Amot follow-up: ToHa2 and the office pipeline that is supposed to move NOI
Amot's next trigger really does sit in ToHa2 and the office pipeline, but the quantitative bridge is still far from closed. Most of the future NOI sits in ToHa2, only part of it is already anchored by contract, and the rest of the step-up depends on both lease-up and execution timing through the end of 2028.
What This Follow-Up Is Actually Testing
The main article already established that Amot's core is stable and that the next NOI layer is supposed to come mainly from development. This follow-up isolates the more important question inside that claim: how much of the next step-up is already backed by signed leases, how much is still open to lease-up, and how much first depends on execution timing rather than demand.
The reason this matters now is straightforward. Amot presents a clear bridge from representative NOI of NIS 1,089 million, to another NIS 66 million from filling vacant space, and then another NIS 256 million from occupying projects under construction by the end of 2028. In other words, almost 80% of the growth layer the company points to does not come from squeezing the existing portfolio harder. It comes from delivering new projects.
That also means the trigger is more concentrated than it looks at first glance. Inside the NIS 243 million to NIS 267 million NOI range attributed to projects under construction, ToHa2 alone accounts for NIS 150 million to NIS 165 million, roughly 60% of that bridge. From here, the real issue is no longer whether a pipeline exists. It is which part of that pipeline is already genuinely de-risked and which part still sits on negotiations, marketing, and construction completion.
Three points matter at the outset:
- Out of the full NIS 322 million bridge from current representative NOI to NIS 1,411 million, only NIS 66 million comes from filling vacant space. The main jump, NIS 256 million, rests on projects under construction.
- ToHa2 is the center of gravity: NIS 150 million to NIS 165 million of projected NOI for Amot's share, against one anchor lease with Google for about 60 thousand sqm and annual rent of about NIS 120 million for the full asset.
- Halehi and K together add another NIS 93 million to NIS 101 million of projected NOI for Amot's share, but they are not the same kind of risk. Halehi is mainly a 2026 office lease-up test, while K is already more of a 2028 timing story.
How Much Of The Bridge Is Actually Backed Today
The right way to read this pipeline is not as one bucket. The three projects that move the NOI are sitting at three very different stages of maturity.
| Project | Expected completion | Projected NOI for Amot's share | What is already backed | What is still open |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ToHa2 | End-2026, with Google's lease starting in Q1 2027 | NIS 150 million to NIS 165 million | Google signed for about 60 thousand sqm and several hundred parking spaces, for 10 years with a one-time exit right after 5 years | The remaining area, where the company says negotiations are underway for tens of thousands of sqm |
| Halehi | 2026 | NIS 44 million to NIS 48 million | The retail floors were already handed over, opened to the public, and contracts were signed for about 13 thousand sqm with annual rent of about NIS 22 million for Amot's share | The office tower is still in finishing works and marketing, so most of the next NOI layer still needs to be leased |
| K Jerusalem | 2028 | NIS 49 million to NIS 53 million | No anchor tenant or lease contracts were disclosed | Both lease-up and delivery are still ahead, with the project currently at the parking-garage structural frame stage |
The core point is that ToHa2 is not just another large project inside the stack. It is the project that decides whether the next NOI layer will feel like a real step-change or a slower roll-in. Even after the Google lease, the company still says it is conducting negotiations on a significant scale with other potential tenants. That wording matters because it says the anchor exists, but the anchor still does not close the story by itself.
Quantitatively, the Google lease covers about 60 thousand sqm out of roughly 156 thousand sqm of above-ground area at ToHa2, about 38% of the marketable area. That is enough to change confidence in the project. It is not enough to treat the tower as if most of the lease-up risk has already disappeared. Anyone reading ToHa2 as largely de-risked on leasing is reading the Google headline and not the remaining area that still has to be placed.
