Adgar Canada: How much of the value really sits in Liberty Village, 120 Bloor, and 350 Burnhamthorpe

What This Follow-up Is Testing

The main article argued that Adgar's balance sheet is calmer, but the value unlock still runs through Canada. This follow-up isolates just one layer: the Toronto rights story. The question here is not whether Canada matters. It is which part of the value already has a disclosed number behind it, which part still rests on planning, and which part can realistically become accessible to shareholders.

The short answer is fairly sharp. At year-end 2025 Adgar presented about NIS 367.3 million of land and development rights in Canada, but the investor presentation gave Liberty Village alone an explicit rights valuation of about NIS 325 million. That means roughly 88.5% of the Canadian rights layer that already carries a price tag effectively sits in Liberty. If an investor is looking for the number that can actually go into a model today, that number sits there first.

120 Bloor and 350 Burnhamthorpe do matter, but not with the same degree of underwriting confidence. At 120 Bloor the company is promoting a plan for 63.7 thousand to 106.6 thousand square meters on its share, but without a separate disclosed valuation. At 350 Burnhamthorpe the materials describe around 53 thousand square meters of residential rights on Adgar's share and ongoing talks with developers, but again without a standalone valuation. So anyone rolling the three sites into one generic statement about "Toronto upside" is mixing very different certainty levels.

The residual Canadian bar in the chart below is simply the gap between total Canadian land-and-rights value and the separately disclosed Liberty figure.

Liberty Village: This Is Where the Number Sits

Liberty Village is not just the most interesting asset in the rights story. It is almost the entire part of the rights story that can already be underwritten with a disclosed valuation. The company describes land of about 32.8 dunams, with Adgar's share at about 20.6 dunams, including existing structures used mainly as offices and parking, with total leasable area of about 31.5 thousand square meters, of which Adgar's share is about 21.3 thousand square meters, plus around 6 vacant dunams, roughly 3 dunams on Adgar's share.

What changed in 2025 was not the existence of the land itself, but the aggressiveness of the appraisal framework. Based on the 31 December 2025 valuations, the buildable ratio in the area was updated from 5.67x to 6.7x. On that basis the site can support around 196 thousand square meters, with Adgar's share at about 121 thousand square meters, including around 117 thousand square meters of residential, or about 74 thousand square meters on Adgar's share. At the same time, the framework approved in late 2023 and later upheld by the Ontario appeal body allows up to 55% of the rights mix to shift into residential. That matters because it moves the value case toward the use class that is usually economically better than office.

The presentation already translates that into money: about NIS 207 million for residential rights and about NIS 118 million for office rights, or roughly NIS 325 million in total. Even that split matters. More than 63% of the explicit Liberty valuation sits in the residential component, not the office component. That is not a footnote. It means the appraiser, and the company after him, are already telling investors that the upside relies first on mixed-use conversion rather than a full return to legacy office economics.

But this is exactly where the distinction has to stay disciplined. NIS 325 million is an appraisal value for rights, not cash on the way up the chain. The company itself says that using those rights remains subject to a detailed updated zoning plan, further customary conditions, and completion of the planning process during 2026, subject to objections. The presentation also says that permit applications have not yet been filed, and that management is still trying to enlarge the rights base beyond what is already in the model. So the number is large, but its finality is still incomplete.

Another important nuance is that the area has already shown it can generate value that turns into cash, but through a different path. The Atlantic 2 and Fraser 7 expropriation events produced compensation above book value, and in January 2026 the Fraser 7 settlement added another compensation and interest payment. That strengthens the view that Liberty sits on land with real value. But it still does not prove that the remaining rights can be monetized on the same timetable or with the same certainty. An expropriation that ends in a cash payment is not the same process as planning, permits, and deal timing.

120 Bloor and 350 Burnhamthorpe: Real Options, Partial Underwriting

This is where the picture becomes less symmetrical. Both assets matter, but they still sit more in the "planning option" bucket than in the "value already disclosed" bucket. That difference matters a lot when trying to separate appraisal value from value the market can genuinely start underwriting.

At 120 Bloor the company is pursuing additional development rights for residential and or office uses, either adjacent to or as part of an expansion of the existing building. To get there it bought an adjacent lot in June 2023, engaged planning and development advisers, and is working toward a formal residential planning application. The potential rights envelope on Adgar's share is between 63.7 thousand and 106.6 thousand square meters. That is a very large number. The problem is that the current disclosure still does not give it a standalone valuation. So 120 Bloor is large in planning language, but not yet large in disclosed balance-sheet language.

That gap becomes more obvious when looking at the existing asset. In 2025, 120 Bloor generated rental income of NIS 6.235 million versus NIS 7.693 million in 2024, average occupancy fell to 62% from 75%, and carrying value fell to NIS 101.2 million from NIS 109.6 million. At the same time, the company reports advanced negotiations to lease roughly 9,000 square meters on Adgar's share, equal to about 2.8% of Canadian leasable area. So 120 Bloor is both an upside option and an operating repair story that still has to be proven.

