Apollo Power 2025: Backlog surged, but 2026 will be decided by revenue and cash conversion

Getting To Know The Company

Apollo Power is not really trying to be another mainstream solar-panel vendor. Its bet is on use cases where a standard rigid panel is too heavy, too brittle or too cumbersome to install: light roofs, vehicle applications, awnings, defense use cases and off-grid power. That distinction matters because the thesis here is not about generic solar growth. It is about whether a niche engineering edge can become repeatable commercial volume.

What is working now is much clearer than it was a year ago. Revenue rose to NIS 19.7 million in 2025 from NIS 12.9 million in 2024. Gross profit climbed to NIS 6.1 million from NIS 2.3 million. Backlog reached about NIS 65 million at year-end and about NIS 70 million near the report date. After the balance-sheet date, the company also reported a new Ministry of Defense order of about NIS 1.67 million and additional orders from Lippert and Volta Solar totaling about NIS 4 million. Demand is no longer the only question.

That is also where a superficial read can go wrong. The improvement does not yet make Apollo a clean industrial story. The company still posted a net loss of NIS 80.2 million, operating cash burn of NIS 55.3 million, and a cost structure with R&D expense alone at NIS 59.0 million. At the same time, the factory that had once been framed around a much larger future ramp is now described in terms of installed equipment supporting a maximum annual production capacity of about 50 MWp, and even that level has not yet reached full potential. That is the active bottleneck.

So 2026 looks less like a breakout year and more like an execution-and-conversion proof year. The market does not need another pilot announcement. It needs evidence that Apollo can take backlog, turn it into timely delivery, hold a reasonable gross margin, and do that without having to fall back immediately on another funding cycle.

The Economic Map Right Now

Those two charts sharpen the main point. 2025 looks less like a year dominated by pilots and more like a year in which actual products and commercial projects started to take a larger share of the business. That is real progress. It still is not enough to carry the cost base of a development-heavy, manufacturing-heavy and commercializing business. That is why the core question around Apollo is no longer just whether there is interest, but whether that interest is mature enough to pay for the company.

Events And Triggers

The focus program: In November 2024 the company approved a business focus plan that included consolidating production and storage into one site, restructuring operations, cutting about 50 employees, stabilizing and improving the manufacturing process before pushing output harder, and focusing on strategic customers in the US and Europe. Management framed the plan as a NIS 25 million to NIS 30 million annual cost-saving program and said it had been fully implemented by the report date. The P&L already shows part of that effect, with selling, general and administrative expenses down to NIS 20.5 million from NIS 23.8 million in 2024.

VW: This is the most important event in the report, both positively and as a source of caution. In August 2025 Apollo received formal approval to restart the VW project, with serial production planned for November 2026, for eight years and a total value of about EUR 14.5 million. In parallel, in November 2025 the parties agreed that VW would pay EUR 1.15 million for prior development work, and Apollo recognized EUR 1.0 million of that, about NIS 3.8 million, in 2025 revenue. The double reading matters: the program is back on track, but part of the 2025 growth came from development-related compensation rather than from serial production.

GPM: In January 2026 the US subsidiary signed a binding agreement with GPM for evaluation, development and deployment of solar solutions across sites in the US. The headline numbers are large: at least 300 sites to be evaluated and potential EPC notices to proceed totaling about USD 53 million over roughly 20 months. The terms, however, still make this a highly optional pipeline. GPM retains full discretion over whether to move forward site by site, and it also has a 90-day termination right. The option package granted to GPM only vests if EPC orders exceed USD 8 million by the end of 2026. This is meaningful upside on North America, not a hard revenue base.

Orders after year-end: In January 2026 the company reported a Ministry of Defense order for about NIS 1.67 million, with delivery planned by the end of the first quarter of 2026. In March 2026 it reported additional orders from Lippert and Volta Solar totaling about NIS 4 million. These are small relative to the long-range commercial story, but they matter because they provide a nearer bridge between backlog, manufacturing and recognized revenue.

The credit line: In March 2026 SolarPaint’s credit facility was extended, on the same terms and at a NIS 40 million size, until February 26, 2027. That does not turn the facility into a growth engine, but it does reduce short-term survival pressure.

That chart matters because the step-up was not driven by a single geography. Israel, Europe and North America all contributed in 2025. That is positive because it suggests real commercial widening. It also means Apollo still does not have one stable geography that alone underwrites the whole business.

