Buligo 2025: The Fee Base Is Firmer, but Upside Still Depends on Realizations

Getting To Know The Company

The easy mistake with Buligo is to read it like a standard U.S. asset manager with smooth recurring fees. That is not the full picture. Buligo is a GP platform, a general partner that structures U.S. real-estate transactions, raises capital from private investors, manages the asset through realization, and also invests alongside those deals as an LP. Its economics therefore sit on several layers at once: transaction fees at acquisition, development fees, annual management fees, carried interest at exit, ongoing distributions from Buligo’s own co-investments, and at times financing income as well. Anyone who looks only at management fees misses the upside. Anyone who looks only at carried interest misses the volatility.

What is working right now is fairly clear. Assets under management rose to $3.507 billion at the end of 2025 from $3.297 billion a year earlier, while managed equity rose to $1.368 billion from $1.273 billion. Inside the 2025 P&L, investment-management fees increased to $6.224 million from $4.860 million, total revenue rose to $19.474 million, and comprehensive income nearly doubled to $5.503 million from $2.895 million. The platform is getting bigger, and profit no longer depends only on an unusually strong realization year.

But the active bottleneck is still there. The Buligo debate will not be decided by whether it has good assets or a live deal pipeline. It will be decided by realization pace, and by how much of that value actually reaches the listed-company cash layer. In the fourth quarter of 2025 alone, the company recognized $3.002 million of carried interest out of $4.679 million for the full year, and $2.760 million of comprehensive income out of the annual $5.503 million. That is a sharp reminder that even after the mix improved, the bottom line still moves with deal timing.

There is also a practical screen issue. As of April 6, 2026, market cap stood at about NIS 551 million, but that day’s trading turnover was only about NIS 8.6 thousand, while short interest was essentially nonexistent. This is a stock the market may interpret through results and realizations, but not necessarily one that trades with much depth around that story.

The Economic Map

Events And Triggers

First trigger: 2025 was a year of pipeline renewal, not just harvesting old inventory. The company led 10 acquisitions covering 19 assets with total volume of about $387.3 million, using roughly $149 million of investor capital. In the board report it also clarifies that roughly $7 million of that amount was invested by the company itself as GP and LP. That matters because Buligo is not selling only management services. It is also putting capital into its own transactions, which means a stronger deal pace increases fee potential, but also raises capital at risk.

Second trigger: realizations recovered, but not all the way back to stronger years. During 2025 the company realized 6 assets for total consideration of about $225.5 million and recognized roughly $4.527 million of carried interest. For investors in those transactions, it reported an average 2.1x equity multiple and an average 14.7% IRR after carried interest and before tax. That is a clear improvement over 2024, when completed sales totaled only $112.5 million, but it is still well below 2023, when realized projects totaled $306.2 million and carried interest reached $10.874 million.

Third trigger: early 2026 supports the read of a somewhat healthier realization market. By the time the annual report was approved, two post-balance-sheet project sales had already been completed for aggregate proceeds of about $54.6 million, with carried interest of roughly $1.547 million. Management went further in the presentation and framed 2026 as having started positively, with 3 realizations completed by the end of the first quarter and a full-year expectation of about 8 realizations. That is still a management framing, not a fact, but it is the bar the company is implicitly setting for the market.

Fourth trigger: at the same time, the company is still adding development deals that require time and capital. On December 22, 2025 it completed the acquisition of land in North Carolina for Ronan at Hendersonville, a 192-unit multifamily development. Land cost was about $3.5 million, total project cost is expected at about $45.3 million, and expected equity for the project is about $16.8 million. Buligo’s own equity share is about $0.8 million, while the subsidiary’s share of transaction and development fees is expected at about $1.1 million. That is the Buligo duality in one deal: each new project opens future fee potential, but it also consumes capital and time.

Fifth trigger: individual post-balance-sheet transactions already sent a cash signal. On January 21, 2026 the Vine Street Square retail center in Florida was sold for about $24 million. Based on LP capital invested, the company presented an expected 17% IRR and a 2.3x equity multiple after carried interest and before tax, with Buligo’s share of carried interest estimated at about $1 million. On March 3, 2026 it also signed an agreement to sell a Tampa retail center for $16 million, with an expected 18.7% IRR, a 2.7x equity multiple, and another expected $1 million of Buligo carried interest, subject to closing in the second quarter.

Sixth trigger: the platform’s capital sources broadened through funds as well. During the period Buligo Fund V reached final close and Buligo Fund VI was launched. Funds managed by the company invested or committed about 13.3% of the equity invested in projects the company led during the period. That means Buligo is less dependent on rebuilding the capital base deal by deal, but it also means the platform now has to show that it can sustain deal flow, fundraising, and realizations at the same time.

Efficiency, Profitability, And Competition

The central 2025 story is better income quality, but not a full shift to recurring economics. Total revenue rose 7.2% to $19.474 million and comprehensive income nearly doubled. But the more important split sits beneath the headline.