350 Burnhamthorpe sits slightly differently. Here the company describes land of about 8 dunams together with a local partner, adjacent to an office building in Mississauga. Based on the valuation, the site can support about 106 thousand square meters of residential together with the partner, or around 53 thousand square meters on Adgar's share. Beyond that, the company explicitly says it is examining planning alternatives and holding talks with several developers around a deal under which it would receive a partnership interest in a rental-apartment project in exchange for the land. This is not a vague ambition. It is already a stated monetization path.

And still, the explicit number is missing here too. The materials do not provide a standalone rights valuation for Burnhamthorpe. What they do show is that the existing asset already includes adjacent land valued at about NIS 30.5 million, inside a total carrying value of NIS 72.0 million at the end of 2025. So part of the value is already sitting in land, but the market still has not been given a clean breakdown of what is office, what is land, and what the future rights layer might be worth if and when a transaction advances.

Operations do not shorten that path either. In 2025 rental income at 350 Burnhamthorpe fell to NIS 3.273 million from NIS 3.904 million, average occupancy fell to 68% from 76%, and carrying value fell to NIS 72.0 million from NIS 80.5 million. So here too the upside sits above an office asset that is still coming from the weaker side of the Toronto office market, not above a strong NOI engine already paying investors to wait.

The conclusion from this section is straightforward: 120 Bloor and 350 Burnhamthorpe are real upside, but not upside written in the same language as Liberty. Liberty already has a price tag. Bloor has a rights range. Burnhamthorpe has a rights envelope and a possible deal path. Those are three different underwriting levels.

Appraisal Value Is Not Yet Shareholder Value

This is the point that ties the continuation back to the main thesis. Even if one accepts the Canadian appraisal numbers as they stand, they still are not the same thing as accessible shareholder value. In the balance-sheet economic split, Canada carries about NIS 1.423 billion of real estate, about NIS 589 million of secured debt, and roughly NIS 834 million of net value. The Canadian land-and-rights layer, at about NIS 367.3 million, equals roughly 44% of that net value bucket. That is a very large share. But it still sits inside the Canadian subsidiary, on top of leveraged assets, and partly on top of planning work that is not finished yet.

The presentation adds that the Toronto portfolio is worth about CAD 611 million, with around CAD 253 million of secured debt and a 41% LTV. In the annual report the company argues that this leverage profile should still allow financial flexibility and refinancing capacity. But for equity holders the reading is different: the rights are first a value layer inside a leveraged platform, not a cash pool waiting to be distributed.

That is also why the market does not have to believe every shekel written into an appraisal will automatically close the discount. The route from rights value to accessible value passes through several checkpoints: planning completion, permits, choice of monetization path, market timing, and of course the question of how much value remains after the financing structure and how much can actually move up to shareholders in a reasonable time frame. This is exactly the gap between "there is value" and "there is value investors can actually catch."

At the same time, it would be a mistake to swing too far the other way. If one counts only what has already turned into cash, one misses the fact that a very large part of Adgar's Canadian upside already has clear appraisal language behind it, especially at Liberty. So the right reading is not to dismiss the rights, but to rank them. Liberty is quantified value with planning risk. 120 Bloor is potential value without a price tag. Burnhamthorpe is a hybrid of real land value, residential rights, and a monetization path that is still not closed.

Bottom Line

If the question is how much of Adgar's Canadian value really sits in these three sites, the answer is yes, a very large part of the theoretical upside clearly runs through them. But if the question is how much of that value can already be underwritten today, the answer is much narrower: most of it sits in Liberty Village, not in 120 Bloor and not in 350 Burnhamthorpe.

Liberty is the quantified core because it already has rights volume, use split, and an explicit NIS 325 million valuation. 120 Bloor is an important option, possibly a large one, but still without a separate price tag. 350 Burnhamthorpe is an asset with actual land, a disclosed rights envelope, and even a stated transaction concept through a partnership structure, but still without a standalone value investors can fully underwrite.

That is why this follow-up sharpens what the market is probably already sensing intuitively: there is value in Canada, but not all of that value is born at the same certainty level, and not all of it is accessible at the same speed. Anyone attributing the entire discount simply to a market refusal to believe appraisals is probably missing the monetization complexity. Anyone dismissing the rights altogether is missing the fact that almost one-fifth of the company's EPRA NAV already sits in the Canadian land-and-rights layer.

Over the next 2 to 4 quarters the checkpoints are clear: whether Liberty's planning process actually advances through 2026, whether 120 Bloor can close the 9,000 square meter lease and restore some confidence in its operating base, and whether Burnhamthorpe moves from the world of "talks" into a transaction with a visible economic structure. If those three things move, the Canadian upside becomes more tangible. If not, even very attractive appraisal numbers will remain more of a discussion point than value that truly reaches shareholders.