Analyst: How Much of 2025 Profit Came From the Fee Engine, and How Much From the Proprietary Book
The clean accounting answer for Analyst's 2025 is less market-driven than the headline first suggests: NIS 148.5 million of segment profit came from managing client assets and only NIS 31.1 million from the proprietary book. The proprietary book is still material, but it was no longer the main story of the year.
The main article showed that Analyst's 2025 looked very strong, but not all of that strength came from the same kind of earnings. This continuation isolates the key question: how much of the improvement came from the management-fee engine on client assets, and how much came from the proprietary portfolio that moves with markets. That distinction matters because the two engines do not deserve the same quality read, the same repeatability assumptions, or the same market interpretation.
The good news for Analyst is that the 2025 answer is cleaner than the consolidated headline implies. The less comfortable part is that the proprietary book is still large enough to shape the reading of the bottom line, so it cannot be dismissed as noise.
Where Profit Really Came From
The cleanest accounting split sits in the segment note. In 2025 the client-investment-management segment generated NIS 148.5 million of profit from ordinary operations. The self-investments segment added another NIS 31.1 million. Together that makes NIS 179.6 million of segment profit, so about 82.7% of segment profit came from the fee engine and 17.3% from the proprietary book.
Dropping one line lower, profit before tax reached NIS 181.1 million after NIS 2.3 million of finance income and NIS 0.8 million of finance expense. So even on a pre-tax reading, roughly four fifths of 2025 came from the business that lives on client money, not from the proprietary portfolio.
That point matters because it corrects a superficial read. Anyone looking only at consolidated earnings and at management's comment that marketable-securities gains are recurring could conclude that 2025 was mostly another strong market year. That would be the wrong read. The proprietary book helped, but the jump was driven mainly by the fee engine.
2025 Was a Fee Year, Not a Proprietary-Book Year
The best way to see this is not only through 2025 itself but against prior years. In 2024 the proprietary book accounted for 28.7% of segment profit, and in 2023 it accounted for 29.0%. In 2025 that weight fell to 17.3%. Not because the proprietary book collapsed, but because the fee engine accelerated much faster.
| Year | Client-investment-management profit | Self-investments profit | Fee-engine share | Proprietary-book share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | NIS 35.0m | NIS 14.3m | 71.0% | 29.0% |
| 2024 | NIS 76.1m | NIS 30.5m | 71.3% | 28.7% |
| 2025 | NIS 148.5m | NIS 31.1m | 82.7% | 17.3% |
The sharpest datapoint here is not just that the fee-engine share rose. It is that proprietary-book profit barely moved at all: NIS 30.5 million in 2024 versus NIS 31.1 million in 2025, only 1.8% higher. By contrast, client-investment-management profit almost doubled, from NIS 76.1 million to NIS 148.5 million. That means nearly all of Analyst's profit growth in 2025 came from the activity that should repeat as long as client assets remain inside the platform.
The quarterly picture tells the same story. Revenue rose through the year from NIS 106.4 million in the first quarter to NIS 153.1 million in the fourth quarter. Profit from operations before gains on marketable securities rose alongside it, from NIS 28.3 million to NIS 47.6 million. Proprietary-book gains were far choppier: NIS 0.8 million in the first quarter, NIS 16.3 million in the second, NIS 7.6 million in the third and NIS 6.3 million in the fourth.
The second quarter was the most market-driven quarter of the year, but the fourth quarter matters more for how 2025 exits into 2026. In the fourth quarter the core engine had already reached NIS 47.6 million, or 31.1% of revenue, while the proprietary book added only NIS 6.3 million. In other words, Analyst's exit rate into 2026 looks much more like a management-fee platform than a market bet.
Why the Proprietary Book Still Cannot Be Ignored
It would be too easy to take these numbers to the opposite extreme and say the proprietary book no longer matters. That would also be wrong. Management explicitly states that gains on marketable securities are a recurring component and are expected to remain material over time, even if the amount can swing sharply between periods. That makes sense, because the NIS 31.1 million contribution still sits on top of a large and liquid balance-sheet base.
At the group level, cash and short-term deposits rose to NIS 176.8 million at the end of 2025 from NIS 68.4 million a year earlier. Marketable securities rose to NIS 232.2 million from NIS 155.9 million. Within the fair-value-through-profit-and-loss securities book, NIS 146.8 million was held in mutual funds managed by the group itself. So the proprietary book is not just a liquidity cushion. It is also a live market layer, and part of that exposure sits on the same product shelf the group manages for clients.
| Selected balance-sheet layer | 2024 | 2025 | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and short-term deposits | NIS 68.4m | NIS 176.8m | Much more financial dry powder on the balance sheet |
| Marketable securities | NIS 155.9m | NIS 232.2m | A profit layer that can help, but can also swing the headline |
| Of which in group-managed mutual funds | Not separately disclosed | NIS 146.8m | The proprietary book is also linked to the group's own product shelf |
| Self-investments segment assets | NIS 155.9m | NIS 293.6m | Capital weight far above profit weight |
That is where the most important nuance sits. In 2025 the self-investments segment held about 42.8% of total segment assets, but generated only 17.3% of segment profit. In other words, the capital weight of the proprietary book is much higher than its profit weight. That is exactly what makes it secondary to the 2025 thesis, but not negligible. It was not the engine that drove this year's growth, yet it still has enough mass to change the character of earnings from one year to the next.
Conclusion
The answer to the headline question is fairly clear: most of Analyst's 2025 profit came from the fee engine, not from the proprietary book. The segment split shows NIS 148.5 million from client activity against NIS 31.1 million from self investments. That does not mean the proprietary book is small or irrelevant. It does mean that the 2025 jump was first and foremost a jump in the management business.
That also defines the 2026 test. If profit keeps growing even in a scenario where proprietary-book contribution is more modest, the market gets another proof that Analyst is primarily a management-fee machine with an attached market layer. If the bottom line starts moving mainly with the investment portfolio, the proprietary book will regain weight in how the stock is read. After 2025, the reasonable base case is to treat Analyst first as a strong fee engine, and only then as an investment house that also earns on its own capital.
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