What Actually Improved

Management fees plus administrative fees, the part closest to recurring revenue, rose to $6.873 million in 2025 from $5.488 million in 2024, an increase of roughly 25%. That is not a side detail. It means AUM growth really passed through the P&L instead of remaining a presentation slide. At the same time, transaction fees and development fees weakened. Transaction fees fell to $3.860 million from $5.059 million, while development fees fell to $1.150 million from $1.434 million. So what held up the fee line was not just more signed deals. It was a greater weight of annual revenue on managed capital.

There was also a one-year improvement on the financing line. Finance income rose to $3.255 million, helped by $1.314 million of distributions from financial investments, $607 thousand of interest from project loans and Fund V, and a net positive $587 thousand fair-value revaluation of financial investments. That is better than 2024, but it is still hard to treat as a clean recurring profit engine in exactly the same shape year after year.

Why This Still Is Not A Clean Revenue Model

2025 was not a full transition to recurring income. In the fourth quarter alone, carried interest was $3.002 million, versus zero in the second quarter and only $12 thousand in the third. In the same quarter, total revenue reached $7.607 million out of the full-year $19.474 million. That is the heart of the case. Buligo is more stable than it looked in 2024, but it still is not in a place where management fees alone can carry annual profit smoothly.

That leads to a two-sided market risk. Anyone who looks only at bottom-line profit may conclude the company has already normalized. Anyone who looks only at carried-interest volatility may miss the fact that the management-fee base has already strengthened materially. The right read sits in the middle: the base is better, but the verdict still depends on realized exits.

Where The Competitive Edge Sits, And Where The Friction Remains

Buligo has one clear advantage: it connects sourcing, local partners, private-capital fundraising, and hands-on asset management through exit. Since inception it has led 153 transactions spanning 175 assets, with total volume of about $5.1 billion and investor capital of about $1.8 billion. That creates scale, reputation, and access.

But it is not a sterile moat. The company itself stresses that the U.S. investment-property market remains highly competitive, with institutions, real-estate funds, insurers, and local sponsors all chasing similar assets. Even within the portfolio, sector quality differs. Occupancy stands at 90% in multifamily and industrial, 93% in senior housing, 94% in retail centers, and 99% in student housing. Offices, though only a small part of the mix, are the weak spot at 78%. So anyone who reads Buligo only through multifamily is missing the weaker tail of the portfolio.

Cash Flow, Debt, And Capital Structure

This is where the most important analytical gap sits. The presentation shows a very strong consolidated balance sheet, and not without reason: total assets were $85.9 million at the end of 2025, equity was $70.2 million, liabilities were $15.7 million, and cash plus short-term deposits were $26.8 million. On first read, this looks like an almost unlevered platform.

The problem is that not all of that value is equally accessible to common shareholders at the listed-company layer. In the financial data attributed to the company itself, rather than to the underlying holdings and project-level entities, cash and cash equivalents were only $3.201 million at year-end 2025, versus $2.285 million a year earlier. That is not a liquidity squeeze, but it is also not the surplus cash position the first consolidated slide may imply.

Value Created Versus Value Accessible

That is the difference between value created and value accessible. Buligo can show high equity, $42.4 million of financial assets at fair value, and a broad transaction pipeline. But shareholders will still judge the company partly on how much headroom remains at the top after project equity, dividends, and credit usage.

The Right Cash Lens Here Is All-In Cash Flexibility

For Buligo, the better framing is total cash flexibility, not theoretical earning power. At the parent-company layer, cash generated from operating activities was $2.563 million in 2025. Against that, investing activity used $1.602 million, while financing activity used a net $48 thousand after a $2.0 million dividend and $135 thousand of lease-principal payments, partly offset by repayments from subsidiaries. Year-end cash rose to $3.201 million.

That is not a weak picture, but it is not one of abundant top-level liquidity either. It says the company preserved flexibility in 2025, yet did not build a cash cushion large enough to remove dependence on realizations, refinancing, or the bank line.

The Credit Line Buys Time, But It Is Not Free

In November 2025 the company and its U.S. subsidiary amended their credit agreement. The facility increased from $15 million to $20 million, for a four-year term, at SOFR plus 2.5%. It is secured by a first-ranking floating charge over most company assets, together with security over the rights to receive management fees and transaction fees from subsidiaries. Financial covenants were reset to a maximum total leverage ratio of 3:1 and a minimum fixed-charge coverage ratio of 1.10:1.

This improves flexibility, but it also clarifies where Buligo’s value pipeline actually runs: through management fees, transaction fees, and project cash flow. As of the financial-statement date, $10 million had been drawn under the line, and by the approval date usage had already declined to $5 million. Management states that the company remains in full compliance with covenants. That is positive, but it is not free liquidity. It is flexibility that still depends on continuing deal flow and covenant discipline.

Capital-allocation policy sharpens the point further. The company paid a $2.0 million dividend in April 2025, and after the balance-sheet date it approved another $2.5 million dividend on March 22, 2026. There are no external restrictions on distributions, but for a critical reader this also means some of the flexibility built at the platform is being returned to shareholders instead of staying as holding-company cushion. The positive signal is clear. So is the cost.

