ORT and the Pagaya Overhang: How Much of the Cash Is Really Coming Back
Pagaya fell to NIS 13.4 million at the end of 2025 after several years of repayments, but roughly half of the balance still sits beyond one year and the path back to cash is controlled by the fund, not by ORT. This is no longer a fully frozen line, but it is still not a line that should be read as near-cash.
How Much Cash Is Actually On The Way Back
The main article argued that ORT's gap is not between value and zero, but between assets that look solid on paper and value that actually reaches the company as usable cash. This follow-up isolates Pagaya because that is the line that is supposed to move, over time, from financial value into real liquidity.
What improved is clear. At the end of 2025, Pagaya was down to about USD 4.207 million, or about NIS 13.42 million, versus about USD 7.602 million, or NIS 27.725 million, a year earlier. The company had also received cumulative proceeds of about USD 5.871 million by year-end 2025, plus another USD 808 thousand after the balance-sheet date and before the report was published. In other words, cash is in fact coming back.
What did not change matters just as much. The pace is still dictated by the fund's withdrawal mechanics, not by ORT, and at the end of 2025 the balance was still split almost evenly between current and non-current. So Pagaya is no longer the large blockage it used to be, but it has not turned into a near-immediate cash line either.
| Test line | End of 2025 | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Pagaya balance | About USD 4.207 million, about NIS 13.42 million | The exposure is still material |
| Of which in PID vehicles | About USD 1.527 million | This is the part that runs off over the life of the underlying loans |
| Of which in the core fund | About USD 2.680 million | This is the part still subject to the fund's withdrawal rules |
| Current classification | About NIS 6.605 million | This is the amount the company expects within 12 months |
| Non-current classification | About NIS 6.815 million | Roughly half the balance is still beyond one year |
| Post-balance-sheet receipt | About USD 808 thousand | The recovery line is no longer merely theoretical |
The chart captures the core point. The Pagaya problem no longer looks like it did at the end of 2024, when the vast majority of the balance still sat beyond one year. But even at the end of 2025, this is still not a full conversion into immediate liquidity. The accounting classification itself says the distance to cash has narrowed, not disappeared.
The Return Mechanism: This Is Not A Deposit, It Is A Runoff Track
The difficulty with Pagaya is not just the size of the remaining balance. It is the shape of the exit path. In June 2023, the fund notified investors that withdrawals were being stopped and spread over time, arguing that the investment agreements allowed exceptional steps in extreme conditions in order to preserve fund stability. The portion that was no longer under its initial lock-up was transferred at the start of 2023 into a dedicated PID vehicle that runs off over the life of the loans, while the remaining balance was later moved into similar structures through periodic withdrawal windows.
That detail is crucial, because a PID vehicle is not cash waiting a few weeks in a bank account. According to the fund's own forecasts, about 35% of the relevant balance is expected back in the first year, with the full amount returned over roughly five years. So even when cash is coming back, it is doing so on a much longer track than an investor would normally associate with a more open-ended fund.
The tightening continued after that. In December 2023, the fund said that only 40% of each permitted withdrawal would be redeemed in cash, while the rest would be managed in a PID vehicle over the life of the loan pool. In September 2024, a forced withdrawal of 20% of the fund balance as of September 30, 2024, about USD 868 thousand, was executed, and for 2025 the fund opened a withdrawal option equal to about 31% of that same balance in four equal installments, which the company chose to exercise. As a result, no additional quarterly withdrawal requests were allowed during 2025. In November 2025, the fund also opened a 2026 withdrawal option equal to 31% of the remaining investment in two equal installments, with no further calls during the year, and the company elected that option as well.
Above all of this sits a legal-friction layer. The company explicitly says it has claims against the way the fund has been managed, both generally and specifically in relation to the severity of the withdrawal restrictions, and that it continues to examine its rights, including through legal means, together with other investors. That does not cancel the cash-return path, but it does mean the investor-versus-fund friction has not been resolved.
That split matters more than the headline number. The PID layer did go down, and the total balance did almost halve. But at the end of 2025 there was still about USD 2.68 million in the fund itself and another USD 1.527 million in the runoff track. The right question, then, is not only how much remains, but in what form it remains.
Cash Is Coming Back, But It Is Also Getting Eroded On The Way
The encouraging data point is that the cash return now shows up clearly in the filing rather than only in expectation. Cumulative proceeds from Pagaya reached about USD 5.871 million by the end of 2025: about USD 910 thousand in 2023, about USD 2.672 million in 2024, and about USD 2.289 million in 2025. Another roughly USD 808 thousand came in after the balance-sheet date. This is no longer a value line resting only on hope.
But this is also exactly where the overhang remains painful. In 2025, Pagaya also generated finance expense of about NIS 5.1 million, including about NIS 2.8 million of FX losses and about NIS 2.3 million of valuation loss. So the same line that is feeding cash back into the balance sheet is still creating accounting and currency noise in the P&L. This is not a pure liquidity layer. It is a financial asset in transition, and that transition comes with a cost.
The accounting anchor is relatively orderly. The investment is carried on a NAV basis, meaning on the redemption value of the fund units and the PID vehicles, based on balance confirmations received from the fund administrator. That matters, because the carrying value is not arbitrary. But that is also the key distinction here: redemption value and immediate redeemability are not the same thing.
This chart organizes the real debate. Most of the original investment has already come back or has already run off, so Pagaya is no longer a story of purely theoretical value. But the remaining balance is still material, and the path from that balance to cash still runs through a mechanism that ORT does not fully control.
There is also a broader FX layer on top. The company's sensitivity table shows that a 10% move down in the dollar would have reduced profit before tax by about NIS 5.851 million and equity by roughly the same order of magnitude. So even as the Pagaya position shrinks, it still sits inside a broader dollar exposure that can blur the operating read on the company.
What This Means For ORT's Liquidity Quality
Pagaya is not ORT's only liquidity layer. At the end of 2025, the company had about NIS 4.288 million of cash and cash equivalents and another about NIS 40.862 million of deposits. The cash-flow statement shows that during the year the company placed about NIS 31.027 million into deposits, while also receiving about NIS 9.076 million from returns of investments in fintech funds and a debt instrument. In other words, part of the money that has already come back from the alternative-investment bucket has already been parked again in more liquid assets.
That matters because it sets the debate correctly. Pagaya no longer decides on its own whether ORT has or does not have breathing room. But it still determines three things: how much of the financial value is truly accessible within one year, how much FX and accounting noise remains attached to the balance sheet, and how much discount investors should apply to an asset that is measured on a redemption-value basis but redeemed on a controlled timetable.
So the right read at the end of 2025 is not extreme in either direction. Pagaya is no longer a frozen pit, but it is still not near-cash. It is an asset in active runoff, with a real realization path, with proceeds that are already visible, and with a still-material remainder that remains tied to time, currency, and the balance of power between investor and fund. At ORT, that is exactly the gap between redemption value and accessible value.
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