Efficiency, Profitability And Competition

The main analytical point here is that the 2025 improvement came from two very different sources: a better commercial mix on the one hand, and items that are not necessarily repeatable in the same way on the other. Mixing the two together would make 2025 look cleaner than it really is.

What Actually Drove The Improvement

Revenue rose to NIS 19.7 million in 2025. Of that, NIS 13.7 million came from product sales, versus NIS 6.8 million in 2024, while NIS 6.0 million came from projects and proof-of-concept work, slightly below the NIS 6.1 million of 2024. The simplest reading is that Apollo sold much more product and relied somewhat less on demo-style activity.

The market split tells the same story. Light roofs generated NIS 9.98 million, or 50.7% of company revenue, versus 21.0% in 2024. That is a meaningful shift because roofs are the area where Apollo most needs to prove it is becoming a product supplier rather than staying a pure technology story. By contrast, vehicle-related product revenue fell to only NIS 399 thousand, while defense and applications product revenue was NIS 2.0 million. In other words, Apollo does not yet have a broad and balanced revenue engine. It has one stronger engine.

Gross profit rose to NIS 6.1 million, and gross margin improved to about 31.1%, versus 17.7% in 2024. That is a sharp improvement, but the quality still needs to be separated. The company explicitly says that revenue growth in 2025 included about NIS 3.8 million from VW tied to a project whose scope and terms changed. That is positive, but it is not the same thing as clean, repeatable serial production revenue. It helped 2025, but it does not solve 2026 by itself.

Customer Concentration Is Confirmation And Risk At The Same Time

In 2025, the top three customers together accounted for roughly NIS 10.1 million, more than half of total revenue:

That concentration is not automatically negative at Apollo’s stage. In fact, a company at this stage needs anchor customers to get to scale. The issue is different: when more than half of revenue comes from three names, any delay, spec change, pause in development or shift in payment terms from one of them quickly changes the whole picture.

The Moat Exists, But Only If The Factory Can Deliver

Apollo competes in a place that is strategically interesting. It is not trying to beat the standard panel on cost per watt on a plain vanilla rooftop. It is trying to win where weight, flexibility, aesthetics or logistics break the fit of the standard solution. That is a real moat, as long as the customer genuinely needs that fit.

But the report also shows the limit of that moat. Two years ago the company expected Apollo Carmel to reach a maximum annual production capacity of around 190 MWp during 2025, subject to the arrival of the remaining machines. Today the same company says that, based on installed equipment, the maximum annual production capacity is about 50 MWp, and even that level has not yet reached its full potential. That is not a footnote. It is an admission that the commercial problem has become an operational problem.

That is why even strong technology and clear interest from global customers are not enough on their own. The market still needs proof of consistent output quality, certifications and delivery pace. It also explains why the 2026 milestones are not just commercial. They are operational too: IEC standards, improved fire resistance, automation and continued line stabilization.

Cash Flow, Debt And Capital Structure

This section needs framing discipline. I am using an all-in cash flexibility lens rather than a normalized cash-generation lens. The reason is straightforward: Apollo’s current story is not about mature recurring cash generation. It is about how much real room the company has left after actual cash uses.

On that basis, 2025 was still a year funded from outside. Operating cash flow was negative NIS 55.3 million. Investing cash flow was negative NIS 13.7 million. Cash used for lease transactions was NIS 10.3 million. Against that, financing cash flow was positive NIS 53.0 million. The year ended with NIS 21.5 million of cash and cash equivalents and another NIS 17.7 million of bank deposits, for gross cash and deposits of about NIS 39.1 million.

That means the business did not self-fund 2025. It financed 2025. That is not unusual for a company at Apollo’s stage, but it does mean the real question is not whether Apollo raised money, but whether the money it raised bought enough time to turn 2026 into a proof year rather than another bridge year.

The Credit Facility Reduced Survival Stress, But It Is Not Cheap

The good news is that year-end 2025, and even more so after the March 2026 extension, does not show immediate covenant pressure. SolarPaint was comfortably within its financial covenants at December 31, 2025: an equity-to-assets ratio of 92% versus a minimum of 24%, and equity of NIS 167.3 million versus a NIS 60 million minimum. The NIS 40 million facility had not been drawn as of the financial statements’ approval date.

But both sides of the story matter. Having the line is not the same as having free liquidity. Up to NIS 10 million would bear interest at prime plus 1.2%, while the rest, if drawn, would cost prime plus 9%. In addition, the company recorded about NIS 297 thousand of non-utilization fees in 2025. So even unused, the line is not free. If Apollo has to draw it heavily, it becomes expensive money.