In ToHa2, The Risk Is No Longer Only Demand. It Is Also The Timing Window
ToHa2 already has a real anchor lease, and that is a meaningful difference versus office projects that still rest only on future marketing hopes. But precisely because it is the biggest project, it is important to see how tight the execution window now is. The Google lease defines commencement in the first quarter of 2027 upon completion, while the company says it expects construction to be completed and Form 4 to be received by the end of 2026. In the capital-market presentation, commencement is already framed around the fourth quarter of 2026.
That is not necessarily a contradiction. But it does mean the economic trigger sits on a very tight year-end seam between late 2026 and early 2027. In a project of this size, the question is no longer only whether tenants will be found. It is also whether shell delivery, Form 4, and lease commencement will line up without slippage that pushes NOI from one year into the next.
That is why ToHa2 now has to be read through two different risks. The lease-up risk relates to the tens of thousands of sqm for which the company still reports ongoing negotiations. The execution risk relates to the fact that even the portion already anchored by Google produces economics only if completion and delivery really happen in the time window the company is currently marking.
Halehi And K: The Same Pipeline, But Two Very Different Qualities Of Future NOI
Halehi is a middle case. On the one hand, there is already some proof of demand: the commercial floors were delivered, opened to the public, and contracts were signed for about 13 thousand sqm with annual rent of about NIS 22 million for Amot's share. On the other hand, the company says the office tower is in advanced finishing works and in marketing stages. That means the NIS 44 million to NIS 48 million of projected NOI for the project does not yet sit on the same certainty base as fully leased and occupied space.
Put differently, Halehi has moved past the raw-construction stage, but it has not yet moved past the office-proof stage. The commercial component already gives some anchor. The main 2026 NOI uplift still has to come from successful leasing of the office tower itself.
K in Jerusalem is a different story altogether. The company attributes NIS 49 million to NIS 53 million of NOI to Amot's share there, but as of year-end 2025 no anchor tenant and no lease contract were disclosed. Execution is also much earlier. The project is at the parking-garage structural frame stage and completion is marked for 2028. So K should not be read as a near-term trigger. It is the later tail of the NOI bridge. It matters, but it is not what is supposed to validate or invalidate the story in 2026.
That sharpens the key distinction inside the pipeline: ToHa2 and Halehi are 2026 tests with a mix of lease-up and execution. K is mainly a 2028 timing test. Putting all three into one NOI line is correct from an accounting bridge perspective. It is less useful analytically.
What Sits Outside The Bridge, And Why That Actually Helps
The company also shows a broader planning and licensing layer, including ToHa3 and ToHa4 with about 100 thousand sqm for Amot's share, HaSolelim with about 110 thousand sqm, and the Amot-Rabad building with about 30 thousand sqm. That is a meaningful longer-dated growth option, but it is not part of the quantitative bridge to NIS 1,411 million of NOI.
That is actually a strength in reading this continuation. The bridge Amot is pointing to for the next few years does not rest on distant planning optionality. It rests on three projects already under construction. That makes the question sharper: not whether Amot has land and rights for another decade, but whether the nearer ToHa2-Halehi-K layer will arrive at the pace and with the quality the company is signaling.
Conclusion
The follow-up thesis is simple: Amot's NOI bridge is real, but it is not fully de-risked. ToHa2 already has an anchor tenant that changed the story, yet the selected local evidence currently discloses an anchor lease only for a material portion of the marketable area. Halehi has already shown some demand proof, but mostly in retail rather than offices. K adds another NOI layer, but it belongs mostly to the 2028 timetable.
So the market should not ask only whether Amot has an impressive development pipeline. That part is already visible. The right question is how much of the NIS 256 million of NOI the company attributes to projects under construction will come from space that is already signed, and how much still depends on successful leasing and clean execution against the timetable.
The next 2 to 4 quarters should be a very sharp test: more leases in ToHa2, real marketing progress in Halehi's office tower, and confirmation that the late-2026 to early-2027 handoff in ToHa2 is actually holding. If that happens, the NOI bridge will look much more tangible. If not, the market is likely to keep reading this pipeline as valid optionality on paper, but not as NOI that is already ready to arrive.
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