in place and with expected construction starts during 2026. Yehuda Gur is expected to start in Q3 2026, Epstein in Q2 2026, and Manna in Q3 2026.
But the gap between "advanced" and "near-term value" is still meaningful. Yehuda Gur received its building permit on January 25, 2026, and the immediate report explicitly says this satisfied one of the conditions precedent for using the financing lines and all of the suspensive conditions in the Tama agreement. Epstein received its permit on February 9, 2026, and there too the permit is framed as a milestone within the agreement structure. Manna signed a financing agreement on February 26, 2026, but drawdown there is still subject to equity injection, collateral registration, a minimum presale threshold, a building permit, and a shell-contractor agreement. In other words, all three projects are now closer, but they are still not the same thing as signed backlog inside a project already under construction.
That becomes even clearer when the early-sales layer is examined. Yehuda Gur entered 2026 with no signed early contracts. Epstein entered with only two. Manna entered with only one. That is still far from a position where those projects can be treated as if they already sit inside the company’s near-term backlog.
The numbers the company attaches to those three projects show the middle-bucket issue clearly. Yehuda Gur carries expected gross profit of NIS 14.9 million, Epstein NIS 11.8 million, and Manna NIS 8.5 million. Those are relevant figures, but they still sit in the projected layer of planning projects. Until there is a deeper sales layer, real financing drawdown, and actual execution, the right reading is still value in formation, not near-term value.
| Project | What advanced | Why it is no longer a pure option | Why it is still not near-term backlog |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yehuda Gur 7 | Building permit on January 25, 2026 | The Tama agreement conditions were completed and the financing path opened | No signed early contracts, and construction is expected only in Q3 2026 |
| Epstein 4 | Building permit on February 9, 2026 | The project cleared another regulatory step toward execution | Only two signed early contracts, and there is still no actual execution base |
| Manna 4 | Financing agreement on February 26, 2026 | Credit capacity now exists in principle | Drawdown still depends on equity, collateral, presales, permit, and shell contractor |
This is exactly the middle layer that readers can misread. These projects should no longer stay in the distant-option bucket, but they also should not be pulled into the valuation multiple of signed revenue. They sit in between, and that layer needs to be read carefully.
La Guardia And Ibn Gabirol Are Large Options, Not Near-Term Value
The third layer is the option layer. This is where the projects can look compelling on paper, but their timing is still too long for the close-in thesis.
La Guardia 35-45 is the clearest example. In December 2025 the company received design-plan approval, and it now describes a project of 420 new units, 302 of them for sale, plus about 1,280 square meters of commercial space. The initial estimate points to about NIS 1.057 billion of revenue and about NIS 877 million of cost. But in the same report the company says the building permit is expected only in another two to three years, that construction should begin within up to 60 days after the permit and work-commencement approval, and that occupancy is expected only in 2031. That is a meaningful option asset. It is not a near-term value engine.
Ibn Gabirol 150-156 sits in the same world, even though it has advanced another step. In January 2026 the company reported that it had reached the legal-majority threshold with 72% of rights holders, above the required 67%. The initial estimate is for 75 new units, 30 of them for sale, plus 2,185 square meters of commercial and office space, with expected revenue of about NIS 207 million and expected cost of about NIS 178 million. But here too the company estimates that the building permit is still about three years away. In the future-project table it adds that as of the report date it is preparing the permit filing, while holdout tenants may still require legal proceedings. That too is an option becoming better, not a shortcut to near-term profit.
| Project | Size of the option | What advanced it | Why it is still an option |
|---|---|---|---|
| La Guardia 35-45 | 420 new units, 302 for sale, about NIS 1.057 billion of expected revenue | Design-plan approval in December 2025 | Permit only in another two to three years and occupancy expected in 2031 |
| Ibn Gabirol 150-156 | 75 new units, 30 for sale, about NIS 207 million of expected revenue | Legal majority of 72% reached in January 2026 | Permit still about three years away, with signatures, permitting, and financing still ahead |
This may be the single most important distinction in reading Anshei Ha'ir. The biggest numbers sit further out, while the closer numbers are smaller but more real. If those layers are blended together, the backlog starts to look richer for the next few years than it really is.
Conclusion
The main article argued that permits at Anshei Ha'ir are advancing faster than profit. This follow-up sharpens that the issue is not only conversion speed, but also counting quality. The part of the backlog that is truly close to value is what is already in execution and already supported by signed contracts, not every project that has earned a planning headline or even another regulatory milestone.
So the right way to read Anshei Ha'ir is through three layers. The first layer, already close to value, is the NIS 100.9 million of signed revenue scheduled for recognition and the NIS 133.7 million of expected payments coming from projects under construction. The second layer, Yehuda Gur, Epstein, and Manna, has moved beyond pure option territory but still needs to prove execution, actual financing use, and real sales. The third layer, La Guardia and Ibn Gabirol, is still mainly strategic future.
At Anshei Ha'ir, near-term value is smaller than the full narrative, but also more tangible. The more distant part should remain on the watchlist, not be pulled too early into the near-term value line.
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