The Financial Relief Came From Equity, Not From The Business

During 2025 the company raised about NIS 57.5 million through option exercises, a private placement and a public offering. The balance-sheet impact is visible: share premium rose to NIS 509.3 million from NIS 447.6 million in 2024. That is the main reason Apollo entered 2026 in a much less fragile funding position than a year earlier.

But that also highlights what is still unresolved. External capital bought time. It did not yet prove that the business model can fund itself. That is why any improvement in liquidity has to be separated from the question of whether Apollo has already crossed the line from externally funded development company to self-supporting industrial platform.

Leases Are Part Of The Story, Not A Footnote

At year-end 2025 the company had lease liabilities of about NIS 72.5 million, of which NIS 7.2 million were current. That is not a theoretical obligation. Cash used for lease transactions in 2025 was NIS 10.3 million. At the same time, the company recognized about NIS 3.0 million of other expense related to impairment of a right-of-use asset that was subleased.

The non-obvious part is this: the move to consolidate activity at Apollo Carmel and sublease space in Yokneam shows that the focus plan was real. It changed the asset footprint. But it also makes clear that restructuring is still costing money, and that even the efficiency story comes with an execution bill.

Forward View

Four points need to stay front and center before looking at 2026:

• Part of the 2025 improvement came from about NIS 3.8 million recognized from VW for development work and compensation, not from serial production.
• Backlog jumped to NIS 65 million, but the dated revenue-recognition schedule disclosed in the report sums to only NIS 32.7 million.
• Of that disclosed amount, only NIS 17.7 million is scheduled for 2026, which is roughly in line with the whole of 2025 revenue.
• GPM looks like major upside, but at this point it is still a highly optional structure rather than a conservative base-case revenue stream.

Why 2026 Is A Proof Year

The real question is how much of the commercial material that has now accumulated around Apollo will actually convert into revenue and cash over the next two to four quarters. The report does something interesting here: it gives investors much more material for optimism, while also forcing a cautious read.

On the optimistic side, there is far more backlog, the VW project has restarted, Lippert and Volta are active, the Ministry of Defense remains a real channel, and GPM opens a path into the US. On the cautious side, the company does not provide a full time schedule for the entire backlog. It discloses NIS 7.3 million for the first quarter of 2026, NIS 5.3 million for the second quarter, NIS 4.3 million for the third quarter, NIS 0.8 million for the fourth quarter, plus NIS 7.5 million for 2027 and NIS 7.5 million for 2028. The table totals only NIS 32.7 million.

That is a subtle but important point. It does not mean the rest of the backlog is invalid. It means investors still do not have a full dated schedule for the whole NIS 65 million backlog at year-end, or the roughly NIS 70 million backlog referenced near the report date. So 2026 has to prove not just that backlog exists, but that Apollo can move it off the page and into the income statement.

VW Restores The Dream, But Not The Cash Harvest Yet

VW is the single most important anchor in the 2026-plus story. It is also the easiest one to read too aggressively. Looking only at the EUR 14.5 million headline and the planned November 2026 serial start could create the impression that 2026 is already largely spoken for. That would be the wrong read.

2026 still carries a real transition period. Serial production is only planned to start in November, so the practical contribution to the year depends heavily on industrial preparation, engineering milestones and Apollo’s ability to reach repeatable quality on time. In that sense, the roughly NIS 3.8 million recognized in 2025 from VW for prior development work and compensation actually makes the point sharper: it supported 2025 reported growth, but it is not proof that serial economics have already arrived.

GPM Is Upside, Not A Base Case

The GPM agreement could eventually become the backbone of a North American commercial story. It gives Apollo a route into a Turn Key model with development services, feasibility checks and EPC work across a broad site base. If it works, it could change the company’s scale.

But the contract terms matter. GPM is not obligated to place any orders. Notices to proceed are expected in stages and only if GPM chooses to move site by site. GPM also keeps the tax benefits. Apollo only gets the option-linked upside if EPC orders reach at least USD 8 million by the end of 2026. For that reason, the right way to read this agreement in 2026 is as a major monitoring trigger, not as a base case on which to build a conservative forecast.

What Has To Happen For The Read To Improve

Apollo does not provide a clean numerical outlook for 2026, but it does provide a sequence of milestones: IEC 61215 and IEC 61730 certifications, the Panda installation kit, improved fire resistance, and continued automation of manual stations. These are not technical side notes. They are exactly the things that separate an interesting product from an industrial platform.

