Ampa Coworking 2026: What Is Left of Profit Once Revaluations Are Stripped Out
Ampa’s coworking business looked stronger in the 2025 filing than it did in economic reality: reported operating profit jumped to ILS 132.9 million, while contractual-rent operating profit fell to ILS 29.7 million. Until that gap closes through occupancy and rent-backed earnings, most of the improvement remains accounting-led.
What This Follow-Up Is Isolating
The main article focused on Ampa’s capital cushion and the growing queue of cash demands across the group. This follow-up goes one level deeper, into the place where the 2025 filing creates one of its clearest optical distortions: coworking. Anyone reading only the reported operating-profit line could come away thinking the segment went through a genuine step change. That is only part of the story.
The core numbers point somewhere else. Revenue rose from ILS 280.1 million to ILS 288.6 million, average monthly revenue per workstation increased from ILS 1,785 to ILS 1,849, but occupancy stayed flat at 81%. At the same time, reported operating profit jumped from ILS 8.5 million to ILS 132.9 million, while operating profit on a contractual-rent basis fell from ILS 31.8 million to ILS 29.7 million. In other words, the headline improved dramatically, but the operating economics after rent actually weakened.
That matters now because coworking is exactly the kind of activity where accounting can easily look like business momentum. Ampa itself explains that reported operating profit is shaped by fair-value and lease-accounting components, and that the metric closest to core performance is the one that includes contractual rent. So the real question is not whether profit surged on paper. The real question is what remains once the activity is charged for the rent it actually pays to run those sites.
Three Profit Lenses, Three Different Stories
The segment table is really presenting three different stories:
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 | Change | What it really says |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 280.1 | 288.6 | 3.0% | Activity grew, but only modestly |
| Average monthly revenue per workstation | ILS 1,785 | ILS 1,849 | 3.6% | Some improvement in pricing or mix |
| Average occupancy | 81% | 81% | Flat | No real demand acceleration |
| Reported operating profit | 8.5 | 132.9 | 1,467% | A line shaped by fair value and lease accounting |
| Operating profit excluding fair-value adjustments | 155.8 | 157.7 | 1.2% | Most of the jump disappears once revaluations are stripped out |
| Operating profit including contractual rent | 31.8 | 29.7 | -6.8% | Core operating economics deteriorated |
The most important part is the gap between the metrics. Reported operating profit was still ILS 24.7 million below the profit figure that excludes fair-value adjustments, but in 2024 that negative gap was ILS 147.3 million. So most of the jump in the reported line came from the sharp reduction in the negative impact of fair-value and lease-accounting components. That is an accounting swing of roughly ILS 122.6 million year over year.
And even the middle metric is not the end of the story. Ampa explicitly says that this measure still does not fully reflect the cost structure, because it remains based on the accounting lease model and does not include contractual rent expense. Once real rent is put back into the picture, operating profit drops to ILS 29.7 million. Put differently, anyone stopping at ILS 157.7 million is still not reading the core business, and anyone stopping at ILS 132.9 million is reading an even more distorted layer.
That is the heart of the thesis. 2025 was not a year of operating breakout in coworking. It was a year in which accounting optics improved far more than the business itself.
Where Core Economics Stalled
The activity itself is not weak. In fact, several data points look fairly stable. Ampa operates 15 active sites in Israel with total area of roughly 102.3 thousand square meters. 69% of coworking revenue comes from medium-sized and large companies with more than 50 employees, and there is no single member whose revenue reaches 10% or more of consolidated group revenue. That is a healthier client base than the stereotypical freelancer-heavy image often attached to the sector.
Forward visibility also improved. Expected revenue from signed membership agreements, excluding renewals, increased from ILS 204.7 million at the end of 2024 to ILS 310.3 million at the end of 2025, and to ILS 363.0 million near the report date. Within that, the amount already signed for 2026 rose from ILS 161.3 million to ILS 168.1 million, and then to ILS 208.2 million near the report date.
That matters because it suggests the problem here is not a simple commercial collapse. There is demand, there are signed agreements, and average revenue per workstation even improved somewhat. But none of that translated into higher profit after contractual rent in 2025. The more reasonable conclusion is that the business is managing to hold the commercial line without yet turning that stability into stronger underlying profitability.
That is a meaningful distinction. In a business like this, average revenue per desk can improve without a matching gain in profit if rent, operating, and maintenance costs are tightening at the same time. Ampa does not provide a full bridge for that gap here, but the fact that the very metric it presents as the closest proxy for core performance moved lower tells you where the issue sits: in the day-to-day economics of the sites, not just in how the market chooses to frame them.
Why Tel Aviv CBD Distorts the Picture
82% of the segment’s revenue comes from assets located in Tel Aviv’s CBD. That is not a footnote. It is a key lens. When Ampa says the difference between 2024 and 2025 came mainly from changes in the economic value of assets in that area, where fair market usage prices fell in 2024 and recovered in 2025, it is effectively saying something simple: the same geography that dominates revenue also dominates the accounting optics.
That means the segment’s reported profit is highly sensitive not only to actual occupancy and pricing, but also to how the Tel Aviv CBD market is fed into valuation models. So the dramatic improvement in 2025 does not necessarily mean the sites themselves became a much more profitable business. It does mean the accounting headwind that weighed on the segment in 2024 became much smaller, and may have partly reversed.
The operating backdrop supports that read. Ampa says the security situation in Israel continues to affect the tech sector, which represents a material share of the activity’s clients. At the same time, it says a significant portion of customers are international companies with financial strength, and that the range of solutions offered by the business mitigated much of the negative impact. That is a picture of resilience, not sharp acceleration. It explains why occupancy held at 81% and why the business did not break, but it also explains why there is still no clear evidence of a true jump in profit after rent.
What Needs to Be Proven Next
If Ampa wants the market to read coworking as an earnings engine rather than an optics engine, there are three clear tests for the next 2 to 4 quarters.
The first is profitability after contractual rent. As long as that metric is not moving back up, it is difficult to argue that the gap with 2024 has really closed at the core level. 2025 proved the business can defend revenue. 2026 needs to prove it can expand the real margin.
The second is conversion of signed visibility into actual revenue without erosion. The volume of signed revenue looks better, but Ampa itself notes that the figure is subject to cancellations and early termination of membership agreements. So the market will need to see that these signatures are not just building up in a table, but are staying in place long enough to support profitability.
The third is less blind dependence on Tel Aviv CBD for the narrative. As long as 82% of revenue comes from that same geography, and as long as the main explanation for the swing in reported profit also runs through that same geography, it remains difficult to separate operating improvement from improvement in valuation assumptions. That is not necessarily negative, because this is still the core of the local office market. But it does mean readers should continue to prefer the contractual-rent metric over the headline line.
Conclusion
Ampa’s coworking business did not collapse in 2025. That is not the story. There is a reasonable client base, signed visibility improved, and revenue per workstation even moved up. But the profit that jumped is not the profit that stayed. Once fair-value and lease-accounting components are stripped out, and then real contractual rent is put back in, what remains is a business that still has not shown a true improvement in core profitability.
The right framing from here is simple: if 2025 was an accounting repair year, then 2026 needs to be an operating proof year. The market may still react to the headline line in the next set of filings, but the real test stays the same: better occupancy or better pricing that finally translates into higher profit after real rent.
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