Outlook

Four points matter before thinking about 2026:

• First: management fees are already growing at roughly 25%, so 2025 is not just an exit year.
• Second: most of the carried-interest recovery still sat in the fourth quarter, so income smoothness has not arrived yet.
• Third: the consolidated balance sheet looks strong, but true shareholder flexibility still has to be read through $3.201 million of parent-company cash and a credit line that is already being used.
• Fourth: management is building 2026 around more exits, but it is also adding development deals, so not every improvement in realizations automatically means de-risking.

What Management Is Really Signaling

Management’s 2026 message is two-sided. On one side, the market backdrop looks slightly more supportive: the report describes U.S. rate cuts, a forecast for roughly 16% growth in commercial-real-estate investment in 2026, and a possible 5 to 15 basis-point decline in cap rates. On the other side, the same report also says financing remains more selective, with tighter covenants and lower leverage. So 2026 currently looks like a proof year, not an automatic breakout year.

The presentation goes further and models potential future carried interest in a range of $110 million to $136 million. That is a large number, but it needs to be read exactly for what it is: a scenario, not guidance. It is based on a percentage of invested equity by deal vintage, and it excludes transactions the company itself does not expect to generate carried interest. As framing, it is interesting. As a standalone earnings thesis, it is still too far away from certain cash.

What Must Happen For The Read To Improve

First, realizations need to rise in fact, not just in slides. If 2026 really gets close to 8 exits, the company can deliver more carried interest and show that the U.S. exit window is reopening. If the year stalls closer to 3 or 4 assets, the market may go back to reading Buligo as another year of nice embedded upside with too little actual monetization.

Second, Buligo has to show that AUM growth keeps translating into management fees even without an unusually strong exit quarter. That matters because this is the layer that separates a platform dependent on sale events from one that can carry its overhead with more consistency.

Third, the gradual move toward more development deals and more company capital at risk cannot materially tighten the top layer. Hendersonville is a good example: the fee opportunity is real, but it comes over several years and in the meantime it requires equity, financing, and execution.

Fourth, the market will want to see how the weaker parts of the portfolio behave. Offices are only a small share of the cost-based investment mix if grouped under Other, but they remain the weakest disclosed operating pocket at 78% occupancy. If the U.S. market recovery stays concentrated in multifamily and retail, Buligo will still carry a weaker tail that needs attention.

Risks

The first risk is timing risk, not survival risk. Buligo does not look like a company under balance-sheet stress, but it does look like one that still depends on realization timing to justify a smoother earnings profile. Any delayed sale delays both carried interest and the positive market read attached to it.

The second risk is the gap between the consolidated balance sheet and cash accessible at the company layer. As long as parent-company cash remains modest, while the platform also pays dividends and uses the bank line, value created at the project level does not automatically translate into flexibility for common shareholders.

The third risk is that the company is moving gradually from a fee manager toward a model with more capital at risk. Investing 3% to 6% in each transaction, lending to projects, and adding development land all increase upside eligibility, but they also lock up more capital and raise dependence on execution and financing conditions.

The fourth risk is that modeled carried-interest potential gets ahead of reality. The $110 million to $136 million figure is useful as a way to illustrate embedded upside built over prior vintages, but it still depends on future sales, exit multiples, investor returns, and which deals actually clear the preferred-return hurdle.

The fifth risk is side exposures that distract from the core platform. Reigo already generated a $606 thousand equity-method loss in 2025, and the company recorded a $332 thousand provision in connection with the Reigo Meitav guarantee. This is not the center of the Buligo thesis, but it is a reminder that investments and guarantees outside the core real-estate platform can still leak into the finance line.

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Conclusions

Buligo enters 2026 as a better company than it looked like a year ago. Management fees are growing, the realizations market has shown early signs of life, and the consolidated balance sheet remains conservative. But the core bottleneck is still unresolved: shareholder upside still runs through realization timing and through how much cash actually reaches the company layer. That is the point that will determine how the market reads the next year.

Current thesis: Buligo already depends less on one-off transaction fees and more on a broader management-fee base, but valuation will still be driven by how successfully it converts assets into exits and moves cash up to the company layer.

What changed: 2025 improved revenue quality. Management fees grew, AUM expanded, and comprehensive income nearly doubled. At the same time, the improvement still did not become fully smooth because carried interest remained concentrated in the fourth quarter.

Counter-thesis: It is possible that the market is still too cautious. The company has high equity, relatively low leverage, a new fund, and a carried-interest pipeline built over years that could release faster if the U.S. property market continues to improve.

What may change the market read in the short to medium term: actual completion of more 2026 sales, more quarters in which management fees keep growing even without an unusually large exit quarter, and proof that credit-line usage and dividends are not eroding the safety margin at the company layer.

Why this matters: Buligo sits exactly on the line between a manager with recurring income and a platform still dependent on realizations. That difference determines both earnings quality and how much of the value is truly accessible to shareholders.

If, over the next 2 to 4 quarters, the company delivers more exits, keeps growing management fees, and preserves genuine top-layer flexibility even after dividends and credit use, the read improves meaningfully. If the realizations market remains patchy and the holding company continues to lean on modest cash and the bank line, the stock is likely to keep trading like a story with attractive embedded upside but too much timing risk.