At the same time, investors should keep four straightforward checkpoints in view:

• whether the post-balance-sheet orders are actually delivered on time and recognized as revenue;
• whether the disclosed 2026 backlog starts converting into the income statement rather than just staying high on paper;
• whether the improved gross margin holds as activity ramps;
• whether cash burn narrows enough to reduce the need for renewed dilution.

That leads to one central conclusion: 2026 is a conversion proof year, not an interest proof year. Apollo already has interest.

Risks

The biggest risk is no longer technological but operational. Apollo has already shown that customers exist, that pilots can be won, and that contracts can be signed. The company now has to show that it can perform at an industrial level with stable quality. The gap between the old 190 MWp framing and the current 50 MWp installed-equipment ceiling is a reminder that timing, output quality and process stability matter here at least as much as commercial wins.

The second risk is backlog quality and timing. A backlog of NIS 65 million to NIS 70 million sounds impressive against NIS 19.7 million of revenue, but the company itself stresses that revenue recognition depends on execution, continued contract validity and customers’ financial condition. With names such as VW and GPM, even without business failure, a spec change, a schedule pushout or slower approval cycle can move a great deal of weight from one period into another.

The third risk is financial. Yes, the end of 2025 looks calmer than the end of 2024: more equity, more cushion, an undrawn credit line and ample covenant room. Even so, the company ended the year with an accumulated deficit of NIS 391.2 million. In addition, Apollo and SolarPaint carry tax-loss carryforwards of about NIS 17 million and NIS 255 million, respectively, and the group did not recognize a deferred tax asset against them because it lacks sufficient visibility on near-term utilization. That is dry accounting language, but it matters. Even within the company’s own accounting frame, near-term profitability still is not visible enough to support that asset.

The fourth risk is competition and market conditions. The company itself says standard-panel prices continue to fall and that this could pressure margins and long-term contract pricing. Management argues the impact is not currently material because Apollo operates in more differentiated use cases. That may prove correct. But until Apollo is delivering at broader commercial scale, it is still hard to know how strong its pricing power really is once large customers move from proof-of-concept into wider procurement.

The fifth risk is external: war, supply-chain frictions, certifications and US regulation. Apollo notes that about 20% of employees were called to reserve duty during the war period, that foreign technicians were delayed, and that US policy changes could affect its operating environment. At the same time, it also sees upside from defense demand and from a US environment that may disadvantage Chinese solar supply more than Israeli supply. This is not a one-way external setup.

Short Interest View

Short-interest data does not signal an extreme negative positioning here, but it does show a rise in caution. As of March 27, 2026, short float stood at 1.02% and SIR at 1.29. In November 2025, short float was around 0.45%. So skepticism has increased, but this is still not a crowded short.

Relative to the sector, Apollo’s SIR is roughly in line with the sector average of 1.317, while short float is a bit above the sector average of 0.84%. The practical reading is simple: the market is not pricing collapse, but it is also not giving full credit to the growth story yet.

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Conclusions

Apollo Power enters 2026 in a meaningfully better position than it exited 2024. It has more backlog, more anchor customers, a revived VW program, fresh orders after year-end, and an extended undrawn credit line. But it still has not shown that it can turn all of that into delivery pace and profitability strong enough to carry its own cost base. That gap is what will shape the near-term market reading.

Current thesis in one line: Apollo has already shown that demand exists for its technology, but 2026 will only matter if that demand converts into revenue and cash at a pace that justifies the company’s cost structure.

What changed versus the old read: the story is now less about whether a major customer might eventually arrive and more about how the company industrializes and delivers after backlog, anchor names and commercialization paths are already on the table.

Counter-thesis: even after the improvement, 2025 included a meaningful non-serial VW revenue component, the cost base remains heavy, and Apollo still has not shown that new commercial activity is enough to support the business without repeated reliance on external capital.

What could change the market read in the short to medium term: actual delivery of post-balance-sheet orders, visible conversion of 2026 backlog into revenue, measurable progress with GPM, and proof that factory throughput can rise without hurting quality or cash.

Why this matters: Apollo is no longer being tested only as a technology company with an idea. It is now being tested as a business.

What has to happen over the next 2 to 4 quarters: the company needs to show that orders turn into revenue, that gross margin holds, that cash burn narrows, and that the backlog jump does not remain mostly a paper story. Repeated delays, renewed funding dependence or margin slippage would weaken the thesis.